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Locke's commentators have almost unanimously concluded his
moral philosophy to he vitiated by contradictions. In this thesis
an attempt is made to discover a consistent moral theory in Locke's
writings. One theme unifies his widely scattered remarks on
morality: the problem of moral knowledge. For Locke this prob¬
lem is s\immed up in the question of how men are to know the moral,
law of nature. His conception of a moral law set over mankind by
God is first defended against the objection that it reduces moral
distinctions to arbitrary commands. The moral law must be the
commands of God if there is to be such a thing as moral obligation0
However, the content of moral obligation derives not from arbitrary
commands, but from the facts of human nature. The question is,
how is reason to derive the content of the law from a consideration
of human nature? In order to answer this, it is necessary to
examine Locke's general epistemological position. Locke is defended
against the criticism that he confines all cases of knowing within
the framework of ideas. Locke's conception of idea is examined
and criticised; and it is then argued that his account of the
special class of ideas (i.e. moral notions) which are used in ord¬
inary moral discourse yields a cognative theory of moral judgements.
The account of moral notions also suggests Locke's project for
a quasi-mathematical science of morality. This project cannot
be carried through. However, even if the demonstration of morality
were possible, it would be of no worth unless we were sure that our
moral notions truly reflected the objective law of nature. Ho;?,
then, is this to be known? Locke argues against the common view
that we can be intuitively aware of moral truth. Rather, the
validity of moral notions is to be decided in the light of man's
desire for happiness. Finally, the theory of moral judgements
developed from Locke's account of moral notions is examined against
the background of certain standard objections against any cognative
theory of morality.
At least I think this is due to everyone
that his words should be understood in the
most favourable and most consistent
meaning (which) could be put upon themo
John Locke: Answer to Mr.Morris's
Reflections.. ^5. c 28, Pol. 108/
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John Locke has suffered much at the hands of his interpreters.
Even so sympathetic a critic as Peter Laslett views him as, "perhaps
the least consistent of all the great philosophers".^ The charge
of inconsistency and self-contradiction is by no means new. It
has been common in Lockean criticism and scholarship from the
seventeenth-century onwards. Indeed the kind of judgement voiced
by Laslett may be said to have hardened into an orthodoxy. This
is particularly the case among scholars who have concerned them¬
selves with Locke's moral philosophy. Locke does say a great deal
about morality. However, it has been almost universally agreed
that what he says is vitiated, by contradictions; so that, in the
words of Professor Aaron, "it is in vain that we search in his pages
2
for a consistent ethical theory".
Yet the alleged inconsistencies quoted from Locke's pages come
so fast one upon the heel of another, that it is difficult to see how
a writer of average intelligence, much less 'a great philosopher',
could have ignored them. If Locke really does contradict himself
with such abandon as is commonly pretended, how is it that he never
rectified the intellectual chaos he left behind him? After all he
was not an author who hurried himself into print. All his published
writings belong to the period of his maturity, and are the products
of long reflection. Furthermore, he revised his most complex work,
the Essay concerning Human Understanding, quite extensively after
1 Introduction to Two Treatises of Government, p. 95*
2 John Locke (3rd. ed.), pp. 266 - 267.
its original publication; and some of these revisions are clearly-
intended as answers to his critics. Locke, then, was quite pre¬
pared to correct and clarify his own thought when he saw that the
occasion warranted ito His inconsistencies, therefore, cannot be
put down to a dogged refusal to correct his published works. The
simple solution to this problem is that the orthodox view of Locke
is, to say the least, highly exaggerated.
Certainly, in the expression of his thought, Locke is
repetitious and mercilessly verbose, especially when engaged in
controversy. This trait can, I believe, be partly ascribed to
the persona he deliberately adopts. In opposition to what he
considers the unnatural formalism of argument in the scholastic
mould, Locke likes to present himself as expressing the thoughts
of the comman man, in the way of the common man. Indeed, as
Professor Ryle once remarked, Locke may lay claim to the invention
of common sense philosophy. However, we cannot forgive all on
the grounds of Locke's persona. It must be admitted that he is
at times a very careless philosopher. But carelessness is not to
be identified with inconsistency. This thesis is an attempt to
present a consistent John Locke.
To be exact, what I have attempted is to discover a consistent
moral philosophy in Locke's writings. And have, a further difficulty
makes itself felt. With the exception of his youthful Essays on
the Law of Nature, Locke wrote no treatise specifically concerned
with morality. Nevertheless, there is one problem in moral
philosophy which appears in Locke's earliest works, and which, in my
opinion, remains in hi3 mind throughout the rest of his life.
vii
This is the problem of the epistemology of morals. It is the
question of how men are to know moral truth that gives unity to
Locke's thoughts on morality.
The errors of fact and deficiences of judgement which no
doubt remain in this thesis are entirely my own responsibility. On
the credit side, however, I would like to mention my supervisor,
Dr John Jenkins, whose criticism has been unfailingly constructive
and whose encouragement has been indispensible; Mr Christopher Kirwan
of Exter College, Oxford, who allowed me to read his unpublished
paper on Locke's moral philosophy and patiently replied to my object¬
ions; and Mrs Hilary Fieller, who carried the burden of typing with
remarkable equanimity. Finally, I would like to acknowledge a
considerable debt to my former teacher Professor S. A. Grave of the
University of Western Australia, who, although he has had no hand in
the present thesi3, first aroused my interest in the history of
philosophy.
A Note on Quotations
Locke's major works are available in a number of editions* In
the present Thesis quotations have been taken from the following
editions:
The Conduct of the Understanding, ed. Thomas Fowler.
(3rd. ed.) Oxford,~1890.
The Educational Writings of John Locke, ed. James L.
Axtell. Cambridge, 1968.
Epistola de Tolerantia, ed. Raymond Klibansky, trans.
J. Wo Gough. Oxford, 19680
An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. John W.
Yolton, 2 Vols. London, 1961 (revised 1967).
Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett.
Cambridge, 1960- (revised, 1963).
The Works of John Locke, in Ten Volumes (11th. ed.)
London, 1912o
Place references for passages cited are to be found in square
brackets at the end of each quotation. The Essay is indicated
by Book, Chapter and Section numbers only. The first two drafts
of the Essay, edited by Aaron and. Gibb and by Rand respectively,
are indicated as /braft a7 and/braft b7» Locke's Journal
entries included in the published edition of Draft A are indic¬
ated as /Aaron and GibbT*. Unpublished KSS in the Lovelace
Collection are indicated by the Bodleian Library Shelfmarks.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION: LOCKE VBRSIJS BAGSHAW
Locke's first extended essay in moral philosophy date3 from
the early 1660's and remained unpublished till the present century.
It consists of two papers; the first written in English, the
second in Latin. The English work is a polemic, consisting in
a rather wearisome refutation of a pamphlet by Edward Bagshaw.^
In the Latin work, obviously with Bagshaw still in mind, Locke
pursues his argument at a more theoretical level. These papers
have now been edited by Dr Philip Abrams under the title of
Two Tracts on Government.
In themselves the Two Tracts are of slight philosophical
worth. Locke's arguments show little originality. It .is also
true to say that they carry no conviction for the modern reader.
Moreover, they very soon ceased to convince Locke; for the
conclusions he draws concerning political power in this first
work are in sharp contrast to his later, published views.
Nevertheless, the Two Tracts are important for an understanding
of Locke. They are not simply a false start to his career, but
contain the framework within which much of his subsequent thought
develops. This is the doctrine that there exists a law of nature
which embodies the moral duties of mankind. Although he expands
and modifies this framework, and arrives at conclusions startlingly
different from those in the Two Tracts. Locke never rejects it.
^ The Great Question concerning Things Indifferent in Religious
Worship" (1 660)
2-
Further, the Two Tracts, because of the unsatisfactory/ nature of
their arguments, highlight a problem which occupies Locke, more
or less, throughout his philosophical careero This is the problem
of how men are to know the duties they have under the lav/ of
nature.
The Two Tracts are Locke's contribution to what was, at the
beginning of the Restoration and during the previous century, the
'Great Question' ; whether the civil ruler could legitimately
impose a set form of dress and ceremony in religious worship.
The complexities of this antique debate have been admirably dealt
2
with by Abrams and need not detail us. It is what lies-behind
the particular controversy which is important. The question of
religious worship was only one aspect of a conflict between two
views of morality and government. It is by no means easy to
characterize the two sides in this conflict, but, very broadly,
it may be seen as a clash between those who maintained the
autonomy of private conscience and the sufficiency of the
morality revealed in the New Testament, and those who emphasised
the existence of an objective realm of moral truth knowable
without revelation. The former view was the inevitable consequence
of the individualism which characterized so much of the Reformation;
(An individualism which was not always favoured by the Reformers).
The latter view was in the tradition of Christian humanism; a
humanism which found its most complete medieval expression in
2 See Abram's Introduction to the Two Tracts, esp. Ch. II.
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the Thomist synthesis of faith and reason, and which was carried
over into Anglicanism pre-eminently by Richard Hooker* The
humanist view did not deny the paramount importance of conscience
as a moral guide for the individual* But conscience x*as defined
in terms of reason, and rationality was taken as a defining
characteristic of man. Therefore, moral truth being accessible
to reason, could be known by all men whether or not they had
heard the Gospel. Nor, was it thought that the morality knowable
apart from revelation had any sort of priority over revealed
morality. Reason and revelation were looked on as two ways to
knowledge of the one moral law set by God to the conduct of
mankind.
'Protestant' individualism did not always mean a complete
break with this tradition. Nevertheless, the emphasis placed
on the perfect morality of scripture tended to restrict moral
knowledge to those fortunate enough to be Christians. More
importantly the thesis that moral knowledge is founded on
revelation made it very difficult to argue against the contention
that private revelation, or inspiration, is the most fundamental
source of moral knowledge. For the line dividing the general
revelations given in the Bible from particular revelation,
which might be claimed by any individual, is exceedingly thin.
Locke's Two Tracts may be seen as primarily a defence of the
traditional rationalist view of morality.
Bagshaw's pamphlet is a plea for toleration in the matter
of religious ceremonies. His arguments ai'e, in the main, based on
4
scriptual texts. While Locke does attempt to meet Bagshaw' s
scriptual arguments his reply is conducted at a philosophical
level which sets the local controversy in the widest possible
context. At the outset Locke expounds a legalistic theory of
morality and moral obligation. If there were no law there could
be no moral significance in men* s actions and they would be free
to act in whichever way they pleased. Thus, he conceives the moral
rightness or wrongness of actions to be a function of their
conformity or non-conformity to a law. God is the source of the
moral law, and the law is both accessible to human reason and
revealed in the Scriptures. However, not every action falls
under the moral law. There exists a broad class of 'indifferent
things' which, as they are neither commanded nor forbidden by
God, are morally neutral. Within this sphere men are naturally
free to do as they please. /lst. Tract, pp. 124 - 12§7 Moral
truth, then, consists in the correct classification of human
actions according as they are in fact forbidden or enjoined by
God's law, or left indifferent.
The problem which engages Locke and Bagshaw arises because,
although there is a definite class of indifferent things, men
are sometimes mistaken as to what falls within that class. In
religious matters, for instance, some believe themselves morally
bound to practice one form of ceremonial worship, some to practice
another. Locke and Bagshaw agree as to the moral neutrality of
the minutia in religious ceremony. Both agree that men in
civil society cannot retain the freedom they enjoy when bound
solely by the moral law. However, Bagshaw, while granting the
civil ruler, or magistrate, th8 power to legislate concerning
indifferent things, holds that there is a special sub-clas3 cf
religious indifferent things with respect to which the citizen's
natural freedom is inalienable® It is, he claims, contrary
to the liberty Christians enjoy under the Gospel that the conscience
of the individual should be imposed upon in matters of religion
3
by the civil authorities.
Locke's move is to deny that things indifferent in religion
can be distinguished from civil indifferent things. /ist. Tract,
p. 126, p. 139; 2nd. Tract, p. 229/. This distorts Bagshaw' 3
position and allows Locke to argue against him as if he denied
civil authority any sphere of legislative competence. Although
it is unfair to his opponent, the move fits Locke's broad
conception of the point at issue. While Bagshaw restricts
himself to the question of religious ceremonies, from Locke's
side what is under discussion is the general question of whether
the magistrate can have legitimate authority over the conscience
of the individual® Locke maintains the thesis of absolute
authority.
3 What Bagshaw argues- for is the liberty which has been revealed
and granted to Christians. It is not at all clear that he
would want to argue such liberty for all men: "Our religion
is styled the perfect law of liberty, which liberty I under¬
stand not wherein it consists if in things necessary we are
already determined by God, and in things indifferent we may
still be tied up by human ordinances and outside rites at the
pleasure of our Magistrates". /The Great Question, p. 4J
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There are, according to Locke, two reasons why the authority
of the magistrate must embrace things which are in themselves
morally neutralo Firstly, if this were not the case there could
be no such thing as civil authority. The magistrate could only
reiterate the moral law, and this any private citizen may do.
/2nd. Tract, p. 22§7 Second, although the moral law set by God i3
complete, its precepts are not meant to cover all the contingencies
which arise in the life of a civil society. Therefore, "God
left many indifferent things untrammelled by his laws and handed
them to his deputy the magistrate as fit material for civil
government, which, as occasion should demand, could be commanded
or prohibited, and by the wise regulation of which the welfare
of the commonwealth could be provided for". /2nd. Tract, p. 22^7
Having established this, Locke deploys two different arguments
for the absolute authority of the magistrate over all things
indifferent. The first is a pragmatic appeal to consequences.
The pragmatic argument (which is most prominent in the first
Tract) emphasises the dangers of civil anarchy. Men, Locke
argues, are so in love with their own opinions that they will go
to any lengths to maintain them. Themajority are not concerned
with objective truth, but with the defence of views which are
more often than not the product of ignorance and passion. The
peace and order of society is in constant danger from those
who are themselves within society. Thus, the rational, responsible
citizens live under conditions of siege, encircled by the mass of
the people who are every ready for violence in the name of their own
arbitrary prejudices. The absolute authority of the government
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and the absolute competence of civil law is the only possible
barrier against thi3 force. Absolutism is a small price to pay
for the security of the commonwealth:
Nor will the largeness of the Governor's power appear
dangerous or more than necessary if we consider that
as occasion requires it is employed upon the multitude
that are as impatient of restraint as the sea, and
whose tempests and overflows cannot be too well
provided against. /Tst. Tract, p. 15§7
Toleration, as it limits civil law in deference to the conscience,
or private opinion, of individual citizens, must weaken and finally
dissolve the hold which it is necessary for government to maintain
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over the mob. True, the tender conscience of the individual
should, whenever possible, be gently handled. However, the laws
of the state applying equally to all men, it is impossible but
that some should be offended; "some being as conscientiously
earnest for conformity as others for liberty, and a law for
toleration would as much offend their consciences as of limitation
others". /lst. Tract, p. 14.67
The picture Locke presents, on the persuasiveness of which
this argument depends, is that of the wise, knowing ruler faced
with the violent, ignorance mob. But at this level the debate
between him and Bagshaw ends in a stalemate. While he depicts
the dangers of civil anarchy, his opponent, with equal force,
4 For an account of Locke's view of human nature and its
relation to his political conservatism, see Abrams;
Op.Cit. pp. 63 f.
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depicts the dangers of civil tyranny. Thus, the debate over
toleration, while limited to an appeal to consequences degenerates
into a sterile and irresolvable clash of attitudes. Locke,
however, claims that his case does not rest on an appeal to
consequences:
Principles ought to be of unalterable verity and
therefore are not to be established upon our uncertain
and commonly partial judgement of their consequences,
which are usually so many, so various and cross,
that nothing then could stand firm, if every little
inconvenience could shake it. The question being
of lawful or unlawful we are to be judged by some
law . . o /lst. Tract, p. 155/
In the first Tract this passage is followed by a series ox rhetorical
questions which do in fact appeal to consequences. It is only in
the second Tract that Locke attempts to give substance to his
second argument from the 1 order of things'.
In the second Tract Locke expounds a four-fold division of
law: divine law, human law, the law of charity, and private law.
These are ordered in a strict hierarchy, each law having as its
proper province the area left free (those things left indifferent)
by the law immediately above it. Divine law is the rule of
morals. Whatsoever it enjoins or prohibits is morally right
or wrong, whatsoever it passes in silence is, in itself, morally
5 Cf. Bagshaw: "I shall clearly prove that many more Absurd and
more Destructive and Total Consequences attend the Doctrine of
Imposition, then /sic/ the Doctrine of Christian liberty. As
1. The first Inconvenience is. the Impossibility to fix a
point where the Imposer will stop. For do but once grant,
that the Magistrate hath power to impose, and then we lie at
his mercy, how farre he will go". /The Great Question, p. ip7
Bagshaw however places less weight than Locke on this point,
but bases his argument on the Special liberty Christians
enjoy under the Gospel.
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neutral. Divine law, as it is made known by revelation, i3
positive law; as it is discovered by reason, it is the law of
nature. The difference between revealed morality and the law
of nature is, therefore, a difference in the manner each is
promulgated to men, not a difference in content.
Human law is always positive. Although he is concerned
primarily with the laws of civil society, Locke includes under
this concept the commands of parents to children and masters to
servants. The obligation men are under with respect to civil
law depend directly on the divine law; "nor are we bound to
obey magistrates for any other reason than that the Lord has
commanded it." /2nd. Tract, p. 226/ The divine law and the
civil law constitute the objective rules of men's conduct,
both as they are moral beings and citizens. The law of charity
derives from the Pauline injunction not to scandalize a 'weak
brother'« That i3, those things which are in fact indifferent
are to be refrained from if their use offend the erroneous
conscience of another. Lastly, Locke distinguishes two aspects
of what he terms private law: the law of contract and the
law of conscience. The former is the law a man places himself
under when, by a promise or voxv, he binds himself to the
performance of an action which would be otherwise indifferent.
(Although the 'law of contract' plays a role of major importance
in Locke's later political thought, in the Two Tracts he avoids
discussing it in any detail.) The latter he defines as, "that
to
fundamental judgement of the practical intellect concerning any-
possible truth of a moral preposition about things to be done in
iife". /2nd. Tract, p. 225/
In the first Tract Locke notes the subjectivity of conscience.
It is, "nothing but an opinion of the truth of any practical
position, which may concern any action as well moral as religious,
civil as ecclesiastical" /Tat. Tract, p. 138/ In the second
Tract he lays emphasis on the function of conscience as the
ultimate moral authority over the actions of the individual:
God implanted the light of nature in our hearts and
willed that there should be an inner legislator
(in effect) constantly present in us whose edicts
it should not be lawful for us to transgress even a
nail's breadth . . . /so that/ it may be taken as
certain that we do_indeed lack that liberty we
think we lacko /2nd. Tract, p. 225/
These two characterizations of conscience are quite compatible
with one another and consistent with Locke's general definition.
Understood as an opinion of the rightness or wrongness of an action,
conscience can either be true or false. That is, the action
conscience declares wrong i3 in fact either wrong or not wrong.
Yet, if understood a3 a moral guide, it cannot be gainsaid that a man
is, at least in some sense, morally culpable if he acts against his
own sincere moral convictions, or what his conscience dictates.
Hence, the paradox that a man may be bound because of his
erroneous conscience to do that which is objectively wrong;
that which he is in fact under a moral obligation not to do.
So long as conscience is understood as having these two aspects
it must be considered the final arbiter of moral action, yet it
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cannot be taken as the final criterion of moral truth.
Locke's argument for the subordination of conscience to the
civil law turns on the characterization of conscience as opinion:
o . . the subordination of these laws one to another
is such that an inferior law cannot in any way remove
or repudiate the obligation and authority of a superior.
For this would be to overturn the order of things . .. .
To appeal from the divine tribunal to man is not lawful,
nor can a subject's vow or a private error of conscience
nullify the edicts of the magistrate, for, if this is
once granted, discipline will be everywhere at an end,
all law will collapse, all authority will vanish from
the earth, and, the seemly order of affairs being convulsed
and the frame of government dissolved, each would be
his own lawmaker and his own God. /2nd. Tract, pp. 226
- 2277
In his evocation of the 'seemly order of affairs' , Locke is taking
over a notion, deeply rooted in scholasticism, which was axiomatic
in the intellectual inquiry of his generation. Very briefly the
doctrine may be summed up as follows: Thero is a cosmic order,
expressed as a system of laws, which embraces all of creation.
It is the task of the intellect to discover and expound the
6
eternal and immutable principles of this order. The universal
order is not 'seemly' in any mere aesthetic sense. It is both
the highest value and the pre-condition of all value. As it
proceeds from God the order of the universe must be good. More
than this, its value is evident in that the only alternative to
order is chaos, which precludes the possibility of value. 'Chaos'
here does not mean simply a large scale confusion of things, but
6 The classic Anglican exposition of the order of things
expressed in terms of law is contained in the first book of
Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Policy.
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the primordial disorder to which the universe would return if God
7
were to relax the laws i;hich He has seto
The moral lav; to which man is subject is part of the overall
order and is conceived as analogous to the laws governing the
operations of inanimate creation. However, there is an important
difference between law as it applies to men and law in the purely
physical world. Material bodies operate as they do of necessity.
This does not mean simply that their activity is determined by a
nexus of causes. The necessity involved is logical, such that
a thing could not be that which it is unless it followed the laws
8
of its nature. Men, on the other hand, conform their own
actions to the moral lav;. That is to say, men are voluntary
agents. As their conformity to the law is voluntary, it is
possible for men to disobey the law of their nature without
ceasing thereby to be men. Whereas the dissolution of the physical
world could come about only as a result of the relaxation of
Providence, men can themselves reject the order set over them.
Hence, the moral order, though a3 an expression of the eternal
law of God it is immutable, is fragile insofar as it is in the
7 Cfo E M W Tillyard's The Elizabethan World Picture, p. 13
See also, Abrams, p. 52.
8 Cf. Hooker: "Whereas therefore things natural which are not
in the number of voluntary agents ... do so necessarily
observe their certain laws, that as long as they keep their
forms which give them their being, they cannot possibly be apt
or inclinable to do otherwise than they do". /Op.Cit. Bk. I,
iii, 47
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keeping of mankind. It is moral chaos which Locke envisages if
the lax/ of conscience were elevated above the civil law.
Behind Locke's argument from the 'axiom of order' stands
9
what has been called the 'axiom of knowledge'. Men follow the
moral lax/ in a volxxntary manner, and they can so follox/ the law only
because they have the capacity to know its precepts. If the law
x/ere unknowable it could not be a lav; set to human action. As
St Thomas Aquinas puts the matter: "to have binding force, which
is an essential property of a law, it has to be applied to the
people it is meant to direct. This application comes about when
their attention is drawn to it by the fact of promulgation. Hence
this is required for a measure to possess the force of law".'^ If
the moral law exists it logically must be known to men. This
must be so despite the erroneous opinions men sometimes form as
to its content. These errors can only be the result of ill
custom or some other factor which perverts man's natural understanding.
9 See Herschel Baker: The V,Tars of Truth, pp. 4-6.
10 Summa Theologiae, 1a, 2ae, 90, 4o
11 Cf. Hooker: "If then it be here demanded, by what means it
should come to pass (the greatest part of the Lax/ moral being
so easy for all men to know) that so many thousands of men
notwithstanding have been ignorant even of principal moral
duties, not imagining the breach of them to be sin: I deny
not but lewd and wicked custom, beginning perhaps at the first
amongst few, afterwards spreading into greater multitudes, and
so continuing from time to time, may be of force even in plain
things to smother the light of natural understanding; because
men will not bend their wits to examine whether things x/herein
they have been accustomed be good or evil. /Op. Cit. Bk I,
viii, 1\J.
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Initially, the debate over indifferent things did not call
the axiom of knowledge into question (the use of the term "indifferent
things" presupposes that some things are known to be indifferent).
The question to which it did immediately give rise was that of
where moral knowledge is to be located. Men do sincerely differ
as to what things are morally right and morally wrong. The
opinions of some men are, therefore, false. But who has the
moral truth?
In the Two Tracts Locke grants a priviledged position of
knowledge to the magistrate. He knows what things the moral law
binds, and thereby knows what things are left indifferent and
within his sphere of authority. It is only in contrast to the
magistrate's knowledge that Locke can talk of the citizen's moral
opinion as a 'private error of conscience'. But this, is to side¬
step the crux of the problem. The dictates of private conscience
(private moral opinion) appear to the individual as moral truths.
When the individual's conscience conflicts with the civil law, he
cannot but conclude the magistrate to be in error. In these
circumstances, it is empty rhetoric to evoke a notion of universal
moral order, according to which the magistrate has legislative
power under the moral law. The obvious reply is that the
magistrate, being himself a man, is just as likely to mistake the
moral law as is the private citizen. Conscience, as it is an
opinion of what the moral law dictates,must take precedence over




Granted that the moral law is, by definition, knowable, the
problem raised by the fact that men sincerely differ in their moral
opinions should present no great difficulty. It should be no
hard thing to show the truth to those afflicted with an erroneous
conscience. The task is simply one of setting up a criterion,
or set of criteria, in accordance with which the individual can
decide whether his conscience directs him aright. The obvious
way of achieving this would be to exhibit the law in a plain and
easy fashion. This would constitute a kind of 'whole duty of
man' which could be read by all. Such solutions were quite
13
common in the seventeenth century. However, at this point
the problem becomes much more serious. The exhibition of the law
must be performed by men. What they take to be the content of
the law is what their private consciences dictate. Therefore, a
further criterion of moral truth is needed. But what criterion
can there be outside of conscience?
12 The only consolation Locke is prepared to grant the individual
derives from the scholastic distinction between obligatio
materialis and obligatio formal!s. Only the divine law places
men under an obligation both to judge the action morally good
or evil in itself (material obligation) and to will or refrain
from the action (formal obligation). In binding indifferent
things the magistrate can impose only formal obligation. The
citizen must do what is commanded but he need not judge the
action to be of moral value. It is this tiny gap that Locke
locates liberty of conscience. In the context of the Two
Tracts, this distinction represents scholasticism at its most
decadent. To say that a man is bound only formally by the
civil law, and that his conscience is still free means
nothing when the man believes himself bound, both materially
and formally, to act contrary to the civil law.
13 The most popular work of this kind was the Richard Allestree1 s
/cont'd
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A number of responses are possible in the face of this
epistemological crises. The most radical solution to the problem
assumes both the supremacy and the inescapable subjectivity of
conscience. The individual's conscience must be his final guide
in moral action. As in the nature of the case there is no means
of telling a true from a false conscience, we can only conclude
that the dictates of a man's conscience are 'true' for him.
The contrary conscience of another man represents a different
moral view and constitutes a different moral ' truth' . This
moral subjectivism is not to be confused with moral scepticism.
The latter, if it is to make sense, must assume the existence of
an objective realm of moral values and distinctions. The sceptic's
claim is that we can never be sure in our opinions concerning
14
those values and distinctions. Moral subjectivism, on the
contrary, entails the denial of any objective moral realm. Moral




The Whole Duty of Man, which remained in print into the nine¬
teenth-century. Samuel Puffendorf wrote a similar treatise
entitled De Officio Hominis et Civis. This latter Locke
recommends in Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a
Gentleman. /Works, 3. P» 272/
14 Concerning the sceptic's need to assume an objective standard
of truth, see W.von Leyden: Seventeenth Century Metaphysics,
pp. 75 f.
15 Needless to say, this is not intended as a characterisation of
all forms of moral subjectivism.
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The type of subjectivism outlined here is faced with a serious
«
objection. The starting-point of the subjectivist argument is the
binding force of conscience. However, it is only because the
dictates of conscience appear to the individual as the embodiment
of objective moral truths that he considers them compelling with
respect to moral conduct. If subjectivism is correct the
binding force of conscience is an illusion. Therefore, to accept
the subjectivist conclusion is to reject the premise from which it
is derived. (Whether this argument is conclusive against all
forms of moral subjectivism is, of course, another question).
A second, far less radical, solution lays similar emphasis
on the role of conscience as moral guide. It is argued that the
function of conscience is to put the individual in touch with
the objective moral realm. Of two contradictory dictates of
conscience at least one is false. When moral disagreement
arises the parties must 'look again' in order to discover the
true dictates of conscience. The difficulty here is bloat this
solution merely internalizes the problem of how we are to
distinguish a true from a false conscience. Assuming that
conscience does reflect an objective moral realm, how can the
individual be sure he is reading his conscience correctly?
Unless an answer can be found to this question (and an answer would
involve going beyond conscience), the second solution is in
danger of collapsing into the subjectivism of the first.
A third response consists in a downgrading of conscience.
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It is argued that the existence of civil society i3 of paramount
importance. The only alternative is the horrors of social anarchy.
To forestall this, it must be granted that any government is
better than none. To elevate private conscience above civil
law is to overthrow the principles of order and authority necessary
for the existence of government. Therefore, the individual must,
notwithstanding his private moral opinions, accept the civil law
as morally correct. This, in essence, is Locke's pragmatic
16
argument. But the acceptance of this pragmatism is tantamount
to a rejection of the moral foundation of government. Locke
has argued that the civil magistrate is empowered to bind things
left free by the moral law. If he oversteps his proper sphere
of authority and contravenes this law, he legislates unjustly.
Yet, if everything the magistrate enacts is to be treated a3
if it is within his proper sphere he can never be said to act
unjustly. Whatever may be the case in theory, in practice the
17
civil lav;, by -virtue of being enacted, will be just.
16 A somewhat similar argument is to be found in Hooker: "How-
beit, the corruptions of our nature being presupposed, we may
not deny but that the Lav; of Nature doth now require of
necessity some kind of regiment; so that to bring things
unto the first course they were in, and utterly to take away
all kind of public government in the world, were apparently
to overturn the whole world", /pp. Cit., Ek 1, x, A?
17 Locke does maintain that the magistrate can act unjustly.
Nevertheless, if he does the subject is still bound to passive
obedience /lst. Tract,p. 152, 2nd Tract, pp. 220-221y.
Therefore, the authority of the magistrate is inviolable.
In an extreme case he might act with complete disregard for
the moral law. It is difficult to see how this degree of
/cont'd
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Finally, there remains the most heroic response to the crisis.
This consists in the attempt to meet the problems raised by
individual differences in the dictates of conscience, and place
moral knovfLedge on a new, unshakeable foundation. The task
involved here does not fall solely within the sphere of epistemology.
As is often the case with problems of knowledge, it is also a problem
of ontology. We have seen that moral subjectivism denies the
existence of any moral realm independent of the opinions of men.
Moral scepticism, on the other hand, was said to presuppose a
moral ontology. Whether or not moral scepticism is a coherent
doctrine, it is clearly not compatible with the doctrine of moral
law which Locke accepts. For promulgation is essential to the
law. If men cannot (as the sceptic claims) attain moral knowledge,
then, logically, the law cannot exist. In the face of the
challenge put by subjectivism and scepticism what first needs to
be established is the existence of the law. Only then can the
epistemological problem of moral knowledge be guaranteed as a real
problem. Within a few years of writing the Two Tracts Locke
does attempt this final response. In his next major work, the
Essays on the Law of Nature, he endeavours to prove that there is
an objective moral law accessible to human reason.
17 cont'd
absolutism is compatible with Locke's hierarchy of la-ws. For
if the magistrate's authority really is circumscribed by the
moral law, how can he be said to retain the right to any kind
of obedience if he rule with complete disregard for the moral
law?
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Although subsequent to the Two Tracts, Locke does turn his
attention to the problem of moral knowledge, the direction in which
his investigation takes him is not obvious. The conclusions
Locke reaches in the unpublished Two Tracts are very different from
those he chose to publish in the Epistola de Tolerantia and the
Two Treatises of Government. In his first work he maintains the
absolute authority of the magistrate over all indifferent things
and preaches passive obedience on the subject's part in all
circumstances. In the Second Treatise he argues the people's
right to rebellion if the civil ruler betray his trust. In
13
the Epistola (and in the earlier, unpublished Essay On Toleration)
he agrees with Bagshaw in distinguishing classes of indifferent
things, and argues that civil authority embraces only those things
which have to be regulated for the good of society. Dr Abrams
ha3 argued that Locke's metamorphosis from defender of political
absolutism to defender of civil liberty can, in great part, be
explained as the result of his, "new sense of the ubiquitous
19
subjectivity of all actual moral knowledge". But, as Abrams
admits, Locke does not give up his belief in the objective moral
order expressed in the law of nature. So long as he retains this
belief he cannot consistently accept the subjectivity of moral
18 The Essay exists in four drafts, one of which is published in
H. R. Fox Bourne: The Life of John Locke. Vol. 1, pp. 174—
194.
19 Abrams: Op. Cit., p. 102.
21
knowledge#
Certainly, Locke's thought developed after the Two Tracts.
But this is not to say that he abandoned one intellectual position
for another. There is no room here for an examination of the
20
continuities between Locke's early and mature writings. It
need only be said that most of the conceptual apparatus which
Locke uses throughout his published work is to be found in the
Two Tracts. Some concepts, like that of the contract theory
of government, attain considerably more prominence. Others,
such as the concept of indifferent things, are further elaborated.
There is, however, one quite indisputable change in Locke's
thought; he rejects the pragmatic argument for political
absolutism. Sometime in the 1660's Locke came to realize that
the danger of tyranny was greater than the danger of mob violence.
This realization in itself suffices to explain the contrasting
conclusions found in the Two Tracts and the later writings.
Before we commence an examination of Locke's moral
epistemology it is important to note the way in which he conceives
moral knowledge. For Locke, moral truths are general truths,
forming the content of a law. The question of how men are to
know these truths is distinct from what might be termed the
question of particular moral truths. Philosophers have- sometimes
20 See Abrams: ■ Op. Cit., Ch. IV, and J. W. Gough's Introduction to
the Epistola de Tolerantia (ed. Raymond Klibansky)
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asked whether, in the concrete situation, a man can know where
his true duty lies. It is often answered that this cannot be
known because it is impossible for the individual to be certain
that he has considered all the facts relevant to a moral decision
21
in any particular case. This type of scepticism is not at
variance with the thesis that men can know general moral truths,
such as are the precepts of the law of nature. In a letter to
Denis Grenville Locke argues at some length against scepticism
with respect to particular moral truths. The major premise
of the sceptical argument is false. It is not the case that,
"there is always some action so incumbent upon a man, so necessary
to be done, preferable to all others, that if that be omitted,
one certainly fails in one's duty". Rather, when it comes to
particular moral actions, "God, out of his infinite goodness,
considering.our ignorance and frailty, hath left us a great
liberty". Locke, then, is concerned with knowledge of the
general content of the law of nature, which commands and forbids
kinds of actions. When men know this they know their duties.
Their further task is to act within the bounds of those duties.
21 See, for example, Sir David Ross: The Right and the Good,
pp. 30 - 33.
22 Locke to Denis Grenville, 23 March 1677-8. This letter is
published in full in Fox Bourne: Op. Cit.. pp. 390 - 393»
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Chapter II
THE LAW OF NATURE
We have seen that the problem of moral knowledge, as it
arises for Locke, fails within the ambit of ontology as well as
epistemology. Locke postulates a moral law, or law of nature,
accessible to human reason. This is said to emanate from God
and to constitute the objective standards of morality. The
ontological problem is to prove that there is such a law, and
the closely connected epistemological problem is to show the way
in which it is known by men. However, there is a prior
problem; for it is often argued that the law of nature cannot
constitute an ontology of morals. Hence, it cannot be the
object of moral knowledge.
The objection against a natural law ontology of morals takes
a somewhat different form according to whether criticism is
directed against the legal or the natural aspect of the doctrine.
First, it is argued that, if God has commanded men to do certain
things and refrain from others, the only moral, as distinct from
prudential, reason for obedience is that the things God commands
are morally worthy. That is, God's commands must themselves
measure up to a moral standard. If this is so it is the
standard external to the law set by God which constitute the
true criterion of right and wrong. God's law can be no more
than a statement of that standard. As far as an ontology of
24
morals is concerned the law is redundant. Secondly, if the term
'nature* is emphasised, the law of.nature may be understood a3
expressing the order which in fact holds in the universe. The
law of nature with respect to mankind will then be an account of
2
how men actually behave. But no moral 'ought' can be derived
from such a factual account. To say that an action accords with
the law will mean only that it conforms to the general pattern
of human behaviour; to say that an action is against the law
will mean only that it is out of the general run of things.
Understood thus, vice is at least as natural, or in conformity
with the law, as is virtue. Therefore, the law of nature cannot
constitute a standard of moral right and wrong. Whether it be
taken as the commands of God or as an account of the way things
are, the law of nature cannot explain moral obligation.
Therefore knowledge of the law cannot be knowledge of what we
1 This argument derives ultimately from the discussion of piety in
Plato's EuthyphrOo It is used by Locke's elder contemporary
Ralph Cudworth /a Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable
Morality. Bk. I, Ch. ii, & j5/, and is given.trenchant expression
by Locke's former pupil Lord Shaftesbury: "... whoever thinks
there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is
just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a
thing as justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and
wrong, according to which he pronounces that God i3 ju3t,
righteous, and true. If the mere will, decree, or law cf God
be said absolutely to constitute right and wrong, then are these
latter words of no significancy at all". /Characteristics, ed.
Robertson, Vol. I, p. 26^7
2 The law of nature will be what John Stuart Mill calls an empirical
law: "Scientific inquirers give the name of Empirical Laws to
those uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to
exist, but on which they hesitate to rely in cases varying much
from those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing
any reason why such a law should exist". fk System of Logic,
Bk. Ill, ch. xvi,
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morally ought to do. That is, it cannot be moral knowledge.
Like the Two Tracts, Locke's detailed treatment of the law
3
of nature remained unpublished up to the present century. It
consists of eight Latin essays, which most probably formed the
basis of the lectures Locke delivered during his term as Censor
of Moral Philosophy at Christ Church in 1664. In the Essays
Locke tries to show: first, that the law of nature exists;
second, that it is neither innate nor known from the general
consent of men, but can be discovered by reason through sense
experience; third, that the obligation imposed by the lav/
extends universally, and does not depend upon individual self-
interest.
In Essay I Locke presents five arguments for the existence
of the law of nature. The first is taken over directly from
Aristotle. All things are designed to fulfil a specific function.
Man's distinctive characteristic is his rationality. Therefore,
his proper function is to act in accordance with reason. More¬
over, besides the laws which differ from society to society, we
suppose there to be laws which have validity everywhere. These
4
must make up a universal law of nature. To the objection that
3 See John Locke: Essays on the Law of Mature, translated and
edited by W. von Leyden.
4 The passages Locke quotes are from the Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1
1098a 7, and Bk. V, 1134618.
26
most men live as if there were no rational basis to life Locke
gives two answers. First, from the assertion that men are by
nature rational and. that the law is knowable by reason, it does
not follow that men must know the law. There are many things which
can disturb the natural operation of reason in the individual.
Secondly, even if in following reason men disagree as to what the
law of nature dictates, this fact goes to establish the existence
of the law. For disagreement as to the content of the law pre¬
supposes that there is an objective law which does have a
specific content. /Essays, pp. 113 - 11^7
Locke's second argument is based on the phenomenon of
conscience insofar as it is the source of guilt feelings. Even
those who acknowledge no positive laws accuse themselves of
wrong doing. Therefore, they must consider themselves bound by
some law. The law acknowledged by conscience can only be the
law of nature. Thirdly, everything in the world operates
according to law. In a passage which strongly echoes Hooker,
Locke defines law as, "that which prescribes to everything the
It would be contrary to the wisdom of God to create man without
giving him a function in the scheme of things. Therefore,
there is a law of nature which prescribes man's proper-function.
5 Cf. Hooker:' "That which doth assign unto each thing the kind,
that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth
appoint the form and measure, of working, the same we term a
law". /The Laws of Ecclestical Polity, Ek. I, ii, J7
Locke has already quoted this passage, with an acknowledgement
form and manner and measure of working". /Essays, p.
27
Fourthly, if there were no law of nature there could, properly
speaking, be no such thing as human societyo Society, so Locke
argues, depends on the institution of a form of government and
on the fulfilment of contracts. Without the lav/ of nature the
civil ruler could enact any positive lav/s he liked. Yet, although
he may be able to compel obedience by brute force, he could not
impose any obligation on the private citizen. For, "positive
civil laws are not binding by their own nature or force or in
any other way than in virtue of the law of nature, which orders
obedience to superiors and the keeping of public peace".
r~ ~~ 6
/Essays, p. 11 The other basis of society consists in the
keeping of compacts; and, "it is not to be expected that a man
would abide by a compact because he has promised it, when better
terms are offered elsev/here, unless the obligation to keep
promises was derived from nature, and not from human will".
/jbuj7
Finally, the law of nature is conceptually necessary if terms
such as 'virtue' and 'vice', 'moral rewards and punishment' are to
6 flf. 2nd. Tract. p. 226
7 Whereas in the Two Tracts Locke explicitly refuses to decide
between the contract and divine right theories of government
/Ist. Tract, p. 122/; he here adopts the position he was to
develop in the Second Treatise on Government. It is noteworthy
that he has not abandoned the doctrine of natural law which
provided the framework for the argument of the Two Tracts.
Clearly, natural law is vital to the contract theory as Locke
conceives it. Abrams, hov/ever, appears to see in it an alter¬
native to the doctrine of natural law. /introduction to the
Two Tracts, p. 257
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have any meaning. For, "there is no fault, no guilt, where there
is no law. Everything would have to depend on human will, and,
since there wotild be nothing to demand dutiful action, it seems
that men would not be bound to do anything but what utility or
pleasure might recommend, or what a blind and lawless impulse
might happen perchance to fasten on". /Essays, pp. 119 - 12J78
Although this is presented as a separate argument for the existence
of the law of nature, it really does no more than spell o\it Locke's
basic premise that morality is a matter of law. What Locke's
other arguments have shown is a certain ambiguity in his use of
the term 'law'. In the first and third arguments law appears
to mean primarily the rule according to which things, including
men, operate. In the second and fourth argument law is that
which imposes an obligation on man. It is likely, therefore,
that Locke'3 doctrine is open to both the objections mentioned
at the beginning of this chapter. However, any pronouncement
on this would be premature. First of all something must be
said about Locke's general theory of law and obligation.
In Essay I. Locke lists three conditions which must be
fulfilled by any law. These, he claims, are fulfilled by the
law of nature:
8 C£ 1 st.Tract, p. 124
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... in the first place, it is the decree of a superior
will, wherein the formal cause of a law appears to consist
. . . Secondly, it lays down what is and what is not to he
done, which is the proper function of a law. Thirdly,
it binds men, for it contains in itself all that is
requisite to create an obligation. /Essays, p. 11^7
Later he adds what may be taken as a fourth condition; the necessity
of sanctions for law:
... there is no law without a law-maker, and law 13
to no purpose without punishment. /Essays, p. 173/
Locke reiterates this point in several of his later works. Although
sanctions are essential to law, it should not be thought that in
Locke's conception laws are primarily threats. Rather, he supposes
that,without sanctions, pronouncements, which are law according
to the first three conditions, would have no force against those
who disobeyed them. This is brought out in The Reasonableness
of Christianity where he discusses Christ's commands:
... if (Christ) did not expect obedience to them,
his commands would be but mere mockery; and if there
were no punishment for the transgressors of them, his
laws would not be the laws of a king, and that
authority to command, and power to chastise the
disobedient, but empty talk, without force, and
without influence. /works, 7, p. 114J
No;/ it is a moot point whether we should call commands 'without
force and influence' laws (or even commands), but certainly Locke
9
does not rule out such a use of the term.
9 Cf. Locke's paper Of Ethics in General, Sect. 9 /Published, in
Lord King: The Life of John Locke, Vol.2, pp. 122 - 133/;
Essay concerning Human Understanding, I, iii, 12, and II,
xxviii, 12.
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With respect to the law of nature, the superior will is the
will of God and what is laid down by the law is the moral duties of
mankindo The obligation men are under, "seems to derive partly
from the divine wisdom of the law-maker, and partly from the right
which the Creator has over His creation ... we are bound to show
ourselves obedient to the authority of His will because both our
being and our work depend on His will . o . moreover, it is
reasonable that we should do what shall please Him who is
omniscient and most wise". /Essays, p. 183] Locke's theory
of obligation, then, gives weight to both the authority of God's
will and to the wisdom of what God commands. However, there is
a certain tension between these two aspects. If moral obligation
is said to arise,even in part, from the wisdom of what God wills,
it would seem that if God willed something which was not wise no
obligation.could be created. If this is so, the fact that the
lav; of nature is an expression of God's will seems, at best, of
secondary importance. The primary source of obligation will lie
with the content of the law. In other words, men ought to act
according to the law because its precepts are morally good or
right, not because they are expressions of the divine will.
This means that God's will is itself circumscribed by the
rectitude of the law. As men cannot legitimately act contrary
to the precepts of the law, so God cannot legitimately command
them to act contrary to those precepts. The aspect of will in
the theory of obligation appears to be displaced by the aspect
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of wisdom.
Locke's editor, Dr. Von Leyden, has argued that we have here
not two aspects of a single theory, but two alternative, and not
always consistent, theories of moral obligation. According to
the so-called 'voluntarist' theory, law is an expression of
God's will and as such it places men under an obligation.
However, Locke tempers this radical position by introducing
elements from the 'intellectual!st' theory, according to which
law and obligation are founded, not in will, but in the 'order of
10
things'. Thus, Locke's doctrine falls between two stools.
At times in the Essays Locke's position is thoroughly 'voluntarist',
in that, "he regards natural law as a set of commands proceeding
from the will of God and that it is on this account that this
law is righteous and binding ... Yet . . . his position shifts
1
and inclines towards the ' intellectualist' theory . . .
according to which law has its foundations in a dictate of Right
Reason, in the essential nature of things, and is thus independent
10 The 'voluntarist' and 'intellectualist' theories are, as
Von Leyden points out, clear-cut alternatives. The former
is represented in Calvin's assertion that, "The Lord in
delivering a perfect rule of righteousness, has reduced
it in all its parts to his mere will". /Institutes of
the Christian Religion, Ek. II, viii, 5/ The latter
stands behind Hugo Crotius's assertion that the law of
nature would still exist and be binding, "though we should
grant ... that there is no God, or that he takes no care
of human affairs". /The Rights of War and Peace, prolog.
§ 1JL7 A brief but thorough general account of the
controversy can be found in Otto Gierke's Political Theories
'
of the Kiddle Age. Note 256, pp. 172 - 174.
11
of will"1.
This 'shift' is most apparent in Essay VII. Here Locke
distinguishes between the unchanging law of nature and those laws
which are created to meet contingent circumstances. In contrast
to the latter, the law of nature is "firmly rooted in the soil of
human nature". Human nature being the same everywhere and at all
times, it follows that the law of nature is universal:
Since . . . all men are by nature rational, and since
there is a harmony between this lav: and the rational nature,
and this harmony can be known by the light of nature,
it follows that all those who are endowed with a rational
nature, i.e. all men in the world, are morally bound by
this lav:. ... In fact, this lav: does not depend on
an unstable and changeable will, but on the eternal
order of things. For it seems to me that certain
essential features of things are immutable, and that
certain duties arise out of necessity and cannot be
other than they are. /Essays, p. 19^7
According to Von Leyden, the notion of a harmony (convenientia)
between the law of nature and human reason is introduced by Locke
in an attempt to arrive at a non-voluntarist, purely rational
foundation for morality. In terms of the alternative theory
it is not will (not even the supreme will of God) which is the
source of moral obligation, but human reason insofar as it
11 Introduction to the Essays, p. 51. Similarly, Dr Abrams
interprets Locke in the Two Tracts as leaning heavily
towards the 'voluntarist' position, yet restrained, "by
his nagging, countervailing concern that what passes for
law shall also be just". /Abrams: Op. Git.. p. 8\J
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comprehends the laws of human nature.
i
However, in Essay VII Locke is not dealing with the concept
of moral obligation. He has already devoted Essay VI to this topic,
and there, his analysis is 1voluntarist'. In the later essay
Locke is concerned to argue an affirmative answer to the question,
13"Is the binding force of the law of nature perpetual and universal?"
His argument for the universality of obligation proceeds from a
consideration of the matter, or content, of obligation. Locke's
view is tha,t, as the law of nature is set by God to the actions
of men, what it dictates must be determined by the facts of human
nature, or the way which God has made man. As human nature is
assumed to be constant,it follows that all men at all times are
under the same moral obligations (or bound to live according to
the same norms); and this is so notwithstanding the diverse and
contradictory moral practices to be found in the world. In this
sense the content of the law does not depend on 'an unstable and
changeable will* which varies according to circumstances. The
universality and immutability of the law and of its binding force
is not, Locke is careful to add, because, "God . . . could not have
created men differently. Rather, the cause is that, since man
has been made such as he is, equipped with reason and his other
12 Op. Cito p. 52
13 Locke explicitly distinguishes the topic of moral obligation
from the subject dealt with in Essay VIIs "We have already
proved that this law is given as morally binding, and we
must now discuss to what extent it is in fact binding".
/Essays, p. 193/
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faculties and destined for this mode of life, there necessarily
result from his inborn constitution some definite duties for him,
which cannot be other than they are". ^Essays. p. 19'27 More¬
over, God will not abolish the law of nature. To do so He would
have to "create a new race of men, who would have another law and
moral rule". /Essays, p. 20// This, Locke holds, God certainly
would not wish to do.
There is nothing in Locke's argument for the universality of
obligation under the law of nature to suggest that he is putting
forward a theory in which obligation is completely divorced from
God's will. From the assertion that what men are obliged to
do is determined by their human nature and discoverable by human
reason, it does not follow that their obligation to act is a
function solely of nature and reason. Von Leyden's interpretation
pays insufficient attention to an important distinction Locke makes
during his discussion of obligation in Essay VI; the distinction
between that which binds 'effectively' and that which binds
14-8 terminatively " s
That thing binds 'effectively' which is the prime cause
of all obligation, and from which springs the formal cause
of obligation, namely the will of a superior. For we
are bound to something for the very reason that he, under
whose rule we are, wills it. That thing binds 'terminatively',
or by delimitation, which prescribes the manner and measure
of an obligation and of our duty and is nothing other than
14 Cf. John W. Lenz's review of Von Leyden's edition of the
Essays in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1996/57
pp. 105 - 113.
the declaration of that will, and this declaration by
another name we call law. We are indeed bound by
Almighty God because He wills, but the declaration of
His will delimits the obligation and the ground of our
obedience; for we are not bound to anything except what
a law-maker in some way has made known an proclaimed
as his will. /Essays, pp« 185 - 18"jj
For an obligation to exist both these elements are necessary. God's
will is the formal cause of moral obligation. However, just as
there can be no such thing as an empty will, but in every case
there must be something which is willed; in the same manner there
can be no such thing as purely formal obligation. Obligation is
always an obligation to do, or refrain from, something; it must
be delimited. It is in this way that human nature enters into Locke'
doctrine of moral obligation. As the content of the law of
nature is determined by human nature, the latter provides the
necessary ' terminative', or delimiting,element in moral obligation,
Far from God's will and man's nature being the centres of alternative
theories of obligation, they are complementary facets of the one
doctrine. We will now look at this doctrine in more detail, and
attempt to assess it in the light of the objections raised against
a natural law ontology of morals.
The formal cause of the law of nature and of moral obligation
is God's will. But obligation does not arise simply from the
fact that God has the power to punish any disobedience to His
commands. To suppose this would be to confuse what Locke terms
*a liability to pay dutiful obedience' with 'a liability to
punishment', /Essays, p. 183/ Sanctions are essential to
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the law if it is to have force; men incur the force of the law
when they fail in their obedience. That is, liability to punish¬
ment arises if men neglect their prior obligation to act in
accord with the law of nature. If obligation involved nothing
more than the liability to punishment it would be no different
from the coercion men are under as captives in the hands of pirates
or robbers. But obligation is quite distinct from coercion:
Indeed, all obligation binds conscience and lays a bond
on the mind itself, so that not fear of punishment, but
a rational apprehension of what is right, puts us under
an obligation, and conscience passes judgement on morals,
and, if we are guilty of a crime, declares that we
deserve punishment. /Essays. p. 1857
So that it is not man's fear of punishment which is the basis of
moral obligation, but his apprehension of a "superior power to which
he is rightly subject". /Essays, p. 15JL7
God's right to command men is, for the most part, a function
of His status as creator; "for who will deny that the clay is
subject to the potter's will, and that a piece of pottery can be
shattered by the same hand by which it has been formed?"
/Essays„ p. 15j7^ Locke's analysis of God's right to command
bears an interesting affinity to the account he gives, in the
Second Treatise of Government, of the individual's right to
15 This is a conscious echo of Jeremiah, xviii, 6-7 and Romans ix,
20-21o In his commentary on the relevant text from St Paul,
Locke interprets the passage as a reference to God's dealings
with nations. He holds that it is not to be taken as
supporting the doctrine of arbitrary predestination respecting
individual persons. /a Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles
of St Paul. 3rd ed. pp. 301 - 302/
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private property. Here Locke is concerned, to explain how private
property can arise from an original situation in which all things
are the common property of all men; and he wants to explain this
without recourse to the traditional doctrine of an "express Compact
1 s
of all the Commoners". /2nd. Treatise. § 2Locke's solution
is that an individual acquires a right to the possession of a thing,
when, "he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something
that is his own". /2nd. Treatise. §27/ Also in the Second
Treatise, Locke talks of men as God's property:
For Men being all the Workmanship of one Oknipotent, and
infinitely wise Maker . . . sent into the World by his
order and about his business, they are his Property,
whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his,
not one anothers Pleasure. /2nd. Treatise, § 6~]
Obviously God does not acquire property in mankind. He does not
mix His labour with something already existing; for men are
utterly and completely the product of God's labour. It is because
the labour involved is the labour of creation, that men cannot but
17
be God's property. God's right with respect to manking is a
unique property right which Locke calls the 'right of creation';
"as when all things are justly subject to that by which they have
first been made and also are constantly preserved". /Essays, p. 185~J
16 Cf. John Yolton: Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding.
p. 187. ~~~
17 Locke's theory of private property depends upon the thesis that
"every Man has a Property in his own Person"./2rkLTreatise, § 27,
But this does not contradict the thesis that all men are also
God's property. It is because all men are equally God's
property that one individual does not have property in the
person of another, i.e. the each man has property in Ms own
person.
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This right like the right men have in their own property, is distinct
from the 'right of contract'; "as when someone has voluntary
surrendered himself to another and submitted himself to another's
will* /ibid.7 It is the latter right which, in the Second Treatise,
forms the basis of political obligation. Thus, the parallel
drawn between Locke's account of God's moral authority and man's
right to property throws into relief the difference between moral
and political obligation.
This parallel also helps to illustrate the way in which God's
right to command is 'limited'. In Locke's political scheme the
individual's right to property does not mean a right to acquire
goods in an unlimited and arbitrary fashion. Similarly God's right
to command is not one of arbitrary dominion. We have seen that
the matter of the law of nature is determined by the nature of man.
Human nature and the laws which arise from the facts of human nature
are expressions of God's infinite wisdom. God's wisdom entails
that everything in the universe, including man, is created for
some end. In consequence the law of nature does not simply bind
men to act in specific ways, but to act in ways conducive to "a
gracious divine purpose". /Essays, p. 15j7 Thus, the facts of
human nature determine the content of the law, and these facts
are themselves determined by the purpose for which men have been
created. Locke's conception of morality is, therefore, thoroughly
teleological. God's right of creation,from which the moral law
takes its origin,is absolute, but this does not mean it is arbitrary.
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The way in which God exercises His right necessarily reflects His
wisdom.
To sum up: We can say that Locke's doctrine is 'voluntarist'
in that he sees the will of a superior as essential to law and
obligation. Will stands as the formal cause of law and obligation.
However, as well as form there must be matter, and the latter is
provided by human nature as it is the product of God's wisdom.
Human nature is therefore the source of the content of the law;
but it is a mistake to think of it as a source of obligation.
Prom the facts of human nature considered in themselves no law or
obligation can be derived. Locke, it is true, does temper his
'voluntarist' position with 'intellectualist' elements, to the
extent that he does not hold the extreme view that the binding
will is arbitrary in its dictates. But this in no way means
that law and obligation can be divorced from will.
As his doctrine has so far been interpreted, Locke does have
an answer to the first formulation of the objection urged against
a natural law ontology of morals. Human nature constitutes the
basis of the standard against which man's actions are to be
measured. The fact that God commands conformity to this standard
constitutes its moral relevance. If there were no God, or if He
issued no commands to His creatues,the facts of human nature would
have no place in morality. Men might still use these facts in
creating standards for actions. But men cannot create moral
obligation. In the absence of God's commands it cannot be said
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that men morally ought to do anything, no matter what the facts of
human nature. The law of nature, considered as the commands of
God, is, therefore, far from redundant. Without it there could,
on Locke's account, be no moral 'ought'.
Nevertheless, there is a variation on the first objection
which has not as yet been considered. It was remarked earlier
that,in Locke's theory, moral obligation depends in part on God's
wisdom. Subsequent discussion has shown only that God's will is
as important for moral obligation as is His wisdom. It might be
argued that, as God exercises the right of creation in accord with
wisdom, His will is limited by His wisdom. In the first place,
it cannot be objected that God is limited by the right of creation.
It is law alone which can be said to set a limit to what can be
willed or performed, Locke makes this clear when he differentiates
between law and right:
... right is grounded in the fact that we have the
free use of a thing, whereas law is what enjoins or
forbids the doing of a thing. /Essays, p. 11 \J
Therefore, it is not intelligible to talk of a right imposing a
limitation on those who have it. In the case of most types of
right it will make sense to talk of the individual failing to have,
or losing his right. But, as God is by definition the creator of
the universe, He has the 'right of creation' necessarily; He
could not lose it without ceasing to be God. Neither does the fact
that human nature determines the content of God's commands impose
any limitations on God. He creates everything for His own wise
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purposes, and the laws he prescribes must suit these purposes.
Otherwise God would frustrate His own intentions. For Locke,
infinite wisdom also belongs to God by definition. Thus, a creator
who prescribed laws which were contrary to the nature of what he
had created would not be God. As infinite wisdom necessarily
belongs to God, it cannot be said to impose restrictions on God;
in no way does it limit God's freedom. Locke makes this quite
explicit in the Essay concerning Human Understanding:
And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we
are to pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness
could do, I think we might say that God himself cannot
choose what is not good: the freedom of the Almighty
hinders not his being determined by what is best.
Zll, xxi, 4#§
In consequence, the question of whether men would be bound to
obey God's if His commands were not vase is, for Locke, a nonsense
question. It is as if one were to ask what properties triangles
w7ould have if they were bounded by four straight lines.
18 The thesis that, as wisdom is just as essential to God as is
will, He has absolute sovereignty and freedom without having
an arbitrary will, is orthodox Thomism. Hooker expresses
it thus: "All things therefore do work after a sort according
to law: all other things according to a law, where of some
superior, unto whom they are subject, is author: only the works
and operations of God have him both for their worker, and for the
lav; whereby they are wrought; for that perfection which God is,
giveth perfection to that he doth". /op. Cit., Bk. I, ii, 17
It is also a common place in the philosophical theology of the
Cambridge Platonists. See, for example, Nathanael Culverwel:
An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Mature (ed.
Brown)p. 50, and Ralph Cudworth: Op. Cit., Ch. iii, 7.
Descartes, on the other hand, appears to adopt an extreme
'voluntarist' position. Cf. his reply to Gassendi's objeet-
. ions, Reply, VI, 8. /works, ed. Haldane and Ross, Vol. II,
pp. 250 - 2517
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The objection against a natural law ontology of morals in its
second formulation states that no law describing the way in which
men actually behave can serve as a guide to how they ought to
behave. Locke also has a partial reply to this second objection.
In discussing Locke's proofs for the existence of the law of nature
we noted an ambiguity in the term 'law'. In some arguments 'law*
appeared to mean the rule according to which things operate, while
in others it appeared to mean that which puts men under an obligation.
There is an ambiguity here, but it is one of which Locke is fully
aware. He uses the word 1 law' in referring both to the content,
or matter, of a law and to its form. Law considered as to its
form is the command of a superior will. This binds 'effectively'
and is the prime cause of obligation. Considered as to content,
law is what is prescribed by a superior will, i.e. that which men
are under an obligation to do. In this sense law binds
'terminatively' and is the declaration of the authorative will. In
his arguments from conscience and from the existence of positive
laws binding in civil society Locke is referring primarily to law
as it binds 'effectively'. That is, he is concerned with the form
of law. In the other two arguments Locke is much more interested
in law as it binds 'terminatively'; and the content of law may be
generally characterized as a rule set to the operation of a thing,
19suitable to the ends for which God has created them. There is
19 It should be noted that, although ha is aware of a difference
between the law of God applying to inanimate creation and the
/cont'd
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no question of any obligation following solely from the way creation,
including man, actually operates; for obligation must be formed by
willo The facts of human nature are relevant to moral obligation
because they determine what men (according to God's will) ought to
do. They are the basis from which the content of the law of nature
derives. Both meanings of law are encompassed by Locke's general
definition of the law of nature as, "the decree of the divine will
discernible by the light of nature and indicating what is and what
is not in conformity with rational nature, and for this very reason
OQ
commanding or prohibiting". /Essays, p. 1lf/
19 cont' d
moral law of nature applying to voluntary agents, it is doubtful
that Locke would have accepted the distinction between scientific
laws which merely describe statistical regularities and laws
which prescribe what ought to be done. For Locke the physical
order of the universe and the moral order to which man is sub¬
ject are equally manifestations of God's will. Cf. Hooker:
"/God's/ commanding those things to be which are, and to be in
such sort as they are, to keep the tenure and course which they
do, importeth the establishment of nature's law". /0p° Cit..
Bk. I, iii, 2J0
20 Von Leyden sees in the phrase 'for this very reason' an indication
that, even in this passage, Locke holds the rectitude of God's
commands, rather than the fact that they are expressions of His
will, to be the prime source of obligation. /up. Cit.. pp. 56 -
527 But, as Lenz points out the passage is ambiguous. It
may be read as meaning that men are under an obligation * for
the very reason' that they are commanded by God. /pp. Cit.,
pp. 110 - 11/7 This, in view of what Locke says elsewhere,
is the more plausible reading. Further, a similar, but
unambiguous, passage appears in Locke's Common-Place Book, dated
1681: "Virtue, as in its obligation it is the will of God,
discovered by natural reason, and thus has the force of a law".
/Quoted in King: Op. Cit., Vol 2, p. 9/7-
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Nevertheless, the above provides no more than a partial
answer to the second objection. Locke does not fall into the error
of supposing that a moral 'ought* can be derived solely from a
consideration of what is the case regarding human nature. Yet he
does believe that the facts of human nature somehow indicate what
ought and ought not to be done. We know that men are God's
creatures and that they are made to fulfil some purpose. As
God is wise we know that He has endowed His creatures with cap¬
acities suitable to the function He wills them to perform.
Therefore, a consideration of the capacities of human nature must
show what God vails men to do. Unfortunately men have capacities
for moral evil as well as moral good. How, then, it is to be
decided which capacities in human nature indicate the content of
the law of nature? Unless this can be settled no amount of
reflection on human nature will tell men what they ought to do.
'This problem is not solved in the Essays and a full discussion
cannot be entered into until we have considered Locke's general
epistemology as it is worked out in the Essay concerning Human
Understanding. In the last part of the present chapter we will
discuss only what Locke has to say about moral knowledge in the
Essays. finally we will consider the assertion that the law of
nature is not based on self-interest.
The law of nature is, Locke insists, completely rational in
its precepts; but this, he is careful to point out, does not mean
the law is identical with the dictates of human reason. It is God alone
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who establishes and pronounces the law* Reason, as it is a
faculty of the human mind, discovers and interprets what God
dictates. /Essays, p. 11_l7 In talking of human reason as the
source of moral knowledge Locke employs the traditional metaphor
of the 8light of nature'. But men do not know their duties by
some kind of internal illumination:
Rather, by saying that something can be known by the
light of nature, we mean nothing else but that there is
some sort of truth to the knowledge of which a man
can attain by himself and without the help of another,
if he makes proper use of the faculties he is endowed
with by nature. /Essays, p. 12"£/
The faculty of reason is not self-sufficient. It needs material
to work upon. Leaving aside divine revelation, which is a
supernatural source of knowledge, there are three ways whereby
men may acquire the primary data of knowledge: by 'inscription'
(innate ideas); by 'tradition' (information and instruction);
by 'sense-experience'. /ibid.7
Essay III is devoted to a refutation of the hypothesis
that the law of nature is known innately. As Locke's arguments
here foreshadow the detailed polemic in Book I of the Essay
concerning Human Understanding, they can be left aside for the
present. Something should, however, be said about Locke's
attitude to tradition as a source of moral knowledge. Locke
does not deny that men learn moral principles from others.
Nor does he think this necessarily an inadequate way of learning
what the law of nature demands. Nevertheless, those who take
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their morality at second hand from the opinions of others do not,
strinctly speaking, know the law of nature:
For what we take over from other people's talk, if we
embrace it only because others have insisted that it is
good, may perhaps direct our morals well enough and
keep them within the bounds of dutiful action, yet it
is not what reason but what men tell us. /lissays, p. 12
Further, tradition must itself spring from some non-traditional
source? If those who originated the tradition discovered the
law by reason, this means of discovery must still be open to men.
If the tradition arose from an original divine revelation, the law
it proclaims is positive, and not the law of nature. /Essays,
p. 131J Similarly, Locke argues in Essay V, that the general
consent of men cannot be the means whereby the law is known.
Even if general consent in moral matters were to be found among
men, this would presuppose a knowledge of the law derived from
some other source. Tradition, then, can sometimes be a safe
guide to moral duty, but it is not the original source of moral
knowledge.
As the beginning of moral knowledge cannot be assigned to
either innate ideas or to tradition, there is only one possibility
left; it must originate in sense experience. However, prior
to knowing what their moral duties are men must know that they
in fact have duties. As we have seen, this prerequisite is
fulfilled once they know there to be a God wrho wills them to act
according to the end for which He has created them. This is the
knowledge of moral obligation.
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Locke's proof of God's existence combines two standard
arguments; the argument from design and the anthropological
argument. We learn from sense-experience that there exists a
world in which objects follow regular patterns of movement. Prom
this primary data reason proceeds to enquire into the cause of the
ordered universe, "for it is surely undisputed that this could not
have come together casually and by chance into so regular and in
every respect so perfect and ingeniously prepared a structure".
/Essay, p. 1527 I*1 this way reason reveals the existence of
"A powerful and wise creator". Man also must be a product of
this creator's activity; for man cannot have made himself. If
man bad created himself he would have bestowed upon himself
all those perfections which he manifestly lacks. He would,
21
for instance, have given himself eternal duration. Thus,
beginning from the evidence of our senses, "reason lays down that
there must be some superior power to which we are rightly subject,
namely God who has a just and inevitable command over us and at
His pleasure can raise us up or throw us down, and make us by the
same commanding power happy or miserable." /Essays, PP. 153 - 1557
Evidence gathered from sense experience reveals not only that there
is a God who has the right to command men but also that God is
21 The anthropological argument is developed in greater detail by
Descartes? Cfo Meditation III, in Works, Vol. I, p. 168.
infinitely wise. For the order and beauty of the universe must
originate from wisdom as well as power. As it would be contrary
to supreme wisdom to do anything without some end in view, it
follows that all things in the universe are governed by final
causes:
Hence it is quite evident that God intends man to do
something, and this was the second of the two things
required for the knowledge of any and every law, namely,
the will on the part of a superior power with respect to
the things to be done by us; that is, God wills that we
do something. /Essays, p. 157/.
In this way the knowledge which is a necessary precondition
for the strictly moral knowledge of right and wrong is built up
by reason working on the materials gained by the senses.
Reason has yet to arrive at a knowledge of the content of
the law of nature. In the Essays Locke's arguments are sketchy
and unsatisfactory. Locke selects three dispositions which he
takes to be observable properties of human nature. First, men
have an inclination to contemplate the works, wisdom and power
of God, and to praise Him. Second, all men desire to live in
society with their fellows, and this inclination goes beyond any
self-centered desire for personal comfort. Men are also
admirably fitted for society by the gift of speech. Third,
all men have a strong instinct of self-preservation. According
to Locke, these natural dispositions broadly indicate, "all that
men owe to God, their neighbour, and themselves". /Essays, p.
1597 That is, they embrace the entire range of moral
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action. Whether or not these dispositions are agreed to he
observable properties of human nature Locke has said nothing to
solve the problem mentioned previously. Indeed his list of
natural inclinations brings this problem to the fore. Why should
these, and not other dispositions, indicate what God has commanded?
Even if this question can be satisfactorily answered, it is by no
means clear how the details of moral duty are to be derived from
such data.
In Essay VIII Locke argues at some length against the thesis
that the individual's inclination to pursue his own interest is
the 'basis of the law of nature'o What he says in the course
of the argument does not constitute a solution to the above
problem; however it does serve to clarify his position.
Locke defines the basis of the law of nature as, "some sort
of groundwork on which all other and less evident precepts of that
lav; are built and from which in some way they can be derived, and
thus they acquire from it all their binding force in that they are
in accordance with that, as it were, primary and fundamental law
which is the standard and measure of all the other laws depending
on it". /Essays, p. 205/ ' If self-interest provides this
22 Similarly, St. Thomas Aquinas derives the main precepts of the
law of nature from tendencies inherent in human nature. In com¬
mon with all substances men have a tendency to preserve them¬
selves. With other animals they have certain appetites such as
the sexual appetite. By virtue of their rational faculty they
wish to know God and to live in society. Cf. Summa Theologiae,
1a 2ae. 94, 2.
23 The 'binding force' referred to here is, of course, 'terminative'
obligation.
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groundwork, the fundamental law will be that each man ought do that
which in the particular circumstances he judges to be of advantage
to himself.
Locke puts forward three arguments against this thesis.
First, it is evident that self-interest (or utility) is not the
fundamental law from which other, less universal, precepts are
derived.
. . . for if you should run over all the dutiful actions
of human life, you will find none that arises out of mere
utility and is binding for the sole reason that it is
advantageous. In fact a great number of virtues, and the
best of them, consist only in this: that we do good to
others at our own loss. /Essays, p. 207/
Secondly, if self-interest were the fundamental law it could seldom
be properly obeyed. The goods of the earth being limited, the
achievement of one man's interest would mean the non-achievement
of the interests of others. Moreover, a law commanding the
individual to follow his own interest would place each man in a
constant state of war with his fellows. Human society would,
if such a law were obeyed, be quite impossible. Finally, self-
interest cannot be the basis of the law of nature, for if it were
each man would be morally bound to act only for himself. Thus
"all justice, friendship, and generosity are taken away from life".
/Essays, p. 21^7 but it is quite unreasonable to suppose these
things morally wrong. Locke does grant that there is some truth
in the thesis that utility and the lav; of nature are closely
connected. He stresses that it is in accord with human happiness,
in general, that all men should follow the precepts of the lav;.
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What this means is that, "Utility is not the basis of the law or
the ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to it".
/Essays, p. 215/
The point to be noted at present is that Locke does not hold
the various precepts of the law of nature to be derivable piecemeal
from a consideration of certain aspects of human nature. Rather,
he believes there to be one fundamental law from which the details
of man's duties somehow follow. Yet the Essays contain no
positive information concerning this fundamental law. They tell us
24
neither what it is nor how it is to be derived.
The Essays on the Lav/ of Nature, therefore, represent an
incomplete moral philosophy in that they culminate in a vital
problem. Locke has a partial defence against the objection that
the law of nature cannot constitute a moral ontology, and hence
cannot be the object of moral knowledge. However, this defence
is incomplete pending a solution to the problem of moral knowledge;
how are men to know what God has commanded? Locke, we shall see,
does return to the task of establishing a fundamental law of nature,
which will serve as a basis for the detailed precepts of morality.
But before this he embarked on an even larger task; that of
determining the limits of human understanding and thereby the
extent of human knowledge. Some six or seven years after he wrote
the Essays. Locke began work on what was to become An Essay
concerning Human Understanding.
24 Locke does, however, refer in passing to justice as "that chief
law of nature and bond of every society". /Essays, p. 169/
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Chapter III
KNOWLEDGE IK THE 'STATE OF'MEDIOCRITY1
A great deal has been written about Locke as a philosopher
of science and epistemologist for the Royal Society. Certainly,
in the Essay concerning Human Understanding he does see himself
laying an epistemological foundation for the experimental practice
of the Royal Society. But the famous self-image of Locke as an
underlabourer clearing the ground so that the Kewtons and Boyles
might work unimpeded should not obscure the fact of his interest
1
in moral knowledge. Indeed, if the Essay is taken as a work
concerned solely with the knowledge of natural phenomena it must
appear a rather odd performance. We would expect an account of
how the scientist (or, in Locke's terminology, the natural
philosopher) gains a knowledge of the physical world. What we
would not expect is Locke's contention that the study of nature
yields hardly anything which can properly be called knowledge.
It takes no very careful reading of the Essay to notice the
emphasis Locke places throughout on the limitations of knowledge:
He that knows anything knows this in the first place:
that he need not seek long for instances of his
ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things that
come in our way have dark sides that the quickest
sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most
enlarged understandings of thinking men find them¬
selves puzzled and at a loss in every particle of
matter. /iV, iii, 227
1 As Locke's friend James Tyrrell reports, the Essay itself grew
out of a discussion about, "the Principles of morality and reveal'd
Religion". Marginal note in Tyrrell's copy of the Essay, kept
in the British Museum/
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Kan's ignorance is not a matter of chance; nor can it be dissolved
by attention to the proper method of discovering truth. Ignorance
is ineluctably part of the human condition. In this world men
dwell in what Locke calls a 1 state of mediocrity'. This he
describes in a letter to Grenville as a state, "which is not capable
of extremes, though on one side there may be great excellency and
2
perfection".
Locke does not arrive at the notion of the state of mediocrity
as a result of his investigation of the extent of human knowledge.
The view of man as a limited creature stands at the starting point
of his epistemology rather than at the conclusion of his arguments.
To a quite large extent the Essay is a polemical work, aimed against
what Locke takes to be the empty pretentions of human understanding.
The extremes of knowledge which are beyond man's capacity fall under
3
the general heading of metaphysics. In his polemical mood, Locke
has particularly in mind the attempt to construct a metaphysical
2 Locke to Denis Grenville, 23 Mar. 1677 - 8. /Fox Eourne: The
Life of John Locke. Vol. I, p. 3927 A detailed discussion of
the Lockean 'state of mediocrity' is contained in D. G. James:
The Life of Reason, pp. 63 - 114.
3 Locke's contemporaries often read the Essay as a sceptical work.
However, as John Sergeant realized, it is not knowledge but
metaphysical knowledge which Locke attacks: "I am a little
apprehensive, from some Words in his Introduction, expressing
his Dis-like that Men let loose their Thoughts into the vast
Ocean of Being; and his Conceit that this brings Men to Doubts
and Scepticism, that he has taken a Prejudice against METAPHYSICS;
whose proper Object is, those Notions of the Thing which abstract
from Matter and Motion, and concern Being only". /Solid
Philosophy Asserted, p. 11^7
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system of the natural world. Of course, the Essay is much more than
a polemic against metaphysical ambitions. Locke's intentions are
far from destructive:
. . . were the capacities of our understandings well
considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered,
and the horizon found which sets the bounds between
the enlightened and dark parts of things . . . men would
perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed
ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and
discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the
other. /T, i, "j]
Thus, the exhibition of human ignorance in one sphere throws into
relief that'excellency and perfection of knowledge attainable in
another sphere. As we shall see, the other sphere is that of
moral knowledge.
Locke several times reminds his readers that his subject is
human understanding. He is convinced that man's position on the
Great Chain of Being is a lowly one, and that there are innumerable
creatures above man whose powers of understanding are correspondingly
greater. /ill, vi, 12; IV, iii, 6 and 2'£j'. It is not only
futile for men to seek to know beyond their powers; it is a kind
of hubris. It is salutory that they be brought to the
realization of their intellectual limits:
Therefore, as God has set some things in broad daylight,
as he has given us some certain knowledge, though limited
to a few things in comparison, probably as a test of what
intellectual creatures are capable of, to excite in us a
desire and endeavour after a better state: so, in the
greatest part of our concernment, he has afforded us only
the twilight, as I may so say, of probability, suitable,
I presume, to that state of mediocrity and probationership
he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein to
check our over-confidence and presumption, we might by
every day's experience "be made sensible of our short¬
sightedness and liableness to error; the sense whereof
might be a constant admonition to us to spend the days
of this our pilgrimage with industry and care in the
search and following of that way which might lead us to
a state of greater perfection. /iV, xiv, 274
In this passage two themes which run throughout the Essay can be seen
side by side. First, the doctrine that probability, as distinct
from knowledge, is the guide to life. This is often cited as the
moral of the Essay. Second, and less frequently noted, the doctrine
that man's life is a pilgrimage and period of probation. In Locke's
opinion it is for life under this religio-moral aspect that the
human understanding is properly fitted. Han is first and foremost
a being bound by the moral law. The reward for obedience to the
law, and the end of man's journey through life, is heaven.
Speculative knowledge concerning the workings of natural phenomena
is very largely beyond man because it is outside the range of his
requirements. For the needs of everyday life in the physical
world, what Locke terms probability is all that is needed. Ken,
therefore have no cause to complain against the narrowness of their
understandings in matters of pure speculation; "it yet secures
their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them
4 Luring his stay in France in the 1670's Locke translated three of
Pierre Nicole's Essais de Morale including 'Of the Weakness of
Man', which displays human ignorance in order to chasten human
pride. /Discourses: Translated from. Nicole's Essays by
John Locke, ed, Thomas Hancock/. A strikingly similar attitude
to human knowledge is to be found in Pierre Gassendi. See his
"Lettre sur le Livre de Lord Edouard Herbert, Anglais, De La
V£rit£" /trans. Bernard Rochot. in Actes du Congr&s du
Ticentenaire de Pierre Gassendi/
to knowledge of their Maker and the sight of their own duties".
U, i» T Provided moral knowledge is attained, the knowledge of
speculative truth is of little importance.
Locke contrasts nature philosophy, or the study of physical
substances, with morality. In the case of the former we can
know by observation only and this sets severe limitations to
our knowledge:
This way of getting and improving our knowledge in
substances only by experience and history . . . makes
me suspect that natural philosophy is not capable of
being made a science. We are able ... to reach very
little general knowledge concerning the species of
bodies and their several properties. Experiments and
historical observations we may have, from which we may
draw advantages of ease and health, and thereby increase
our stock of conveniences for this life; but beyond this
I fear our talents reach not . . .
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that moral philosophy
can achieve the status of a science:
For it is rational to conclude that our proper
employment lies in those inquiries, and in that sort
of knowledge which is most suited to our natural
capacities and carries our greatest interest, i.e.
the condition of our eternal estate. Hence I think
I may conclude that morality is the proper science and
business of mankind in general. /IV, xii, 10 - 1j/
As Locke more usually states the dichotomy, morality is capable of
demonstration, while natural philosophy is not.
For Locke 'science' and 'knowledge' are synonymous terms.
His conception of science, and consequently of knowledge, is far
narrower than ordinary English usage suggests. There are a
number of uses of the words 'know* and 'knowledge', and different
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epistemological problems arise according to which uses are
selected for scrutiny. To take two examples: I can be said to
know mathematics, meaning that I understand a body of knowledge.
Or I can be said to know that there is a desk in front of me.
To know the latter is to have knowledge of a fact. It is not an
example of knowing in the sense of understanding. Natural
philosophy and morality, as Locke contrasts them, are bodies of
knowledge. They are known in the sense of being understood. As
he tells us on the first page of Ms introductory chapter, Ms
purpose is to enquire into the human understanding. In view of
this purpose he selects one sense of the word 'knowledge'; the
sense in which we have knowledge when we understand.
Locke's main concern is not only clear from his introductory
chapter. He reiterates his interests in the last chapter of the
Essay. Here we would hope to find seme kind of summary drawing
together the diffuse threads of argument which have gone before.
In a way , this is what we do find. The final chapter lays down
three, "most general objects of the understanding", or sciences:
5natural philosophy, ethics and logic? Reading the Essay from the
stand-point of this division it can be seen as a work concerned
g
with bodies of knowledge. Locke's main question is, how, and to
5 The division of the sciences was an intellectual pastime going
back to the Stoics. In the seventeenth century it was indulged
in, among others, by Pierre Gassendi. Locke's classification
is simpler than most.
6 TMs approach to the Essay via the book's final chapter has been
used with considerable success by Professor Yolton in Ms book,
Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding.
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what extent, do these putative sciences really fall within the compass
of human understanding.
At this point a considerable difficulty in the interpretation
of Locke must be faced. Critics have generally agreed that his
main concern is with the knowledge we have in abstract sciences such
as mathematics, and that he formulates his theory of knowledge with
this paradigm constantly in view. The difficulty is that this
interpretation seemingly leaves Locke no room for the knowledge
of facts. Yet we must be able to know facts about the world.
Otherwise all our knowledge will be but a play of abstractions;
something which might or might not bear a relation to reality,
but which can never be known to bear such a relation.
Locke is well aware that real knowledge must somehow 'hook
onto? the world. Yet Locke's commentators have almost unanimously
concluded that his endeavours to introduce knowledge of reality
within his general scheme have led to incoherence and inconsistency.
Professor Aaron's judgement may be taken as exemplifying the
orthodox interpretation:
Tocke7 opens Book IV of the Essay with a theory of
knowledge applicable . . . merely to knowledge of
relations between abstract ideas, a universal,
hypothetical, and highly abstract knowledge, best
typified in mathematics. Another theory becomes
necessary for knowledge of particular existences.
Consequently, Locke's whole account of knowledge is
far from consistent, for he does not even try to
remove this dualism or to relate the two theories
. . . Thus we must conclude that Locke's theory
of knowledge is defective in being both incomplete
and incoherent.^
7 John Locke (3rd ed.), pp. 246 - 247
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Because they have considered the Essay a work dealing in the main
with knowledge of the natural world, Locke's critics have seen the
flaw in his epistemology as centered on his supposed inability to
account for our knowledge of physical objects. However, the
difficulty involves all knowledge of reality, whether it be
0
physical reality or not. If" his general scheme of knowledge
allows only hypothetical, highly abstract knowledge, moral reality
must be equally beyond men's reach. The law of natural is as much
external to the human mind as is the physical world. The
propositions of the law do not state physical facts, but they
state facts nonetheless. It is the case that certain types of
action are right and certain types wrong. These moral facts
are expressed in categorical, not in hypothetical, propositions.
To know the moral law, then, is not to possess purely hypothetical
knowledge.
What then is Locke's general scheme of knowledge? And
why have his commentators so often found him inconsistent? The
answer to the first question serves equally as an answer to the
second. Locke's general scheme may be said to consist in two
major parts. First, he equates knowledge and certainty. In his
second reply to his critic Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester,
he writes:
. . . with me, to know and be certain, is the same thing;
what I know, that I am certain of; and what I am certain
8 See James Gibson: Locke's Theory cf Knowledge, pp. 166 - 168o
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of, that I know. What reaches to knowledge, I think may
be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty,
I think cannot be called knowledge. /Works, 4, p. 145/
Secondly he defines knowledge, as, "nothing but the perception of
the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any
of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception
is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we may
fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge".
Jjv, i, gj There is nothing exceptional in the equation of
knowledge with certainty. However, in the light of the second
quotation, it appears that certainty resides solely in the perception
of relations between ideas. Locke's term 'idea' is notoriously
ambiguous. It will be discussed in the next chapter, but for the
present it can be assumed that at least very often, Locke means
by an idea what is now more commonly called a concept. Now the
relations holding between concepts are necessary and universal.
We know them a priori, provided we understand the concepts
involved. For example, once we understand the concepts, 'red'
and 'blue' we know that necessarily anything which is red is not
blue, and we know this to be true for every possible world. Given
that certainty and knowledge are one and the same, and certainty
belongs only to cases of the above type, it follows that knowledge
consists entirely in necessary, universal truths. Further, in
view of the contrast Locke draws between 'knowledge' and the verbs
'fancy', 'guess' and 'believe', it is natural to assume that the
second quotation is a definition not only of knowledge, but of
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the cognative act of knowing. This is the way it has generally been
understood. If this is Locke's meaning he is committed to the
thesis that,whenever we know we perceive a connexion between ideas.
Hence, we are left with the daunting conclusion, that according to
g
Locke, we know only necessary a priori truths.•
Locke distinguishes four possible sorts of connexions between
ideas: 1) Identity, or diversity; 2) Relation; 3) Co-existence,
or necessary connexion; 4) Real existence /VJ, i, Although
he places knowledge of relation in a separate category, Locke
realizes that, on his definition, all knowledge is of relations
between ideas:
Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing
but relations, yet they are so peculiar ways of
agreement or disagreement of our ideas that they
deserve well to be considered as distinct heads and
not under relation in general. JVJ, i> lJ
How much knowledge then can be found in these four categories by
the perception of the relations between ideas?
Knowledge of identity end diversity is a prerequisite of all
knowledge; for, if the mind could not tell one idea from another it
obviously could not perceive relations between different ideas.
However, in itself, knowledge in the first category is of little
9 However in a Journal entry Locke talks of two sorts of knowledge:
"There are two sorts of knowledg in the world generall and
particular founded upon two different principles, i.e. true
Ideas and matter of fact or history. All generall knowledg is
founded only upon true Ideas and soe far as we have these we
are capable of demonstration or certain knowledg". Sund. Jun.
26, 1681. /Aaron and Gibb, p. 1167
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worth. It is expressed "by propositions such as 'red is red',
5 red is not white*. These Locke calls 'trifling propositions' as
they do not increase our stock of knowledge. /jVf viii/ While
this knowledge is trifling, knowledge of co-existence (by which
Locke means the co-existence of qualities in a physical object)
is hardly to be had at all:
Indeed some few of the primary qualities Jot bodies/ have a
necessary dependence and visible connexion one with another,
as figure necessarily supposes extension, receiving or
communicating, motion by impulse supposes solidity . . .
/Nevertheles£7 For all the qualities that are co-existent
in any subject, without this dependence and evident connexion
of their ideas one with another, we cannot know certainly
any two to co-exist any further than experience by our
senses informs us. Thus though we see the yellow colour
and upon trial find the weight, malleableness, fusibility,
and fixedness that are united in a piece of gold: yet,
because no one of these ideas has any evident dependence
or necessary connexion with the other, we cannot certainly
know that where any four of these are, the fifth will be
there also, how highly probable soever it may be:
because the highest probability amounts not to certainty,
without which there can be no true knowledge. /iV, iii, 147
It is on these grounds that natural philosophy cannot achieve the
status of a science. We are left with the categories of relation
and real existence.
Knowledge of relation does give certainty, and it is instructive®
In mathematics we have an actual example of knowledge within this
category, and Locke is confident that the methods of mathematics-
can be used to extend knowledge in other fields, especially in
morals. Nevertheless, he holds that the objects with which
mathematics deals are purely ideal constructions of the mind.
iv, 6 and 8] We know for certain that, 'Two triangles
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upon equal "bases "between two parallels are equal'o This proposition
is true whether or not triangles actually exist in the world. It
is because its truth is independent of the world that it is
certain. No fact about the world could possibly refute it. With
respect to reality the proposition can be no more than hypothetical.
The most that can be said is that if there are any triangles in the
world they will have certain properties. Such a proposition
conveys no information as to what is the case. As Locke himself
stresses, there is no way we can argue from an idea (or concept)
to any corresponding reality JjFI, xi, fj^ Therefore, if
knowledge is to be anything more than a mere play of ideas, there
must be some way in which the mind knows beyond its ideas.
There is no doubt that Locke is aware of the need to break
out of the circle of ideas to which he has confined knowledge.
He devotes a chapter of the Essay to the 'reality of knowledge'o
There he attempts to rebut the objection that, "If it be true
that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or
disagreement of our own ideas, the visions of an enthusiast and
the reasonings of a sober man will be equally certain. It is no
10 Cf. Locke's paper on Descartes' ontological proof of God's
existence: "By ideas in the mind we discern the agreement or
disagreement of ideas that have a like ideal existence in our
minds, but that reaches no farther, proves no real existence,
for the truth we so know is only of our ideas, and is applic¬
able to things only as they are supposed to exist answering
such ideas. But any idea, simple or complex, barely by being
in our minds, is no evidence of the real existence of any
thing out of our minds answering that idea". ^/hord King:
The Life of John Locke, Vol. 2. p. 13§7
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matter how things are: so a man observe but the agreement of his
own imaginations and talk conformably, it is all truth, all
certainty". /iV, iv, {J Locke replies that, "It is evident the
mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of
the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only
so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality
of things". /TV, iv, U It appears that Locke's fourth category,
the knowledge of real existence, must go beyond ideas if any
knowledge is to be real. However, according to Locke's general
11
definition, all knowledge is of relations between ideas. Thus
it appears that the category of 'real existence' must, in consistency,
remain empty. Knowledge is by definition restrained within the
circle of ideas.
In Professor Aaron's opinion, Locke sees the difficulties
arising from the restriction of knowledge to ideas and his
endeavours to meet them result in a second theory of knowledge
contrary to the first. Yet, as the chapter on the 'reality of
knowledge' shows,hesawthe difficulties with particular clarity.
11 As the definition stands it does not state that the perceived
agreement must be between ideas. There is room for the view
that the agreement might be between ideas and something else.
Locke is thus interpreted by Yolton (pp. cit., pp. 111f).
However, passages such as the following from The Conduct of
the Understanding make Locke's position quite clear: ". . .
knowledge consists only in perceiving the habitudes and
relations of ideas one to another". /sect. xxxi^ Cf. A. D.
Woozley: "Some Remarks on Locke's Account of Knowledge".
/The Locke Newsletter. 1972/
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Moreover he revised parts of the Essay right up to the time of his
death. If there is such a glaring inconsistency in Locke's thought,
as Aaron and other critics have presumed, why did he not revise his
general scheme of knowledge? Before Locke is judged inconsistent
the final category of knowledge should be re-examined.
Locke supposes there to be three examples of the knowledge of
real existence: the existence of God, our own existence, and the
existence of external things /iV, ix, 2/, We know the first by
demonstration, the second by intuition and the third by sensation.
As we shall see, intuition and. demonstration are ways in which the
mind perceives relations between ideas. Whether or not the first
two examples of existential knowledge do fit within Locke's general
scheme is a problem which can be safely ignored. We will take the
knowledge of external objects by sensation as a test case. Is
this type of knowledge consistent with Locke's general scheme?
Locke usually refers to the knowledge of external objects
gained by means of the senses as sensitive knowledge. This he
defines as knowledge, "of the existence of particular external
objects, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual
entrance of ideas from them". /iV, ii, 14/ Mow it is quite
obvious that when I know of the existence of an object by means of
the senses my knowledge cannot be construed as a perception of a
relation between ideas. Let us suppose I know by sense experience
that there is a desk in front of me. Even if this could, on some
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logical Procrustean bed, be stretched into an example of perceiving
some sort of relation, it could not be a relation between ideas.
Provided the idea of a physical object is not conflated with the
object itself, it is obvious that in order to know that there is
a desk in front of me I must somehow be in touch with the desk,not
merely with the idea of the desk. Therefore, even if there is a
perceived relation, one of the terms related must be the physical
object. Locke does not conflate ideas with the objects of which
they are ideas. For him, the function of ideas is to represent
12
things other than ideas. Therefore he. cannot construe sen¬
sitive knowledge as a perception of a relation between ideas.
Can Locke consistently maintain that there is such a thing
as sensitive knowledge? It would appear not. Sensitive knowledge
is a sub-category of the knowledge of real existence. But Locke
12 Locke's doctrine of sensitive knowledge is considerably com¬
plicated by the fact that he sometimes uses 'idea' in a way
which suggests that ideas are some kind of reified sense-data
'standing in' for objects in the external world. (See, for
example, his definition of sensitive knowledge). Thus he has
often been understood to hold a crude representative theory of
sense perception, according to which all we ever directly
perceive are 'pictures' of reality. Needless to say such a
theory makes scepticism of the senses inescapable. For how
can we know that our 'picture* matches the external world, or
even that there is an external world? Whether or not Locke
holds this theory, has been much debated. (See, for example,
Reginald Jackson: "Locke's Version of the Doctrine of
Representative Perception" /in Martin and Armstrong/; A.D.
Woozley's Introduction to his edition of the Essay; Yolton:
Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding, pp. 38f.) But
the problem belongs more to the philosophy of perception than
to epistemology. We are concerned here to discover the
connexion (if there is one) between Locke's general scheme of
knowledge and his doctrine of sensitive knowledge.
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has distinguished, the knowledge of real existence as one of the
categories of knowledge falling under his general definition.
Surely, all types of knowledge within this category must conform
to the general definition, i.e. they must all he examples of the
perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas.
In his second reply to Stillingfleet, Locke does attempt to
place knowledge of the real existence of external objects within
his general scheme . His argument is worth quoting at some
length:
. . o your lordship argues, that because I say, that
the idea in the mind proves not the existence of that
thing whereof it is an idea, therefore we cannot know
the actual existence of any thing by our senses: because
we know nothing,but by the perceived agreement of ideas.
But if you had been pleased to have considered my answer,
... to the sceptics . . . you would . . . have found
that you mistake one thing for another, viz. the idea
that has by a former sensation been lodged in the mind,
for actually receiving any idea, i.e. actual sensation;
which, I think, I need not go about to prove are two
distinct things . . . Now the two ideas, that in this
case are perceived to agree, and do thereby produce
knowledge, are the idea of actual sensation (which is
an action whereof I have a clear and distinct idea) and
the idea of actual existence of something without me that
causes that sensation. And what other certainty your
Lordship has by your senses of the existing of any thing
without you, but the perceived connexion of those
two ideas, I would gladly know. If/hen you have destroyed
this certainty ... your lordship trill have well
assisted the sceptics in carrying their arguments
against certainty by sense. /works, 4, p® 36o7
This passage has been taken as an ad hoc attempt to solve a problem
13
which Locke himself has made insuperable. Yet Locke's reply is
13 Cf. H. G. Van Leenwen: The Problem of Certainty in English
Thought, 1630 -- 1690, p. 129, n. 18. Yolton critizes Locke's
reply as, "misleading even on his own account of thinking,
perceiving, etc." Op. cit. p. 112.
unusually precise and polished. He carefully states the thesis he
wishes to refute; that we cannot know the existence of external
objects from sense experience (this may be termed the sceptical
thesis). Stillingfleet's error is to confuse particular sensory
ideas which are lodged in the mind, with the idea of sense
experience itself. It is true that, from an idea in the mind we
cannot argue to the existence of an object corresponding to the
idea. For example, from the idea of a centaur it does not follow
that any such creature exists. However, if we compare the idea of
actual sensation (i.e. the process whereby the mind acquires ideas)
with the idea of an external cause of sensation we do perceive a
connexion between them. This knowledge (which clearly comes
within the terms of Locke's definition of knowledge) may be
expressed broadly by the proposition: 'sense experience must be
14
caused by things external to the mind'» That is to say, sense
experience does put us in touch with the external world. The
conclusion reached, in Locke's reply to Stillingfleet is that the
sceptical thesis is false; and that it is known to be false
•by the perceived agreement of ideas'.
14 Of course this proposition expresses Locke's thesis in a rather
unsatisfactory fashion. Sense experience is understood as
veridical experience of external objects. It would have to be
defined as such in order to escape the objection that pseudo-
sensations, such as hallucinations, are not in fact caused by
external objects. But it is difficult to arrive at a
definition which does not beg the question by making it an
analytic truth that sense-experience has an external cause.
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There are several things to be noted about Locke's argument in
this passage. In the first place, it assumes the causal principleo
Given the fact of a sensation there must be something which caused
ito Locke does accept the causal principle as a necessary truth
(See, for example, Draft A. Sect. 16; Draft B. Sect. 140; Essay,
IV, x, 3)« Secondly, it assumes that the mind cannot be the cause
of all its own ideas. Locke does argue this in the Essay.
Simple ideas, he holds, cannot be produced by the mind. ii,
27- Thirdly, and most important, all that Locke purports to prove
against Stillingfleet is the thesis that, 'we do know the existence
of things by our senses'. This is proved from a consideration of
ideas. However, it is not itself an example of our knowing the
existence of an external object by sense experience. That is, it
is not an example of sensitive knowledge. If we are to take Locke's
reply to Stillingfleet seriously (and there is no reason why we
should not) the knowledge we have of the real existence of external
objects, by the perceived agreement of idea3, consists in the
proposition asserting there to be external causes of our sense
experiences. It is, therefore, not particular examples of
sensitive knowledge that make up a sub-category of the knowledge
of real existence, but simply the one fact that there is an external
world which can be known by means of the senses. What then are
we to say of particular examples of sensitive knowledge, of those
cases when I know there is a desk in front of me because I see it,
or know there is a fire in the grate because I feel it? How do
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these fit into Locke's epistemology?
The doctrine of sensitive knowledge is introduced in a
discussion of the degrees of certainty of which the human mind is
capable. This takes up the second chapter of Book IV of the
Essay. It is in the preceding chapter that Locke gives his general
definition of knowledge and distinguishes the four categories of
knowledge. In the later chapter he is intent on giving an account
of the ways in which the mind knows.
The highest degree of certainty is said to belong to intuition,
in which the mind immediately perceives the agreement or dis¬
agreement of two ideaso The great part of what we know by intuition
is trivial, expressible in propositions such as, 'a circle is not a
triangle'o What Locke calls demonstration produces knowledge of
far greater importance, though of less certaintyo Demonstration
is required when the agreement or disagreement between two ideas
cannot be immediately ascertained. It is then necessary for the
mind to bring in intervening id.eas, which Locke calls proofs, in
order to make the relation holding between the initial ideas
perspicuous. The possibility of demonstration depends on intuition
in that the connexions between each proof must be intuitively cer¬
tain. However, there is an element of fallibility in demonstration
due to the fact that each step in a demonstrative argument must be
held in the memory till the conclusion is reached, and memory is
15
fallible.
15 It has often been noted that Locke's account of intuition and
/cont'd
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Both intuition and demonstration are concerned with connexions
between ideas. The knowledge we gain by intuition falls mostly
within Locke's first category; the knowledge of identity, or
16
diversity. Demonstration yields knowledge of relation; the
category to which Locke presumes most knowledge belongs. The
smallest degree of certainty is found at the point where knowing
breaks through the circle of ideas:
... intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of
our knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these,
with what assurance soever embraced, is but faith or
opinion, but not Knowledge, at least in all general
truths. There is, indeed, another perception of the
mind, employed about the particular existence of finite
beings without us, which, going beyond bare probability
and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the fore¬
going degrees of certainty, passes under the name of
knowledge., /iV, ii, \£j
Professor V'oozley has recently drawn attention to the hesitation
with which Locke admits 'sensitive knowledge'. He seems to regard
it as something of a poor relation in the family of intuition and
demonstration. It goes beyond 'bare probability' and therefore
17
•passes under the name of knowledge'. Further, whereas Locke
15 Cont'd
demonstration closely resembles the doctrine developed by Des¬
cartes in the Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii. However, the
influence of the Regulae on Locke's thought has recently been
questioned. Cf. Thomas O'Kelly: "Locke's Doctrine of
Intuition was not Borrowed from Descartes". /Philosophy, 197\J
16 However, it is to be remembered that, according to Locke, we
know our own existence by intuition.
17 See? "Some Remarks on Locke's Account of Knowledge".
72
simply presents intuition ana demonstration as two ways in. which the
mind gains knowledge, he finds it necessary to justify the
credentials of knowledge gained by the senses. That is, he argues
against the sceptical thesis that we can never know by sense
experience. ii, 14 and xi, 7 - &7 It Is to these arguments
18
against scepticism of the senses that Locke refers Stillingfleet.
It is not difficult to see why Locke should hesitate over
'sensitive knowledge'. He is aware that knowing the existence of
18 Although not strictly germane to our present purpose, Locke's
arguments against scepticism of the senses deserve attention.
For they are more than merely an expression of common sense
realism or a cavalier attitude towards the sceptic. The
objection he sets out to refute is the standard one; in dreams
I am deceived as to the existence of external objects. How
then can I be sure of any of my perceptions? How can I know
they are not all really dream deceptions? Locke's answer is in
three parts: 1) If the sceptic does suppose life to be a
dream, any proof of the external world will carry no weight
with him. He is bound in consistency to dismiss all such
arguments as dream deceptions; 2) There is a, "manifest dif¬
ference between dreaming of being in the fire and being actual¬
ly in it". 5) We know that some objects are sources of
pleasure and some sources of pain for us. We know this
whether or not these objects are really external or only dreamed
to be so; and "this certainty is as great as our happiness or
misery, beyond which we have no concernment to knov; or to be".
(3) is in part an expression of Locke's general attitude to
knowledge in the 'state of mediocrity*. However, if put
together in a slightly modified form-Locke's arguments do
constitute a persuasive refutation of the type of dream scep¬
ticism he considers. In this life there manifestly is a
significant contrast between dreaming and waking. It is this
contrast which gives the terms their meaning. The sceptic
assumes his position to be rational and meaningful. However,
tie proposition that, 'all life (including what we call-dreaming
and waking) is a dream' is strictly meaningless. For it robs
'dreaming' of any possible contrast. As this proposition is
meaningless, so is the sceptic's assertion that, 'all life might
be a dream'. His position is, therefore, meaningless and
irrational.
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a- particular external object by means of the senses does not amount
to a perception of the connexion between ideas. It follows that
what we gain when we know by the senses cannot, in accordance with
Locke's definition, be properly characterized as knowledge. Never¬
theless, Locke has proved in his argument against the sceptics that
sense experience is a genuine way of knowing, and it is a fact of
English linguistic usage that to know something is to have knowledge.
However, English usage is not sacrosanct. It was remarked earlier
that there are a variety of ways in which the words 'know' and
•knowledge' can be used. We may now add that it is a mistake to
assume that all these ways can be covered by a single definitiono
It is rather that the various uses are linked by what Wittgenstein
1 g
calls •family likenesses'o There is not one concept of 'knowledge'
and •knowing' , but a family of related concepts. Any definition
of knowledge is, therefore, sure to be restrictive. It will
encapsulate one concept of knowledge at the expense of others.
Therefore, it cannot but interfere with the ordinary connexion
between 'knowing' and 'knowledge'. Locke does not attempt a
systematic revision of the way in which we commonly use the words
'know' and 'knowledge'. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose
him unaware of the fact that his own definition of knowledge is
restrictive. It is simply that he is content to abide by the
19 The Blue Book, p. 17.
linguistic rule which allows the name of knowledge to that which
is known whatever sense of the verb ' to know' may be involved.
Indeed he is wise to refrain from linguistic revision here; for
it is likely that an alternative terminology would be impossibly
cumbersome
On the foregoing interpretation of Locke's doctrine there
is no need to conclude that, in his endeavour to reach the world
outside ideas, he developed a second theory of knowledge
inconsistent with his first, general theory. Rather he might
be said to have developed a theory of knowledge and a theory of
knowing. According to the former we have knowledge only when we
perceive the connection between ideas. We have knowledge when
we know something in the restricted sense of.understanding it.
For Locke, the understanding rests only with the apprehension of
necessary truths. Therefore, the objects of the understanding
(which constitute knowledge in the strict sense) are universal,
apodeictic propositions. What counts as a body of knowledge
is a system of these propositions. Mathematics stands as the
paradigm of such a systematized body of knowledge. What falls
20 As Woozley notes, Locke sometimes talks of 'being sure' rather
than 'knowing' when knowing beyond the circle of ideas is
involved. For example, at IV, iv, 18; "Whenever we perceive
the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, there is
certain knowledge; and whever we are sure those ideas agree
with the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge".
Again, at IV,xi , 3, he says of sensitive knowledge that, "it is
an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge".
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below this paradigm is, on Locke's account, not strictly knowledge
4- 21at alio
Locke contrasts the certainty of propositions constituting
knowledge with the probability belonging to propositions expressing
truths discovered by experience:
Probabilityo « . is always conversant about propositions
whereof ire have no certainty, but only some inducement
to receive them for true . . <> Thus, that fire warmed
a man, made lead fluid . . . that iron sunk in water
and swam in quicksilver: these and the like
propositions about particular facts, being agreeable
to our constant experience ... we are put past doubt
that a relation affirming any such thing to have been
or any predication /sic/ that it will happen again in
the same manner is very true. /TV, xv, 4 and xvi, 6/
The contrast Locke draws is, in effect, the familiar distinction
22
between a priori and a posteriori propositions. A priori
propositions go to make up knowledge while those which aire
a posteriori fall within the broad area of probability. Locke
21 Locke's 'knowledge' is closely related to what Aristotle terms
ep.isteme and the Scholastics called scientia. That is, a body
of propositions derived from evident premises in such a way
that their truth is guaranteed. Beth Aristotle and the
scholastics assumed what Locke calls natural philosophy to be
such a rigorous science. (See, for example, Aquinas: Summa
Theologiae. 1a, 84, 1). A similarly restricted conception of
knowledge is to be found in Descartes, who maintains that, "in
our search for the direct road towards truth we should busy
ourselves with no object about which we cannot attain a cert¬
itude equal to that of the demonstrations of Arithmetic and
Geometry". /Regulae in Works, Volo I, p. p/
22 Cf. Ro S. Woolhouse? Locke's Philosophy of Science and Know¬
ledge. p. 17.
does not think that, because a proposition is only probable, we
can always doubt its truth. Probability, (or, at least, the
highest degree of probability); "naturally determines the judgement
and leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as a
demonstration does, whether we will know or be ignorant" /j-Vt
xvi, 9, cf. IV, xvi, 0 So far as the knower is concerned,
then, the feeling of assurance generated by probability is no
different from that generated by knowledge. The difference
between knowledge and probability is not psychological, but logical.
On the one hand, the propositions which form part of knowledge are
necessary. They are true for every possible world in the sense
that their negations are self-contradictory, or entail self-
contradictions. On the other hand, although we can feel assured
(and be justified inour assurance) of the truth of probable
propositions, it is always logically possible that what they assert
is false.
Locke's theory of knowing may be said to cast a wider net
than his theory of knowledge. The mind knows first and foremost
by intuition. Intuition is a necessary condition for demonstration.
Both intuition and demonstration, consisting as they do in the
23 This degree of probability was often termed 'moral certainty'.
See, for example, the passage quoted from Chillingworth in
Robert R. Orr: Reason and Authority, pp. 51 - 52. Locke*
however, does not use this term. His aim is to divorce as
far as possible the certainty of knowledge from felt conviction
in the knower. For a general survey of the concept of
certainty in seventeenth-century thought, see Van Leenwen:
Op. Cit. passim.
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mind's perception of connexions between ideas, yield what is properly
knowledge. The third way of knowing distinguished in the Essay
does not yield knowledge. The mind knows by means of the senses,
but what is thus gained is expressed in propositions which are only
contingent, stating what happens to be the case. The greater
breadth of Locke's theory of knowing in comparison with his theory
of knowledge might be summed up thus: whereas there can be no
24
knowledge a posteriori, we can know a posteriori. " Thus we can
know whether or not our ideas have counterparts in the real world,
It is true that our knowledge derives solely from the consideration
of ideas; but the reality of knowledge is guaranteed by our capacity
to know beyond our ideas.
Y/hat, then, is the relevance of our interpretation of Locke's
general epistemological position for the specific problem of moral
know'ledge? Y7e have seen that Locke believes moral philosophy,
unlike natural philosophy, to be a sphere in which demonstration is
possible. But even if morality can be demonstrated (or made a science)
there must be something more to Locke's moral epistemology. The
demonstration of morality is a problem for the moral philosopher.
24 It should be noted that, according to Locke, we can strictly
only be said to know by the senses at that time when we
actually experience the external object. So-called sensitive
knowledge, "extends as far as the present testimony of our
senses, employed about particular objects that do affect them,
and no further". /vi, xi, 9; cf. IV, iii, 2j|7° On this
account the propositions expressing sensitive knowledge will be
something like the Protocol Sentences on which the Logical
Positivists sought to base knowledge.
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The ordinary moral agent does not have to wait upon the solution
of this problem in order to discover what he ought to do. If he
did his situation would be unfortunate in the extreme. For Locke
does not claim that morality ever has been successfully demonstrated;
and it is well known that he himself never produced such a
demonstration. Yet, as he does not doubt the existence of the
law of nature which binds all men, he must accept that the law has
been promulgated. That is, he must suppose men capable of dis¬
covering the content of the law for themselves.
Locke's belief that men can know the law of nature in what
might be called an everyday sense, as distinct from the esoteric
sense of demonstration, is quite explicit in the Essay. The
•candle of the Lord' is set up in the minds of men and gives all
the light they need for following the paths of virtue. 5, i. 5;
-7 25
IV, iii, 20/. The demonstration of morality would not create
knowledge of moral truths. Rather it would make perspicuous, and
place beyond the possibility of doubt, what men, in some sense,
already know. It would exhibit the law of nature in such a way
that the rational man could no more doubt where his duties truly lie
than he can now doubt the truths of mathematics, once he has
followed the proofs involved. This would not eradicate evil doing,
but it would eliminate moral error. The 'axiom of knowledge' in
25 The 'candle of the Lord' and the 'light of nature' were common
metaphors in the seventeenth-century. In the context of moral
philosophy they both may be defined as 'reason applied to
questions of right and wrong'. Cf. The Reasonableness of
Christianity, in Works, 7, p. 133.
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morals would be completely unassailable just as it is in mathem¬
atics. In order to understand Locke's moral epistemology, therefore,
we must answer two questions: How does Locke suppose men come to
know their duties? and, how does he suppose their duties can be
demonstrated? Strictly speaking the first question belongs to
Locke's theory of 'moral knowing'; his theory of 'moral knowledge'
*
being concerned only with demonstration. However, for the sake of
convenience, we will follow Locke in allowing the name of knowledge
to whatever is known.
With respect to the first of these questions; it has been
noted that the lav; of nature has an objective existence outside
the mind of men. Therefore moral knowledge, in order to be real,
must go beyond ideas. So far the only way of knowing beyond ideas
which we have considered is sense experience. But sense
experience hardly appears an appropriate means of discovering the
law of nature. Surely my knowing what I ought to do is quite a
different matter from knowing that there is a desk in front of me,
or that iron sinks in water. In a subsequent chapter it will be
argued that Locke does develop an account of how man came to know
the lav; of nature. Very roughly they can be said to know it
through experience. But, of course, the term 'experience' covers
far more than the rather limited kind of experience which is the
awareness of physical objects.
With respect to the second question; Locke's failure to
produce a 'demonstration' of morality has sometimes been taken as
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an indication that in the end he, at least implicitly, gave up the
belief in a demonstrable morality. It has been argued by Dr Abrams
that Locke's final position is a kind of moral fideism. Men
cannot know the law of nature, they can only know the divine
positive law revealed in the Gospels. It is faith, not reason,
which teaches men their duties. If Abrams is correct, Locke's end
is the direct opposite of his beginning. In his refutation of
Bagshaw he counters the puritan reliance on nothing but revelation
with the rationalist premise of a morality knowable by reason alone.
On Abraias' fideistic interpretation be finally transfers to the
opposite camp. It is true that Locke's letters reveal him as
being luke-warm on the subject when pressed by his friend William
Molyneux to carry out a demonstration of morality. Yet his
comments show that he has the project still in mind. What he urges
is the difficiilty of carrying it out. Further, he remarks that,
as the Gospel provides a perfect set of morals, reason may be
27
excused the task of demonstration. But the view that the
demonstration of morality is difficult, and that revelation is
an adequate substitute presupposes the belief that such a demon¬
stration is in principle possible. We may conclude that if
the project of a demonstrative science of morality is a wild goose
chase, Locke never realized that it was.
26 Abrams: Introduction to Two Tracts, esp. pp. 98 - 107, Cfo
Yolton's comments ,/Op. cit., pp. 178 - 180^7.
27 See Locke's Letters to Molyneux, 20 Sept.. 1692; 30 Mar.,




The key tern in Locke's epistemology is 'idea'. For, "We
can have knowledge no further than we have ideas". _ZlV> iii, 27
We have intuitive knowledge when "the mind perceives the agreement
or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the
intervention of any other". /iV, ii, ±7 Demonstration, which is
much the more considerable source of knowledge, "is the showing the
agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one
or more proofs which have a constant, immutable, and visible
connexion one with another". JjV, xv, J7 There are two major
infelicities to which the human understanding is subject, and which
severely limit the scope of demonstrative knowledge. First, "between
two different ideas we would examine, we cannot always find such
mediums as we can connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge
in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, we
come short of knowledge and demonstration". TlV, iii, Secondly,
a great many of our ideas are inadequate; "such which are but a
partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which
they are referred". 51, xxxi, i7 The second of these two
factors limits demonstration absolutely. Where we lack adequate
ideas, there demonstrative knowledge is impossible. However,
where our ideas are adequate demonstration is a possibility,
provided we can discover the proper intervening ideas. The first
limiting factor, therefore, serves as a challenge. Our know-
ledge is to be increased by seeking out ideas which will exhibit
connexions between the adequate ideas we do haveo It is because
Locke believes our ideas of physical substances to be inevitably
inadequate that he denies the possibility of a demonstrate.ve science
of nature. Conversely, he believes our moral ideas to be all
adequate. It is this latter belief vrhich forms the basis of his
view that morality can be made a science.
The central importance of ideas is not confined to Locke's
theory of intuition and demonstration, i.e. to the ways in which
the mind acquires what is strictly knowledge. We have said that
sensitive knowledge cannot be construed as a perception of
relations between ideas, and we have argued that Locke does not
so construe it. However, even examples of sensitive knowledge
involve ideaso For instance, my knowing that there is a desk in
front of me involves the idea of a desk. If I did not have this
idea I could not know what the object was. 'Idea', then, is at
the centre of Locke's entire epistemology; it dominates both ids
theory of knowledge and what we have called his ' theory of knowing'.
An understanding of Locke's 'idea' is, therefore, essential for an
understanding of his epistemology.
At the beginning of the Essay Locke defines 'idea' as,
"Yttiatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks
. . . whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever
it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking"• /J, i, S7
This definition, capacious as it is, does not fully cover all the
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ways 'idea' is used in the Essay» As defined here Locke's 'idea'
appears equivalent in meaning to the more modern, although equally
vague, term 'concept'. However in the second book of the Essay,
Locke introduces a somewhat different definition:
Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate
object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I
call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind,
I call quality of the subject wherein that power is.
Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the
ideas of white, cold and round, the power to produce those
ideas in us as they are in the snowball I call qualities;
and as they are sensations or perceptions in our under¬
standing, I call them ideas. .Zll> viii, 87
Despite the obvious similarities between the two definitions, in
the second 'idea' appears to be equivalent in meaning to 'sense-
datum' . As such it would be more at home in the philosophy of
perception than in a theory of knowledge.
Faced with this ambiguity the commentator seems forced to one
of two conclusions. On the one hand, Locke might be interpreted
as using the one term,'idea' to cover both concepts and sense data.
In which case there arises the problem of why Locke should use the
term thus. On the other hand, he might be interpreted as holding
that ideas, (concepts) are quasi-sense-data, or mental images.
Historically, it is the latter thesis which has been most
1
frequently attributed to Locke. 'Locke is understood as maintaining
1 For example, Berkeley's attack on Locke's doctrine of abstract
ideas assumes that for Locke such ideas are images. /SQG "the
/cont'd
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that to have an idea, or a concept,of a thing is to have a mental
image, or at least to have the abilitv to conjure up a mental
image, of that thing. This interpretation is highgly uncongenial,
for it means that Locke holds a doctrine which is patently false.
The thesis that concepts are mental images is false for the simple
and obvious reason that we can think and talk intelligibly about
things which cannot be imaged. But as we can think of these
tilings we must have concepts of them. Even if there is some
faint plausibility in the supposition that having the concept (say)
'red' consists solely in having a mental image of red, there is no
plausibility in the supposition that having the concept (say)
'number1 in any way consists in having a mental image. We can,
of course, connure up mental images of numbers (or numerals), but
the attempt to conjure up a mental image of number itself is
clearly absurd.
Locke does cite a great many ideas of things which cannot
be imaged: for example, ideas of mental operations such as willing
and perceiving; ideas such as 'unity' and 'existence', and, most
notoriously, the idea of pure substance in general. Yet there are
1 cont'd
Introduction to The Principles of Human Knowledge7 More
recently Professor Jonathan Bennett has argued that Locke's
double use of idea is more than a piece of terminological
ambiguity, but, "it embodies his substantive mistake, shared
with Berkeley and Hume and others in the empiricist tradition, of
assimilating the sensory far too closely to the intellectual".
/Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. p0 25/
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passages, particularly in the second book of the Essay, which suggest
that Locke does conceive of ideas as mental images simpliciter.
The two passages following are fairly typical of those in
which ideas are presented as images:
o « . our ideas do, whilst we are awake, succeed one
another in our minds at certain distances, not much
unlike the images in the inside of_a lantern, turned
round by the heat of a candle. /il, xiv, 2/
And, talking of the difference between clear and obscure ideas, he
writes:
The perception of the mind being most aptly explained by
words relating to the sight, we shall best understand
what is meant by clear and obscure in our ideas by
reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects
of sight. Light being that which discovers to us visible
objects, we give the name of obscure to that which is not
placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us
the figure and colour which are observable in it, and
which, in a better light, would be discernible. In like
manner, our simple ideas are clear, when they are such
as the objects themselves from whence they were taken did
or might, in a well-ordered sensation or perception,
present them ... so far as they either want anything of
the original exactness, or have lost any of their first
freshness and are, as it were_, faded or ternished by time,
so far are they obscure. /ll» xxix, 2J
It is not difficult to see what Locke is doing in these two
passages. In the first he is resorting to simile as an aid to
explanation. The train of thought in a person's mind is said to
be something like the passing of images. The first few words of
the second passage may be understood as a justification for the use
of this type of simile or metaphor in an account of the mental..
The language of visual sense perception is, Locke maintains, the
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most suitable terminology for describing the intellectual operations
of the mind. However, in neither passage is it asserted that any
ideas are in fact mental images. Far less is it asserted that all
ideas are mental images. An examination of other passages which
suggest the assimilation of ideas to images reveals the same
pattern. That is, theyare mainly metaphorical in intent. Thus,
at II, x, 5 ideas fading in a man's memory are likened to tomb
inscriptions effaced by time. At II, xi, 17 the understanding
is compared to a dark room, the senses being windows which let in
views, or ideas, of external things. At II, iii, 1 much the same
metaphor is applied, the brain being likened to the mind's presence -
room in which ideas entering via the senses are first received.
Admittedly there are other passages in which metaphor is not so
evident. At II, xxix, 8, for example, Locke talks of, "our ideas
which are, as it were, the pictures of things". Yet, given the
important qualification expressed in the phrase 'as it were', this
can hardly be taken as a statement that ideas are pictures, or
image s.
The most that can be concluded from the passages we have cited
is that Locke considers tallc of images, pictures and so on to
provide useful metaphors in an account of mental operations involving
ideas. However, if Locke's image/idea talk is metaphorical, then
he is not suggesting that ideas are images. On the contraxy, the
suggestion is that, literally speaking, ideas are not images. When,
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in the Conduct of the Understanding. Locke comes to discuss the use
of similes and metaphors, he explains that such expressions, "always
fail in some part, and come short of that exactness which our
conceptions should have to things if we would think aright". It
is true, that, "Figured and metaphorical expressions do well to
illustrate more abstruse and unfamiliar ideas which the mind is not
yet thoroughly accustomed to; but then they must be made use of
to illustrate ideas that we already have, not to paint to us those
which we yet have not". /Sect. xxxii/ A metaphorical assertion
is therefore quite distinct from the assertion of a literal truth.
There is, then, ample room for the first interpretation of
Locke's account of 'idea'. That is, he uses the one term to cover
concepts and sense-data. The question now arises; how is it
that Locke thinks himself justified in using 'idea''with such a
broad area of reference? The answer to this question lies in
Locke's empiricism; his thesis that all the mind's ideas, or
concepts, (no matter how complex, or seemingly remote from our
ordinary perceptions) derive ultimately from experience, i.e.
from sensation and reflection:
. . . even the most abstruse ideas, how remote soever
they may seem from sense, or from any operation of our
own minds, are yet only such as the understanding
frames to itself, by repeating and joining together
ideas that it had either from objects of sense, or from
its own operations about them: so that those even large
and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or reflection,
being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use
of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from
objects of sense or from the operations it observes in
itself about them, may and does attain to. j/ll> xii, 8/
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It is this thesis concerning the origin of ideas that Locke is
at pains to establish in the second book of the Essay.
We can see from the above passage that some ideas are built
up by the mind working with materials originally obtained in experience.
What Locke calls simple ideas (for example, the idea of red) are
furnished by experience; and from these basics the mind constructs
its entire range of complex ideas. Zll, ii» 2] Locke, then,
holds that, while some ideas derive from experience and nothing more,
others are the product of experience plus the activity of the mind.
Further, he holds that in the acquisition of simple ideas the mind
is passive; at least, it is passive in comparison with the
activity needed for the construction of complex ideas. xii,
Locke's empiricism is open to two slightly different
interpretations. In the first place, it may be taken as the thesis
that, whatever ideas the mind possesses, they are all causally
dependent on the mind's experience; either in that they are the
direct effects of experience, or that they are framed by the mind
from materials which are the direct effects of experience. Thus,
if a man possess the idea of red, this is the result of his having
seen red coloured objects. If he had been born blind he would not
possess the idea of red. This will apply, mutatis mutandis, to all
2 This is not to say that the mind is wholly and completely passive
even in the reception of simple ideas. Cf. John Yolton: "Locke's
Concept of Experience" in Martin and Armstrong.
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of a man's ideas, whether they be simple or complex® Understood
in this way, the empiricist thesis says something about the origin
or cause of ideas, but it does not say anything about the nature of
ideas themselves® So long as the concept of experience is not
closely defined this thesis is about as uncontentious as it is
possible for a philosophical thesis to be. Through a large part
of the second book of the Essay Locke is content with a vague
concept of experience® Having in the first book argued the
negative thesis that the mind has no innate ideas, he wishes to
show that those ideas which seem plausible candidates for innateness
can in fact be traced back to what may, in a rather indefinite
manner, count as experience® Thus, he concludes his account of
the ideas of duration, space, number and infinity with the remark:
"I pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude: it
suffices to my design to show how the mind receives them, such
as theyare, from sensation and reflection; and how even the idea
we have of infinity, how remote soever it may seem to be from any
object of sense or operation of our mind, has, nevertheless, as
all our other ideas, its original there". j/llj xvii, 2?]
At times, however, Locke does endeavour to tighten up his
concept of experience (to be exact, his concept of sense experience)..
His attempt lead to a much stronger empiricist thesis® On the
second interpretation, Locke's empiricism may be taken as the thesis
that the mind's simple ideas of sensation are quite literally reified
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sense-data.,or mental images. It is easy to see how the move from
the first to the second version of empiricism might come about.
If it is granted that some ideas (i.e. ideas of sensation, such as
the idea of red) are directly dependent on sensation, and that the
mind is passive in the acquisition of these ideas, it is tempting
to suppose such ideas caused by sensation in the sense of being
directly given in sensation. However, what the mind is directly
given in sensation is sense-data. When I see a red patch what I
have (the content of my experience) is a sense-datum of a red
patch. (Although, from this it does not follow that what I
really see is a red-patch-sense-datum). On this interpretation
of the relation between ideas and sense-experience, a man's having
the idea (say) of red would in fact consist in his having a mental
image of red, either present in his mind, or at least stored at
the back of his mind from whence it could be summoned when
occasion arose to think of red things. On the first, weak
empiricist thesis it is left an open question as to whether the
mind's simple ideas of sensation are different in kind from their
experential causes. The idea of red might be as different from its
cause as a pain is different from its cause. The second thesis
does not leave this open. The idea of red in the mind is the
exact counterpart of the sense-datum given in sensation.
If Locke holds the first empiricist thesis, his broad use of
'idea' may be put down as a piece of carelessness. The term is
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confusingly used to cover both what are properly speaking ideas
3
and what are properly speaking the causes of ideas. If he embraces
the second thesis, he might defend his use of 'idea' on the grounds
that some ideas (concepts) are quite literally reified sense-data.
It is doubtful that Locke consistently embraced either one of these
theses. It is more likely that his use of 'idea' is not only
confusing, but reveals a confusion in his own mind. It is,
therefore, probable that his empiricist position cannot be set
forth without ambiguity. In fairness, however, it should be
pointed out that he does appear to have some inkling of the dangers
inherent in his use of 'idea'<> For at one stage he introduces
the word 'impression', seemingly as a term for the immediate
content of experience:
These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the
understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter
when they are imprinted, nor blot them out and make
new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or
obliterate the images or ideas which the objects
set before it do therein produce. As the bodies
that surround us do diverseley affect our organs, the
mind is forced to receive the impressions; and
cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are
annexed to them. j/ll, i, 2^7
But this passage is hardly a model of lucidity. Moreover, even if
Locke's intention here is to distinguish impressions, or sense-data,
3 Locke adds to the confusion by sometimes using 'idea' to refer to
the powers existing in physical bodies which cause sense-data.
For example, . . we cannot observe any alteration to be made in
. . . anything, but by the observable change of its sensible ideas,
nor conceive any alteration to be made but by conceiving a change
of some of its ideas". /il, xxi, i~J
from ideas, he very soon slips into his broad use of 'idea* and
the distinction is lost.
One thing has clearly emerged from the discussion so far:
Locke's belief that the terminology of sensation can provide
illuminating similes ^.nd analogies in an account of mind's ideas.
We might say that it is at the level of analogy rather than the
ontological level that Locke assimilates the intellectual to the
sensory. While he gives no clear answer to the question of the
nature of ideas, his view that ideas can be usefully likened to
4
sense-data is made quite explicit.
The analogy drawn between ideas and sense-data, or images,
can be seriously misleading; and the errors which it suggests are
far more intractable than those involved in the thesis that
concepts are literally mental images. The mistake in the latter
thesis soon becomes apparent once we consider concepts other than
the concepts of those things which are the objects of sense
experience. For it is only the objects of sense experience which
can be mentally imaged. Locke does not hold sensation to be the
sole source of the mind's ideas. What he calls reflection is
4 In fact Locke avoids answering the ontological question of the
nature of ideas even when it is put to him directly. In reply
to John Norris he remarks first, that as all men have ideas they
can tell for themselves what ideas are. Second, he misinterprets
the question as one concerning the psycho-psychological processes
whereby ideas are produced in the mind. /remarks upon some of
Mr Norris's Books, Sect. 2. Works. 10, p. 245/• Needless
to say both Locke's remarks are no more than evasions of
Norris's question.
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an equally important aspect of experience. Reflection supplies
the ideas the mind has of its own operations; ideas such as,
"perception, doubling, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing."
/TL, i, 47 Even though Locke understands reflection as closely
parallel to sensation (so that reflection consists in the mind
peering within itself), he could not miss the absurdity of the view
that these ideas of reflection are literally mental images. On
the other hand, the much milder view that all ideas may be usefully
considered as analogous to images is not obviously absurd.
We can therefore say that, notwithstanding his confusing use
of the term, for Locke ideas are primarily concepts, and that he
5
understands concepts to be in some way analogous to images. To
say that Locke's ideas are concepts means no more than that they
carry out tasks which recent philosophers have assigned to concepts.
Locke's ideas perform three main functions; they make thought
possible, they serve as the meanings of words, and they are the
criteria whereby we classify particular things into kinds.
As Locke defines them, ideas are ' the ob.iects of the under¬
standing when a man thinks'. This does not imply that all we
ever think about are ideas as distinct from things. It is rather
that we think about things by means of our ideas, and this is the
5 Bennett, on the other hand, concludes that "Locke's'ideas' are,
first and foremost, sense-data". /pp. cit., p. 3iJ How¬
ever he no more than acknowledges the fact that Locke talks of
•ideas of reflection' as well as 'ideas of sensation'.
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only way v:e can think about them. For ideas serve as representations
of things. They are the signs of reality. As Locke explains to
Stillingfleet:
o . . since ... in all your lordship's knowledge, you
will allow, that you have some immediate objects of
your thoughts, which are the materials of that knowledge,
about which it is employed, those immediate objects,
if they are not . . . the very things themselves, must
be ideas. Not thinking your lordship . . . persuaded,
that as often as you think of your cathedral church,
or of Des Cartes's vortices, that the very cathedral
church at Worcester, or the motion of those vortices,
itself exists in your understanding ... I conclude,
your lordship has immediate objects of your mind, which
are not the very things themselves existing in your
understanding; which if, with the academics, you will
please to call representations ... rather than with
me ideas, it will make no difference. /Works. 4,
PPo 390 - 39i7-
Here Locke stretches the spatial metaphor, 'in the understanding'
beyond its limits. The supposition that when one thinks of an
object, such as a cathedral, the object itself is present in
one's understanding is clearly nonsensical. However, the fact
that this supposition is nonsense does not support the conclusion
that there is some other kind of entity 'in the understanding'
which goes proxy for the object in the external world.
Despite the weakness of his argument, Locke's explanation to
Stillingfleet does contain an important truth. We do need ideas
in order to think. For instance, if I think about 'the grass
outside my window', what I am thinking about is a patch of grass
in rebus. Nevertheless, my thinking about the grass is dependent
on my having idea.s. Suppose I think that the grass is green; I
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am able to form this thought only by virtue of having the ideas,
'grass' and 'green'. It is true that a man might, in some
circumstances, be correctly described as 'thinking about the grass*
even if he lacked the idea of grass. Having never heard of grass
he might simply be wondering what the patch of vegetation outside
his window was. But the important point is he could not be
thinking at all if he did not possess some ideas.
Granted that we cannot think without ideas, it might be
concluded that ideas themselves are some kind of entities the
possession of which gives us the ability to think. Locke does
accept this conclusion. To be exact, he assumes that ideas are
some kind of entities lodged in the mind. Nov/ the entity theory
of ideas encounters a great variety of difficulties. For the
present purpose it will suffice to give a brief account of one
of these difficulties: idea-entities (whatever their specific nature
may be) cannot serve in an explanation the human ability to think.
Here an analogy might be drawn between thinking and playing chess.
Both are things that v/e do. In order to play chess we need chess¬
men, just as we need ideas in order to think. However if a man
acquires a set of chess-men he does not thereby acquire the ability
to play chess. The ability to play chess is something he must
learn. Similarly, if ideas are conceived as entities of some
kind, the mind's acquisition of these entities cannot account for
the human ability to think. Moreover, the analogy between thinking
and chess breaks down at an important point. The pieces with which
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chess is played are observable entities. If it is accepted that
ideas are mental images, it goes without saying that they are
observable entities. But, as we have seen, the doctrine that ideas
are mental images is false. Now in the absence of this doctrine it
is difficult to find any support for the view of ideas as observable
entities. In defence, it might be argued that, although not
observable, ideas are entities none the less. They are entities
which we must postulate in order to explain the observable phenomenon
of human thinking. However, idea-entities do not explain our
ability to think. It is true that we think with ideas, just as we
play chess with chess-men; but neither thinking nor the playing of
chess can be explained in terms of entities. Idea-entities,
therefore, are not observable entities, nor does there appear any
reason to postulate them as unobservable entities.
As the entity theory of ideas is inevitably subject to
difficulties such as the above, it would be an achievement if the
whole theory could be abandoned. Happily, there is a much more
tenable alternative theory waiting in the wings. Given that there
is an intimate connexion between having ideas and the ability to
think, why not construe this connexion as one of identity? On
the new theory of ideas, to have ideas is. to have the ability to
think. To be more precise, to have ideas is to have the ability
to do a whole complex of things which can be grouped under the
vague heading of 'thinking'. For example, 'having the idea of'
a horse involves being able to recognize horses; being able to
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distinguish them from cows; knowing that horses are animals, not
vegetables, and so on. (it might even be the case that the
possession of some ideas, for example, ideas of colours, does involve
the ability to conjure up mental images.) This theory has been
6
termed the dispositional, or capacity, theory of ideas.
The most friendly critic could not pretend that Locke came
to any clear realization of the problems facing the entity theory
of ideas; much less that he made any decisive move towards a
dispositional theory. He always remains wedded to the belief
that ideas are some kind of entities somehow existing in the
7
mind or in the understanding. The best that can be said is
that there are passages in the Essay in which the idea-entity
appears less important that the human ability to 'do things with
ideas':
Neither would it carry any imputation of falsehood to
our simple ideas if . . . the same object should produce
6 For accounts of the dispositional theory of ideas see, Peter
Geach: Mental Acts, esp. Ch. 5; and Jonathan Bennett: Kant's
Analytic7~B 17-
7 Douglas Greenlee, on the other hand, has argued that Locke at
least comes close to rejecting the entity theory of ideas.^/"Locke's
Idea of 'Idea'" in Theoria, 19677° Greenlee bases his argument
largely on the following passage: "For if these words (to be in
the understanding) have any propriety, they signify to be under¬
stood. So that to be in the understanding and not to be under¬
stood, to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one
as to say: anything is and is not in the mind or understanding".
/l, ii, 5] However, when read in its context (Locke's polemic
against innate ideas) what Locke is saying amounts to this; the
child cannot be said to be born possessing innate truths which ha
is "yet wholly ignorant of". If these truths really are innately
in the understanding' then the child must know them. In this
passage Locke is not,as Greenlee assumes explicating the meaning
of the phrase, 'in the understanding'.
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in several men's minds different ideas at the same time:
v.g. if the idea that a violet produced in one man's
mind by his eyes were the same that a marigold produced
in another man's, and vice versa. For, since this could
never be known . . . neither the ideas hereby, nor the
names, would be at all confounded, or any falsehood be in
either. For all things that had the texture of a violet
producing constantly the idea which he called blue, and
those which had the texture of a marigold- producing
constantly the idea which he as constantly called yellow,
whatever those appearances were in his mind, he would be
able as regularly to distinguish things for his use by
those appearances, and understood and signify those
distinctions marked by the names blue and yellow, as if
the appearances or ideas in his mind, received from those
two flowers, were exactly the same with the ideas in other
men's minds. ]_II, xxxii, 157
Yet even this passage serves as an illustration of Locke's ambiguous
use of 'idea', and of the muddle to which the entity theory of ideas
gives rise.
The second function performed by Locke's ideas is that of
providing meanings for words. According to Locke, the difference
between words as mere articulate sounds and as meaningful components
of a language consists in the fact that, in the latter case, words
are signs of ideas. As God designed men to live in society, it
is necessary that they should communicate their thoughts one to
another. To this end men are endowed with a natural capacity to
frame sounds. Men make use of this capacity to develop a medium
in which the ideas private to the mind of the individual can be
given public expression. In this way words are made signs of
internal, invisible ideas, and language comes into being.
Till, i, 1 - 2; III, ii, .
This theory of meaning is a complete failure. It is
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vitiated by Locke's entity theory of ideas. According to Locke,
what makes the utterance of words (which in their public aspect
are no more than sounds) meaningful is their relation to ideas
in the mind of the speaker. The presence of these ideas is
absolutely necessary for meaningful discourseo To illustrate this
Locke cites the fact that parrots can be taught to frame words,
but what parrots say is not meaningful. The trouble is that
the ideas necessary for meaning are completely private to the
individual. It is quite impossible for one man to 'see' the ideas
in the mind of another. Therefore, the only person who can be
acquainted with both the uttered words and the ideas which give
them meaning is the speaker himself. Any other person has only
the uttered words to serve as an indication that there are ideas
in the speaker's mind. But the example of the parrot shows this
to be a very poor indication. On Locke's theory we simply can
never be sure whether the utterances of other people have any
more meaning than the 'language' of parrots. However, in the
great majority of cases, we have no difficulty whatsoever in being
sure of this; and the basis of our knowledge that an utterance
is meaningful is utterly remote from a perception of ideas in the
speaker's mind. The theory that words have meaning because they
signify ideas internal to the mind of each speaker, is therefore,
Q
false.
8 My argument here is borrowed from Bennett: Locke, Berkeley, Hume:
Central Themes, pp. 4-6.
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It should he noted, however, that what Locke expounds in the
third book of the Essay is not so much a theory of meaning as a
theory of words and of language. Locke sees language as essentially
a system of signs. Thus, ideas as vrell as words constitute a lan¬
guage. Whereas words signify ideas, ideas themselves signify
things. The outline of Locke's theory of language just given
suggests that he considers ideas to constitute a complete language;
one which is merely paralleled by verbal language. It is only
because the individual vrishes to communicate his thoughts to
others that words are necessary. In themselves, words are no
more than arbitrary signs applied to internal ideas. If
individuals gave up communicating with each other the public
language of words would be redundant, while the private language
of ideas would remain intact and be self-sufficient. Locke does
assume that ideas have autonomy with respect to words. In
discussing truth he distinguishes between mental and verbal prop¬
ositions, according, "as there are two sorts of signs commonly
made use of, viz. ideas and words". Jj-Vt v» 2J Nonetheless, he
admits that in practice the distinction cannot be a hard and fast
one. We cannot talk about a mental proposition, for when we
state such a proposition we immedaitely convert it into its verbal
form. More importantly, Locke realizes that, except at a very
rudimentary level, men cannot think without using words. But this
he considers a contingent misfortune due to the imperfections in our
ideas. , v, 3-^7
Notwithstanding these reservations (which suggests that words
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are something more than merely external signs applied to ideas)
Locke does hold the language of ideas to be the fundamental
language. This language we have seen to be private to each indiv¬
idual. There are good reasons for supposing the concept of a
private language, such as is the language of ideas, to be incoherent.
One thing is plain; even if a private language is a possibility,
its existence cannot explain the phenomenon of public, verbal
language. Locke's account of verbal language, like his account
of the meaning of words, comes to grief over the entity theory of
ideas. If ideas are entities in the minds of individuals, it is
logically possible that, by some remarkable chance, each individual
has affixed what are qualitatively the same words (or public sounds)
to what are qualitatively the same ideas. However, the important
point is, that, even if this were the case, it could never be
known to be the case. In the discussion of Locke's theory of
meaning it was argued that, merely from the occurence of verbal
utterances we have no right to conclude the existence of ideas in
the mind of the speaker. A fortiori, we have no right to conclude
that the ideas the speaker signifies by certain words are the same
as the ideas we signify by those words. Therefore, Locke fails to
explain how language can serve as a vehicle of human communication.
That is, he fails to explain what he grants to be the fundamental
feature of verbal language.
Locke does have some awareness of the difficulties attendant
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upon his theory of ideaso The following passage illustrates the
direction in which he might have escaped the entity theory of ideas,
and the consequent theory of langaage:
But though words . . . can properly and immediately
signify nothing hut the ideas that are in the mind of
the speaker, yet they in their thoughts give them a
secret reference to two other things.
First, they suppose their words to be marks of the
ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they
communicate: for else they should talk in vain and
could not be understood, if the sounds they applied
to one idea were such as by the hearer were applied to
another, which is to speak two languages. But in this,
men stand not usually to examine whether the idea they
and those they discourse with have in their minds be the.
same, but think it enough that they use the words as
they imagine in the common acceptation of that language,
in which they suppose that the idea they make it a sign
of is precisely the same to which the understanding men
of that country apply that name.
Secondly, because men would not be thought to talk barely
of their own imaginations, but of things as really they
are, therefore they often suppose their words to stand also
for the reality of things. /ill, ii, 4 - 5/-
Reading this passage one cannot but wonder what job Locke can find
for idea-entities. He concedes that communication between men
involves publicly agreed rules of linguistic usage. Further,
although his theory demands that words signify ideas in the mind, he
concedes that men use them to signify things in the world. It
would appear that the two 'secret references' (which, strictly within
the terms of Locke's theory, men cannot justify) are of primary
importance, while the absence of ideas in the mind might well never
be noticed.
In an explanation of the relation between language and ideas,
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the dispositional theory of ideas has a considerable advantage
over the rival entity theory. If 'having an idea' is understood
to mean, not the possession of an entity, but 'having a complex of
abilities' there is every reason why linguistic ability (the
capacity to use words meaningfully) should be included as part of
the meaning of 'having an idea'. Indeed there is every reason
why linguistic ability should be taken as central to the meaning
of 'having an idea'. For, as Locke admits, it is in fact
9
impossible for men to think above a primitive level without words.
On this analysis the problem of how public language (which must
be related to ideas) can possibly be related to ideas dissolves.
Thought and language are not separate from each other; they are
two aspects of the one thing, which, for convenience sake, may be
termed 'thinking'.^
Locke does not develop a dispositional theory of ideas but
always retains the view of ideas as entities lodged in the mind.
That he should retain this view is hardly surprising. The
dispositional theory arises from reflection on phenomena such as
9 Cf. Geach: "The central and typical applications of the term
"having a concept" are those in which a man is master of a bit of
linguistic usage; we can then reasonably extend the term to
cases sufficiently like these". /Op. cit., p. 187
10 It should be noted that the dispositional theory of ideas does
not entail a behavioural analysis of intellectual processes.
Ideas are definable in terms of capacities for doing things.
However, these capacities may well turn out to be irreduciably
mental.
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language.. Eut Locke does not develop his theory of ideas to explain
language or meaning, or even to explain thought. On the contrary,
he endeavours to explain these within the terms of an already
developed theory. This overall theory is shaped in accordance
with a picture which Locke accepts without question. The picture
may be dubbed that of the Cartesian Solitory, for if Descartes
was not the first to draw it, he is its great popularizer. Descartes
sees man as an essentially isolated being. That is to say,
according to Descartes, the individual can intelligibly suspend
belief in the existence of an external world and of other minds.
Moreover, from the one indubitable fact of his own existence the
individual can, as it were, rebuild the world around himself.
We saw in the previous chapter that Locke does not entertain
any doubts concerning the existence of the external world. He holds
that our senses put us in touch with reality, and presumably reality
includes other mind-endowed persons. Nevertheless, he accepts the
second, more important, feature of the Cartesian picture. He holds
that each individual builds up the world for himself out of the
material provided by experience. The simple ideas acquired by the
mind are grounded directly in experience, and from these the mind
constructs complex ideaso Once acquired, ideas serve as the means
whereby the mind classifies and orders its subsequent experience
of the world. It would be going too far to say that the Cartesian
picture entails the view that ideas are entities in the mind
functioning as tools for the classification of experience. Yet it
iub
certainly does strongly suggest this view. The individual is
conceived as primarily an observer of the world, rather than one
who is engaged in the world and with his fellows. What we would
expect from such an aloof observer is a classification of the
particular things he experiences. Again,it is easily seen that
anyone holding the dispositional theory of ideas is likely to find
the Cartesian picture of man highly uncongenial. On this theory
the acquisition of ideas is the acquisition of abilities, or
capacities to do things. Typically this will mean the mastering
of rules. Rules are interpersonal. Any number of individual's
can comply with, or fail to comply with, a given rule. Rules
develop because men are engaged with the world and with one another
and consequently need rules in order to regulate their behaviour
and to achieve common purposes. However, we think of the
classification of things as involving the application of standard
patterns, and a typical pattern (for example, a colour chart) is
an entity.
In the third place, then, Locke's ideas are the criteria in
accordance with which we classify particular things into kinds.
To be exact, this is the function Locke assigns to general ideas;
those ideas which are signified by general terms. Language,
Locke explains, would be of little use if each word uniquely
signified one particular thing. Men therefore invented general
terms, which, because they directly signify general ideas, can
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be used to refer to an indefinite number of particulars. General
terms make up the vast part of the words in any language. The
general ideas they signify are the ideas which enter into demon¬
stration, yielding knowledge, "which, though founded in particular
things, enlarges itself by general views, to which things reduced
into sorts, under general names, are properly subservient".
/in, iii, ^7 General ideas are patterns, and the words
signifying them name patterns.
Patterns are always ' of' something; they represent those
tilings which conform to them. Herein lies the cash value of Locke's
metaphorical use of words like 'picture' and 'image' when talking
about ideas. General ideas are not images inside a person's head,
/ \ 11
but, like images, they picture (i.e. represent; things. Patterns
may either be prior or posterior to the things they represent. For
instance, before any motor-cars were actually produced a pattern
of the motor-car was drawn up. The machines which were constructed
in conformity with this pattern were, by virtue of their conformity,
motor-cars. Such a prior pattern logically must provide an adequate
representation of the thing. Now that there are innumerable motor¬
cars in existence, a man might set himself the task of drawing up a
11 To say that something pictures something else is not necessarily
to say that it pictures it in the manner of a visual image.
Even things which cannot be seen can be pictured. Cf. Wittgen¬
stein' s use of the verb 'to picture': "The gramophone record,
the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand,
to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds
between language and the world". Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
4*® 014-o
pattern embodying all the essential features possessed by the actual
machines. This would be a posterior representation, and, as it
is posterior, it could be an inadequate representationo The man
might,through ignorance, faulty observation and so on,leave out of
his pattern certain features which are essential to the actual
motor cars. It is much the same with Locke's ideas. These may
be adequate or inadequate. On the one hand, he holds moral ideas
to be always adequate. As we shall see, their adequacy is due
to the fact that they are logically prior to what they represent.
On the other hand, he argues that ideas of physical substances,
which are posterior representations, are always inadequate. In
Locke's terminology, an idea is adequate if it expresses the real
essence of the thing it signifies; an idea is inadequate if it
expresses only the nominal, as distinct from the real, essence of
the tiling it signifies.
The distinction between real and nominal essence is one of
the most important pieces of Locke's conceptual apparatus. He
develops the distinction with respect to ideas of physical sub¬
stances, and for Locke the idea of a physical substance is the
paradigmatic idea.
Locke cites two meanings of the word 'essence': First,
"Essence may be taken for the being of anything whereby it is what
it is . . . in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the
essence of particular things, without giving them any name".
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Jill, iii, 1^7 This Locke terms 'real essence'. Secondly, in
its more familiar use, 'essence' means the genus and species in
which particular things are classified. Locke considers genu3 and
species artificial constructions of the human mind; "it being
evident that things are ranked under names into sorts or species,
only as they agree to certain abstract ideas to which we have
annexed those names, the essence of each genus or sort comes to be
nothing but that abstract idea which the general or sortal ...
name, stands for". /lbido^ Essence in this sense Locke terms
' nominal essence'.
Concerning the real essence of physical bodies there are two
opinions:
The one is of those who, using the word essence for
they know not what, suppose a certain number of those
essences, according to which all natural things are made
and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake,
and so become of this or that species. The other and
more rational opinion is of those who look on all natural
things to have a real, but unknown, constitution of their
insensible parts, from which flow those sensible qisLities
which serve us to distinguish them one from another,
according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts,
under common denominations. /ill* 127
The opinion which Locke rejects is the doctrine of hypostatized
universals, or substantial forms. The 'more rational opinion',
which he endorses, is the corpuscular theory of matter. According
to the latter theory the macro-bodies of the physical world are
composed of minute corpuscles, or atoms, in different configurations.
Certain properties of bodies, such as figure and motion, are
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objectively present in the bodies themselves; while others, such as
colour and taste, are dependent on a perceiving subject. Physical
objects are not really coloured, but they have the power to produce
colour sensations in the perceiver. This power is due to nothing
more than the arrangement and motion of the bodies' constituent
corpuscles. Considered as an account of the ultimate nature of
matter, the corpuscular theory is, Locke stresses, no more than a
likely hypothesis _/lY, iii, 167* However, the theory is also
important because, as it is expounded by Robert Boyle in The Origin
of Forms and Qualities, it provides a theory of universals which
does not violate Locke's fundamental ontological principle: "All
things that exist /are/ particulars". /II I, iii, 17
Philosophers have called upon universals to solve two
different problems. The first may be summed up in the question,
'what makes a particular thing to be what it is?'; the second in
the question, 'how are particular things distinguished into kinds?'.
The doctrine of substantial forms provides an answer to both questions.
A particular thing is what it is because it partakes in a universal
real essence, or form, which exists independently of the particulars
it shapes. A particular thing is of a specific kind by virtue
of its form, which is the genus or species to which the thing
belongs. Boyle answers both questions in terms of the corpuscular
theory. What makes a particular thing to be what it is, i.e., have
the qualities it does have, is its particular internal atomic
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structure. A particular thing is of a specific kind because
men, noticing that many particular tilings exhibited similar qualities,
agreed to distinguish things into kinds according to those similarities.
The theory of universals which Locke takes over from Boyle is
primarily a theory of classification (and thus- an answer to the
first question). Nevertheless, Locke takes for granted the intel¬
ligibility of the problem of what makes a particular thing to be
what it is. Boyle is annious to prove that qualitative changes
occurring in bodies can beexplained in purely mechanical, quantitative
14
terms. Therefore, in his positive doctrine, he has little need
for the concept of a form which imposes a specific kind of being on
a particular thing. A body is as it is, and can undergo certain
15
changes, because God has so arranged its constituent atoms. In
Locke's epistemology the concept of form (or, as he terms it, 'real
essence') is cf considerable importance. For Locke, each particular
body has a real essence and its real essence imposes a logical
necessity on that body. It is not simply that a body does in fact
exhibit certain qualities because of its real essence; it is
logically necessary that it exhibit those qualities, and any other
12 See The Origins of Forms and Qualities, in Boyle's Works, ed.
Birch (1744) Vol. 2, p. 483.
13 Op. cito, p. 469
14 Op. cit., p. 459
15 Op. cito. p. 483
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body having the same real essence logically must exhibit the same
qualities. Because we cannot penetrate to the real essence of
bodies, our ideas of them are always inadequate. They fail to
capture the necessity which Locke assumes to lie at the heart of
physical substances.
For Locke the doctrine that the real essence, or form, of a
16
body is an existent universal is simply unintelligible. In view
of the incoherence of this doctrine, he concludes that the real ess¬
ences of bodies must be their particular internal structures.
This 'real constitution' of bodies is the configuration of corpuscles
postulated by Boyle (or, at least, it is something very like this
configuration). The reference of the term 'real essence' is,
then, 'the particular internal structure belonging to a body';
but its sense is 'that which logically compels a body to have
specific properties' o
However, irrespective of the knowability of the real essences
of bodies, we distinguish them into kinds in accordance with what
Locke calls nominal essence. That is to say, we classify bodies
by ranking them under the general ideas we have framed ./ill, vi, 367.
Thus, to talk of the essence of a thing which has been classified
under a general name is to refer to the nominal essence which, on
16 Cf. Locke's second reply to Stillingfleet: "... the difficulty
to me, is, to conceive an universal nature, or universal any
thing, to exist; which would be, in my mind, to make an
universal a particular: which, to me, is impossible".
/Wks, 4, p. 1667
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Locke's account, belongs to the general idea. General ideas, as
they are entities existing in the mind, are, like everything else,
particular beings® It is only in their function as patterns
according to which things are sorted into kinds that they can be
called universals. So that, "general and universal belong not to
the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures
of the understanding made by it for its own use, and concern only
signs, whether words or ideas® /ill, iii, 117
Following Boyle, Locke supposes that we frame our general ideas
of physical substances by abstracting from observed similarities:
o . . the sorting of /things/ under names is the work¬
manship of the understanding, taking occasion, from the
similitude it observes amongst them, to make abstract
general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names
annexed to them, as patterns or forms, ... to which,
as particular things existing are found to agree, so they
come to be of that species, have that_denomination, or are
put into that classis® /ill, iii, 11/
Locke's doctrine of abstraction encounters a considerable difficulty®
For, in accordance with what we have called the Cartesian picture,
Locke assumes that each individual creates his own abstract general
ideas de novo. For instance, at III, iii, 7 the child is said to
gather together empirical similarities observed in his nurse, his
parents etc., and to unite these similarities into the single
complex idea 'man'® But how is the child to know which similar¬
ities to select from his experience? Prior to his forming any
general ideas, he is, by hypothesis, faced with a world of undif-.
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ferentiated particulars. However, any one particular thing may
empirically resemble, or fail to resemble, any other particular
thing in an indefinite number of ways. For, we do not just observe
similarities between objects; rather, it is objects which are
observed to be similar' to one another in certain respects. What
similarities we select depends on a number of factors; primarily
17'
on our shared interests and purposes.
At present this difficulty in Locke's account of the original
formation of general ideas need be no more than noted. For in
his analysis of our ideas of physical substances, Locke clearly
does have a range of interests in view; those of the natural
philosopher whose purpose, as Locke conceives it, is to grasp
physical substances in their essential nature. Locke believes
that this purpose can never be carried out because our ideas of
physical substances are inevitably inadequate. But, as yet, no
reason has been given for Locke's opinion. Why should not the
nominal essence of the idea the natural philosopher forms from
observation exactly correspond to the real essence belonging to
things as they exist in reality?
Locke gives three arguments to prove that our ideas of
17 At I, xi, 9, Locke cites the simple abstract idea of whiteness.
Given this example his doctrine has somewhat more plausibility.
It might be argued that we do just observe similarities of
colour. The difficulties of Locke's doctrine are multiplied
if we insist, as does Berkeley, that abstract ideas must be
literal images. However, an abstract image is not necessarily
an absurdity. Cf. Bennett Op. cit., pp. 35 - 43°
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physical substances are always inadequate. First, our powers of
vision are too weak for us to observe remote physical bodies, or
to see the minute particles which make up those bodies close at
hand. /lY, iii, 2. Secondly, bodies are 'retainers' to
other bodies for many of the qualities they exhibit. By this
Locke means that, contrary to our picture of things, particular
bodies do not possess their qualities in themselves, separate from
all other bodies, but as parts of a network of interconnected
entities which together make up the physical world Jj-Y, vi, 11 -
1Q
12/ Finally, the nature of the causal connexion existing
between the objective primary qualities of bodies and. the sub¬
jective secondary qualities produced in the observer is inconceivable:
... we can by no means conceive how any size, figure,
or motion of any particles can possibly produce in us
the idea of any colour, taste, or sound whatsoever:
There is no conceivable connexion betwixt the one and
the other. /j-Y, iii,
Hence, even if we could surmount the difficulties listed in the
first two arguments, our ideas of physical substances would still
be inadequate. If we could make observations at the level of
the ultimate constituents of bodies, and if we could somehow
overcome the problem of the interconnectedness of things in
nature, then our ideas of physical substances would picture that
which constitutes the real essence of bodies, i.e. their real
18 Cf. Boyle: Op. cite, p. 464.
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constitutions. However, even these detailed ideas would not grasp
the logical connexion between the bodies internal structure and its
secondary qualities. That is, they would not express the real
essence as it is the form of the body, making it 'to be what it
is'. We would only know that a certain structure does in fact
produce certain colours etc., we could not know why it logically
must produce those colours. In consequence our ideas of physical
substances do not yield knowledge:
In vain . . . shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas
(the only true way of certain and universal knowledge)
what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with
that of our complex idea of any substance: since we
neither know the real constitution of the minute parts on
which their qualities do depend; not, did we know
them, could we discover any necessary connexion between
them any of the secondary qualities; which is necessary
to be done before we can certainly know their necessary
c.o-existenceo /iY, iii, 1*7
Therefore, natural philosophy, or the study of physical substances,
19
cannot achieve the status of a science.
Locke agrees that a proposition such as 'All gold is malleable'
appears to be both universal and certain. However, this is only
because we have included the idea of malleableness as part of the
nominal essence of our idea of gold. We cannot be certain that
19 Locke does believe that, if we could observe the minute
constituent parts of any two bodies, we should have knowledge
of the operations of these bodies one upon the other. That is,
we could know what mechanical quantitative changes one would
produce in the other. ,/lY, iii, 13 and 2^7. What we cannot
conceive is how secondary qualities .such as colour, have a
purely mechanical basis.
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the substance' we call gold is necessarily malleable. For, "The
connexion that malleableness has (if it has any) with those other
qualities, being only by the intervention of the real constitution
of its insensible parts, which since we know not, it is impossible
we should perceive that connexion, unless we could discover that
which ties them together". 37 If we could express the
real essence, or form, in our ideas of physical substances, Locke
supposes that the propositions of natural philosophy would be
universal and certain;
... if the formal constitution of this shining, heavy
ductile thing (from whence all these its properties flow)
lay open to our sense, as the formal constitution or
essence of a triangle does, the signification of the word
golji might as easily be ascertained as that of triangle.
/HI, xi, 227
That is, the study of bodies would achieve equality with Locke's
paradigm of knowledge, mathematics.
Locke's denial tha.t men can achieve knowledge in the sphere
of nature and his argument that our ideas of physical substances are
inevitably inadequate are, then, two sides of the one coin. But
is Locke's conception of the real essence of bodies, and his
distinction between it and the nominal essence of ideas, coherent?
There are strong reasons for concluding that it is not.
Locke dismisses the doctrine of substancial forms as
unintelligible. Yet he does not reject all aspects of the doctrine;
he retains the concept of ' form'. As the form, or real essence, of
a body cannot be an hypostatized universal, Locke concludes it to be
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the particular internal structure, or real constitution, of the body.
But can this reference bear the sense of the term 'real essence'?
On the traditional doctrine forms are universals (although they need
not be universals existing independent of all particular things).
The assertion that it is essential to a particular piece of gold to
be malleable is explained on the grounds that it possesses the form
of gold, and if a particular thing possess this form then it is
malleable. In these terms the logical connexion between a tiling
being gold and being malleable is quite apparent. However, according
to Locke, to give a general name to a particular is immediately
to rank it under a general idea, and thereby treat it as a kind of
thing. Thus, to talk of a quality being essential to a pjese of
gold is to refer to the nominal essence of our idea. Strictly,
one cannot say of a bare, unnamed particular that it has anything
essential to it,
... take away the consideration of its being ranked
under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is
nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it.
£Lii, vi, 6720
What Locke means is that it is not essential to any particular
body that it have the real essence, or real constitution, it does
have. However, given the contingent fact that a particular does
have a specific real constitution Locke assumes it to be logically
20 The passage from which this quotation is taken has occasioned
some confusion among Locke's critics. For example, R. F.
Anderson argues that here Locke gives up his belief that
bodies have a real essence. See "Locke on the Knowledge of
Material Things", in Journal of the History of Philosophy
1965. But Cf. R. S. Woolhouse: Locke's Philosophy of Science
and Knowledge, pp. 110 111.
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necessary that it exhibit the qualities it does exhibit. But what
is the cash value of 'logically necessary' here? Locke maintains
that the nature of the necessary connexion between the real con¬
stitution of a body and its secondary qualities is beyond the
comprehension of human understanding. From our point of view the
fact of the connexion can be attributed to nothing else but "the
arbitrary determination" of God. ^IV, iii, 28J Now it is
extremely difficult to see how this connexion can be both logically
necessary and an 'arbitrary determination'. At this stage Locke's
concept of real essence is 'the being of anything whereby it is
vihat it is' tends to lose meaning altogether.
Without going into details we might say that Locke's doctrine
of the real essence of physical substances arises from an ill-
advised attempt to combine two different conceptual schemes. He
accepts the ontology of nature expressed in the corpuscular
philosophy, yet endeavours to retain the mode of explanation developed
under the auspices of the Aristotelian ontology of forms. But the
doctrine of forms cannot be successfully reinterpreted in terms of
the corpuscular theory of matter. If the latter philosophy is
accepted it must also be accepted that a completely demonstrative
science of nature, based on the knowledge of forms, is not merely
something beyond the human understanding, but is a chimera. It
was not Locke but his conservative minded opponent, Stillingfleet,
who realized, "that according to the Atomical Principles, no Rational
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account can be given of those Effects which are seen in Nature".
If we take a 'rational account' to be one in which necessary
connexions are exhibited a priori (as they are in mathematics)
Stillingfleet would appear to be in the right; within the terms
of the corpuscular philosophy Nature cannot be rational.
Locke draws his distinction between real and nominal essence
with respect to our ideas of physical substances; and it might well
be concluded that in this context it raises more difficulties than
it solves. However, he carries the distinction over into a
discussion of quite different ideas. Having examined Locke's
account of ideas in general and said something of his account of
the ideas of physical substances in particular, we can now turn to
the ideas of morality, or moral notions.
21 Orignes Sacrae: or. A Rational Account of the Grounds of




Besides ideas of substances, Locke discusses two further
classes of ideas: modes and relations. Though, as a natural law
theorist, Locke conceives the relation between human action and law
to be fundamental in morality, his account of our moral ideas is
given in terms of modes. What he has to say about relations is,
therefore, not strictly relevant to the present topic, and may
be safely left to one side. Modes, as the name suggests, are
modifications of things. A mode cannot be conceived as existing
by itself. Actions, for example, are modes; they cannot be
thought of except as dependent on an agent. (To be precise we
should say that what a mode signifies cannot be conceived as
existing by itself. However, for reasons which will soon become
apparent, Locke finds it difficult to formulate a clear-cut
distinction between modes as ideas and modes as things signified
by ideas.) Modes are simple or mixed. Simple modes are homo¬
geneous, consisting in a repetition of the same simple idea;
mixed modes are hetrogeneous, combining together ideas of different
kinds. /II, xii, 4 - By far the greater part of our moral
ideas fall within the sub-class of mixed modes. This is because
most mixed modes signify actions, and human action is the province
of moralitv. /il, xxii, io7
Like our ideas of substances, mixed modes are framed by the
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mind uniting a number of simple ideas into one complex. However,
there is an important difference between these two classes of ideas.
We have seen that in the construction of general ideas of substances
the mind abstracts similarities existing between the sensible
qualities exhibited by bodies in nature. Once they are framed,
ideas of substances constitute patterns in conformity with which we
classify particular things; but in framing them we copy patterns
which, Locke assumes, have a prior and quite independent existence
in nature.^ In contrast to ideas of substances, mixed modes are
•arbitrary1 creations of the mind which, "combines several scattered
independent ideas into one complex one and, by the common name it
gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, without
regulating itself by any connexion they have in nature. v> .§7
As a consequence, mixed modes achieve what Locke has argued it is
impossible for our ideas of substances to achieve. In the case
of mixed modes the nominal essence of the idea coincides with the
real essence of that which is signified:
• • » the names of mixed modes always signify ... the
real essences of their species. For, these abstract
ideas being the workmanship of the mind and not referred
to the real existence of things, there is no supposition
of anything more signified by that name, but barely
that complex idea the mind itself has formed; which is
1 Cf. Locke to Molyneux, 20 Jan, 1692-3: "This I do say, that
there are real constitutions in things, from whence these simple
ideas flow, which we observe combined in them. And this I
farther say, that there are real distinctions and differences
/cont* d
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all it would have expressed by it, and is that on which
all the properties of the species depend, and from
which alone they all flow; and so in these the real
and nominal essence is the same. ^Tll, v, 117
Mixed modes are all adequate ideas; "Because they, not being
intended for copies of things really existing, but for archetypes
made by the mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want
anything: they having each of them that combination of ideas and
thereby that perfection which the mind intended they should, so
that the mind acquiesces in them and can find nothing wanting".
xxxi, 27
It can be seen that Locke's 'mixed modes' are what, in the
preceding chapter, we called 'prior representations of things'.
As the pattern of the motor-car, constructed by the inventor
before any such machines are produced, exactly determines what
any actual motor-car must be, so a mixed mode in a person's mind
determines what reality must be if it is to answer to that mode.
Again, if it had been the case that no motor-cars were actually
produced, the pattern of the motor-car thought up by the inventor
would nevertheless exist. Similarily, mixed modes may be
1 Cont'd
in those real constitutions, one from another; whereby they
are distinguished one from another, whether we think of them,
or name them, or no: but that that whereby we distinguish
and rank particular substances into sorts, or genera and species
is not those real essences, or internal constitutions, but such
combinations of simple ideas, as we observe in them. /Works.
9, PPo 305 - 3067
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constructed quite independently of there being anything in the
world signified by them:
Who can doubt but the ideas of sacrilege or adultery
might be framed in the minds of men, and have names given
them, and so these species of mixed modes be constituted,
before either of them was ever committed; and might be as
well discoursed of . . . whilst yet they had no being but
in the understanding, as well as now that they have but
too frequently a real existence? v>
The fact that mixed modes are prior representations explains
Locke's awkward use of the term 'mode' (as in the above passage)
to mean both a type of idea in the mind and what is signified by
that type of idea. Whereas in the formation of our ideas of
substances we copy and endeavour to sum up a world which is
'already there' irrespective of our own existence, in forming
mixed modes we create a possible world the actuality of which
depends on things conforming to our ideaso Thus, on the one hand,
it is easy for Locke to talk without qualms about ideas of
substances; for substances exist quite independently of our ideas.
On the other hand, it is only because we have constructed mixed
modes that there can exist anything for them to be the mixed
modes of. Insofar as the phrase 'idea of x' suggests an 'x'
existing independent of any idea, it is misleading when the idea
in question is a mixed mode. We will term this highly important
creative feature of mixed modes their 'ontological priority' over
the things they signify. In view of this difference between ideas
representing substances, and mixed modes (or ideas of mixed
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modes) Locke calls the latter 'notions'. " In what follows we vail
adopt Locke's terminology.
From the ontological priority of notions over things it follows,
according to Locke, that notions are always real, and any knowledge
they yield 'real knowledge'. In this they differ sharply from
ideas of substances. The latter, "being made all of them in
reference to things existing without us, and intended to be repres¬
entations of substances as they really are, are no further real than
as they are such combinations of simple ideas as are really united
and co-exist in things without us". 51, XXX, 57 It is far
otherwise with notions. So long as the ideas combined are
consistent one with the other, the notion is said to be real; for
"having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men,
there is nothing more required to this kind of ideas to make
them real, but that they be so framed that there by a possibility
of existing comformable to them". /il, xxx, Because notions
are always real the perception of relations between them always yields
2 The mind often exercises an active power in making these several
combinations; for, it being once furnished with simple ideas,
it can put them together in several compositions and so make
variety of complex ideas without examining whether they exist so
together in nature. And hence I think it is that these ideas
are called notions: as if they had their original, and constant
existence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of
things; and to form such ideas, it sufficed that the mind put
the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the
understanding, without considering whether they had any real
being. /il, xxii, 2] Locke distinguishes between 'notion'




o . • we cannot but be infallibly certain that all the
knowledge we attain concerning these ideas ^notions/
is real and reaches things themselves a Because in all
our thoughts, reasonings, and discourses of this kind,
we intend things no further than as they are conformable
to our ideaso So that in these we cannot miss of a
certain and undoubted reality. j/lVt Iv» 57
Clearly the term 'real' is being applied to notions on different
grounds from those on which it is applied to ideas of substances.
The reality of notions is a function of their independence from the
external world; ideas of substances are real if they conform to the
external world. However, as notions and ideas of substances
are different kinds of ideas, this difference in criteria for
application for the term 'real' is quite in order. What does
appear odd is Locke's move from the reality of notions to the reality
of the knowledge in which they enter. He says that the mind can
construct any notions provided only they meet the requirements of
logical consistency. On what criterion can knowledge concerning
notions be called 'real'? On the face of it notions would seem
to have severed all links with reality. Locke's conception of
reality as he applies it to ideas and to knowledge is in need of
exegesis if this move is not to be intolerably odd.
We should be careful not to confuse 'real ideas' with
'adequate ideas'. Our ideas of substances all, "want something
we should be glad were in them, and so are all inadequate".
Tii, xxxi, ^7 Nonetheless, these ideas are real, provided what
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they purport to represent does exist in nature. Thus, although
inadequate, the idea of gold is real; while the idea of a centaur
is 'fantastical', there being no such creature in the world.
xxx, $} With respect to substances, then, the reality and
adequacy of our ideas are quite separate considerations. In the
case of our notions, there being no gap between the nominal essence
of the idea and the real essence of the thing signified, there can
be no question of inadequacy. That is, because it is reality
which must measure up to our notions there is no possibility of
their misrepresenting reality. Thus, from nothing more than the
contemplation of a notion we can tell exactly what a segment of
reality, logically, must be like if it is to answer that notion.
With respect to notions, then, reality and adequacy go hand in
hand.
We can now see how Locke might justify his application of the
word 'real' to both certain ideas of substances and to all notions.
An idea of a substance is real if what it represents actually exists.
Notions are all real because if there is anything in reality
corresponding to them, they cannot misrepresent it. In both cases
'realness' is concerned with felicity of representation. However,
the move from the reality of our notions to the reality of the
knowledge into which they enter still remains obscure. For the
knowledge we gain from our notions is only hypothetical. From the
notion itself we can tell what any corresponding reality must be;
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but we cannot tell whether there is a corresponding reality. It is,
for example, a purely contingent fact that actions corresponding to
the notions of sacrilege and adultery do exist in the world. Like¬
wise, it is a contingent fact that centaurs do not exist in the
world. Yet, as 'centaur' is an unreal, or fantastical, idea in
no circumstances can it enter into real knowledge. As Locke has
committed himself to the application of the epithet 'real knowledge'
to hypothetical propositions concerning adultery, sacrilege and
such like (and would be so committed even if chastity and religious
piety were universal), how can he be justified in -iri.thhold.ing this
epithet from hypothetical propositions concerning non-existent things
such as centaurs?
The answer to this question lies in the differing intentions
Locke assumes to be behind the formation of ideas of substances and
the formation of notions. In forming ideas of substances we intend
to represent and classify objects existing in the external world.
Therefore, every idea of a substance carries the implication that
there is something in the world corresponding to that idea. Our
ideas always falling short of the real essence of substances, they
can never be completely adequate representations. However, the
formation of fantastical ideas frustrates our intention at the very
beginning. We are, of course, able to frame ideas of centaurs etc.
from material gathered in sensation. Propositions concerning
centaurs are not false, but they imply a falsehood; that centaurs
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exist. To call such propositions real knowledge would be to
3
acquiesce in a falsehood..
Although Locke talks of the mind proceeding in an arbitrary
fashion in its formation of notions, he does not suppose them to
be random creations. Notions are arbitrary only in contrast to
ideas of substances, the latter being framed in accordance with
pre-existing patterns presented to the mind. As notions are not
restrained by external patterns any notion will be real so long as
it keeps within the bounds set by logic0 Nevertheless, in practice
men do not frame just any notions; they frame notions to accord
with their interest and purposes. Locke makes this point quite
explicit:
. . . the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into
complex ideas such as it finds convenient ... I do
not say this is done without reason . . . but' this I
say, that it is done by the free choice of the mind
pursuing its own ends . . . and there is nothing more
evident than that for the most part, in the framing
of these ideas, the mind searches not its patterns
in nature, nor refers the ideas it makes to the real
existence of things, but puts such together as may
best serve its own purposes. Jill, v,
3 This is not to say that the use of 'centaur' is always
misleading. When used in the context of an undisguisedly
fictional narrative, for instance, the word does not carry
the implication that centaurs exist, as men and horses exist.
But it is to be remembered that, in his analysis of ideas of
substance, Locke has in the forefront of his mind the interests
of the natural philosopher, and the factual use of language.
Despite his early predilection for Romances, Locke, in later
life, had very little time for the "willing suspension of
disbelief' demanded by works of imagination. Cf. his remarks
on poetry in Some Thoughts concerning Education. § 174.
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Assuming men to be clear as to their purposes, it follows from the
fact that they have a free choice in the forming of notions that
whatever notions they do form will fulfil their intentions. It
is on this ground that notions are always real and the perception
of relations holding between them real knowledge.
What has been said so far may be summarized briefly: Notions
are not intended to represent a pre-existing reality. On the
contrary, they are ontologically prior to any reality which
corresponds to them. In forming notions, therefore, men create
possibilities which may or may not be actualized in the worldo
Although in theory any ideas which are not inconsistent with one
another can be combined into notions, in practice notions are
framed in accordance with human interests and purposes. It was
also stated that most notions are notions of actions and that
therein lay their importance with respect to morality. But as yet
the question of how notions and actions are related and the relevance
of the relation to morality has not be raised. We must now
endeavour to add seme flesh and blood to what up to now has been a
somewhat abstract discussion.
Locke mentions many different notions of actions in the Essay.
The following is by no means an exhaustive list: drunkenness,
lying, sacrilege, murder, fencing, running, revenge /lI, xxii, 1,
3» 9, 107; adultery, parricide, incest JjIIt v, 5 - §7° He also
includes dispositions to action, such as boldness and testiness-
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51, xxii, 1o7o Given what we have termed the ontological priority
of notions, it follows that, if the notion did not exist the
corresponding action could not exist.
The priority of notions over the existence of actions is more
easily seen in some cases than in others. Talcing Locke's example
'fencing', the dependence of the action on the notion is fairly
obvious. Fencing involves bodily movements on the part of the agento
An observer intent on describing only what he actually saw would
confine himself to these movements. But Ms description, no matter
how detailed, would not add up to a description of the action of
fencing. (indeed, the more minute Ms description of the movements,
the further it would be from a description of the action). For
fencing does not consist simply in bodily movements. In order to
fence the agent must conform Ms movements to certain pre-ordained
rules. It is by virtue of this conformity that his observable
behaviour constitutes the action of fencing. Had these rules not
been instituted what the agent does could not be fencing. The
formulation of the rules of fencing is the main part in framing
the notion of fencing. Without the notion, then, the agent's
bodily movements would either not constitute any action (would be
notMng more than bodily movements) or would fall under some other
notion and thereby constitute some other action.
The 'fencing' example also serves to illustrate Locke's
distinction between notions of actions and ideas of substances. If
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men had never framed the idea of gold. Locke does not doubt but the
particular objects in fact ranked under that idea would exist in
themselves exactly as they are now<> They would be unnamed
particulars; but giving them a name can in no way alter their
particular existence. It is possible that, in a world without
'fencing', men might happen to go through the motions which, in this
world, constitute the action of fencing. However, their movements
would lack the significance they have now. Even if, in framing a
notion, we encompass certain 'doings' already prevalent in the world,
we are not merely giving a name to something. We are grouping
things under a name and giving them a unity and importance which they
had not previously® The formulation of notions does not leave
everything as it is; rather in forming notions of actions, men shape
a new realityo
It might be objected, however, that in taking fencing as our
example of a human action, we have unfairly weighted the argument
for the ontological priority of notions over actions® Fencing is
an activity which has been consciously instituted by men® It is
a product of society and the notion can be understood only against a
social background® Certainly, in the case of fencing the notion
is prior to the existence of the action, but this hardly proves
that all, or even most, human actions are dependent on notions® If
we take another of Locke's examples, the much simpler action of
running, the argument is likely to turn out differently® Running
is something which men just do, without attending to any rules.
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It is a completely non-artificial action. In framing the notion
of running it would appear that we do no more than represent an
action previously existing in its own right. Here the notion of
an action seems to differ little if at all, from the idea of a
substance.
Nevertheless, if running is understood as an action, and
not merely as bodily movements, the notion is ontologically prior.
It is not hard to see that there is a conceptual difference
between human bodily movements and human actions. We can conceive
of a wholly inanimate universe in which bodies foimed configurations
exactly reproducing human bodily movements. But this inanimate
universe would be one in which events happened, not one in which
actions were performed. The difference between actions and mere
bodily movements has often been thought to consist in the fact that
the former always have, and the latter always lack, certain mental
antecedents peculiar to intellectual beings, e.g. acts of will,
intentions. We should not be too anxious to reject the purely
mental in an account of action. Nevertheless, the appeal to
something cut of sight in the mind, yet always standing behind the
observable behaviour which constitutes human action, does come up
against a host of problems. Moreover, there is a much easier way
of demarcating the regions of actions and movements. Even in the
performance of a simple bodily action such as running the agent
does something which counts as that action. That is, his movements
conform to a horm; and it is this conformity which makes an action
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of his movements. In this respect, the action of running is not
markedly different from the action of fencing. Ve can say that
the fundamental difference between human actions and mere bodily
movements resides not in the presence or absence of precedent mental
occurrences, but in the presence or absence of normso The norms
to which actions conform are Locke's notions of actions. If we did
not have these notions there would be nothing for bodily movements
to accord witho Therefore there could be no actions in the world.
This is all that is meant by the thesis that notions are ontologically
4
prior to actionso
Running is, in fact, an atypical human action; and this for
two reasons. First, it is a physical action, or what Locke calls
an 'action of the body'. .Zll, xxii, 1 oj The majority of the
actions men perform are not purely physical, but involve the agent's
mind as well as his body. They are not things which a man 'just
does', but things he plans, intends, decides upon etc. Second, in
the case of an action like running the correlation between observable
behaviour and the action performed is atypically simple. If a man
is observed to propel himself from place to place by rapid movements
4 This is not to say that all human actions have two components:
norms, or notions, and bodily movements conforming to those norms.
The concept of human action is a broad and vague one. Included
under it are actions which do not involve bodily movements.
What Locke calls 'actions of the mind' fall into this category.
Zii, xxii, 1 o/. However, this point does not affect the main
argument. Whether or not the ' doings' involved in an. action
are physical movements, thej'- must fall under a notion if they
are to constitute an action.
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of Ms legs, the cautious judgement that he is running will, under
almost any circumstances, he correct. However, if, solely on the
grounds of observed behaviour, the same man is judged to be (say)
fleeing, there is a considerable likelihood of the judgement's
being incorrecto The action of running is one of the ways in
wMch the action of fleeing may be performed, but it is far from
being the only way. Further, running is an action which can go
to constitute an indefinite range of quite different actions. In
running the agent may be fleeing, deserting, racing, exercising,
etc., etco Once we go beyond the cautious judgement that the man
is running we need grounds which cover more than Ms overt
behaviouro However, we almost always do go beyond the cautious
judgement warranted by the observation of behaviour. The assertion
that the man is running, in itself, carries very little information.
As the range of bodily movements wMch constitutes running is a
limited one, and as the action itself is completely constituted by
that limited range of movements, anyone can see that the man is
running. But generally what we want to know is the significance
of what he is doing. This significance is expressed by the notion
under which we rank his behaviour. For what counts as significant
in human behaviour is relative to our interests and purposes; and
the same interests and purposes prompt the formation of notions of
actions. It is not surprising, then, that the great majority of
notions signify actions far more complex than those in which there
is a one-one correlation between overt behaviour and the action
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performed. These simple actions are seldom worth mentioning;
they are not the actions which go into a person's biography® The
importance of actions such as running lies primarily in the fact
that they constitute parts of other actions.
Locke is acquainted with the fact that in most cases the one
type of overt behaviour can constitute different types of actions,
and the one type of action can be constituted by different types of
behaviour:
... a man holding a gun in his hand and pulling
downe the triger may be either Rebellion, Parricide,
Murther, Homicide, Duty, Justice, Valer, or recreation,
and be thus variously diversified when all the
circumstances put togeather are compared to a rule
though the simple action of holding the gun and
pulling the triger may be exactly the same.
/Draft A. p. 3_§/
However, as we shall see, he has no clear realization of the
implications of this fact for moral theory.
In light of the foregoing exposition, it should be fairly clear
that the distinction Locke dravrs between real and nominal essence does
have a value in his analysis of human action. For in this context
Locke can avoid the difficulties attending his distinction when it
is applied to physical substances. The hominal essence of the idea,
or notion, is the real essence,.or form, of the action existing in
the world. That is, a particular piece of behaviour in the world
is the action which it is by virtue of measuring up to a notion.
The notion is the universal in which the particular action partakes.
It is, of course, not an hypostatized universal, or substantial formo
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Notions are ideas and thus, on Locke's account, they are some kind of
particular entities existing in the minds of men. As the being of
a particular action depends on its participating in a universal
form, it cannot (unlike a particular physical object) exist as a
bare, unnamed particular. A physical object exists as a substance
whether or not there is an idea under which it can be ranked.
Once it is classified according to an idea it is considered an
instance of a kind of substance. A particular action, however,
must always be an instance of a kind of action. A bare, unnamed
particular action would be one which did not measure up to any notion
whatsoever; but then it could2not be an action. In short, we may
conclude that, with respect to human action, the doctrine of forms
whereby things are what they are, is coherent and highly relevant.
We may now turn our attention to the importance of Locke's analysis
of notion in the context of moral action.
It can be seen that some of the actions we have cited from
Locke's text are referred to by distinctively moral notions, (e.g.
murder, lying); while the notions referring to others are non-moral
(e.g. fencing, running). 'The difference between moral and non-moral
notions is a difference in the use they are put to. For instance,
if it is asserted of a man that he has committed murder or that
5
he is lying, a moral judgement has been made. However, to assert
5 This is in need of some qualification. The assertion that a
man has committed murder, etc. may be uttered as part of a play
/cont' d
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that the man is fencing or running is (unless a special background
is assumed) simply to state a fact, one which is of no moral import
whatsoever.^*
It is important to note that the difference suggested here
between moral and non-moral notions is not that in using the latter
we assert facts about the world, whereas in using the former we
express emotions or attitudes towards things in the world. On the
contrary, both types of notion are equally suited to the assertion
of facts. 'That a man is lying' is just as much a fact as 'that
he is fencing'. Both these expressions refer to something which
is the case. Since Locke's time a great many philosophers have
grown suspicious of the view that moral judgements state objective
facts. Yet two things are beyond doubt: (l) The assertion that
a man is fencing states a fact. (2) The assertion that a man is
lying is a moral judgement. Comparing the two assertions it is
hard to see how they can be said to differ in anything other than
that they state two different facts« Of course the philosophers
5 Cont'd
or as a joke. In these circumstances no moral judgement has
been made. However, the use of moral notions outside moral
contexts is parasitic upon their use within such contexts.
6 These facts may have moral import if, for instance, the man was
deserting his friends or fencing on a Sunday. But if moral
relevance is granted here the action in question will fall
under a moral notion, e.g. 'treachery', 'Sabbath-breaking'.
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who maintain that moral judgements do not state facts (or that they
do not state objective facts about the world, or that what makes
them moral judgements is not the facts they state) are not to be
refuted this lightlyo The similarity noted here between an
undoubted factual judgement and an undoubted moral judgement
represents nothing more than a starting-point for a theory of moral
judgements. For the present we will endeavour to outline the theory
of moral judgements suggested by Locke's account of notions, without
paying much attention to the objections which may be urged against
it.7
Any theory of moral judgements must take cognizance of our
deeply felt belief in the division between the moral and the non-
moral. If it be granted that moral notions, such as 'lying',
•murder', 'adultery' etc, are a sub-class of the notions we have
formed to signify actions, and,further,that we always form our
notions to accord with our interests and purposes, the difference
between the moral and the non-moral might be explicated thus%
When we use moral notions to refer to human behaviour we consider
that behaviour in a specific way; we look at it from the moral point
of view as opposed to other points of view. It is not that there
is a line dividing the moral on one side from the non-moral on the
other (a division expressible in terms of a dichotomy between fact
and value or descriptive and evaluative discourse); rather, there
7 In Chapter IX we will consider the non-cognitivist objections
raised against a 'factual' analysis of moral judgements.
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are many ways of looking at the world and the moral point of view
is one of these ways. There are many points of view from which the
world can he seen because men living in the world have a wide
variety of interests ana purposeso It is true the distinction
between moral and non-moral does loom large in our consciousness,
while distinctions between other points of view are often forgotten.
This is because we suppose the moral point of view to be somehow
universal, and sovereign over all other ways of looking at the
world. We assume that all men (at least those who have attained
f the age of reason') are committed to considering things in a
moral light. Moreover, we assume moral considerations to be supreme.
Therefore, the conclusions we reach when considering things from the
moral point of view are looked on as being more important than any
conclusions reached from any non-moral point of view.
Moral notions may be said to compose the vocabulary in which
we express the moral point of viewo That is, when we use moral
notions we are speaking from the moral point of view. Moral
notions signifying actions do not make up the whole of this vocab¬
ulary, but they do make up the distinctive and typical part of it.
They are much more typical than notions such as 'good', 'right',
'bad', or 'wrong'. These latter certainly have roles in moral
discourse, but in the everyday business of morality they are in
fact seldom used. Their infrequent use is easily explicable. The
assertion that an action is wrong, in itself, conveys little
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information* Earlier on the 3ame explanation was given for the
infrequent use of a notion like 'running'. The assertion that a man
is running is generally uninformative because the notion involved is
too specific; it tells us nothing more than any observer can see
from the man's behaviour. The assertion that'an action is right
is uninformative for the opposite reason; the notion involved is
too vague* Such an assertion always invites, and always warrants,
further specification* We want to know why the action is right,
in what way it is right and so on. Typical moral notions (murder,
adultery, etc.) group together features of the world of human action*
Therefore, they can be used to convey quite detailed information.
For instance, if we are told only that a person did something wrong
we learn virtually nothing. If, however, we are told that he
committed murder we learn at least the general characteristics of
8
Ms action* It may be added that terms such as ' good' and ' right'
are not distinctively moral notions; for they have perfectly
normal uses in non-moral contexts. In fact their use in non-moral
contexts is much more frequent and informative than their use in
moral contexts. If a truthful, uneccentric green-grocer says
that his potatoes are good this week, we learn much more than if he
tells us that his assistant is a good man*
8 It could be argued that the prime role of 'good' and 'right' is
not in morality as it is practiced, but in moral pMlosophy,
insofar as the latter is a discipline concerned with the nature
of goodness and the ultimate criterion of right and wrong*
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A moral notion, like any other notion, shapes reality. It
imposes a form and significance on human behaviour. However, a
given piece of human behaviour can be viewed in a number of ways.
As was mentioned previously, once we go beyond a cautious judgement
using a notion in which there is a simple one-one correspondence
between overt behaviour and the action performed, there is a
probability of our judgement's being incorrect. We have gone
beyond what we can see to be the case. More than this, bejrond
a cautious judgement confined to observable behaviour there is .
always a range of notions under which the action might legitimately
be placed. Let us suppose we correctly judge the man who is
running to be fleeing. That is, his action of running, in the
particular circumstances, conforms to the notion of 'fleeing'.
The action of fleeing may in turn be ranked under a notion.
Considered from the moral point of view it might be ranked as an
act of teachery. But considered from some other, non-moral, point
of view it might be ranked under the notion of (say) 'self-
preservation'. These rankings are quite consistent one with
another. The difference in the two judgements is due to the dif¬
ferent points of view adopted with respect to the action. In the
first judgement it is seen in a moral perspective; in the second it
is seen as morally neutral.
It should not be thought that, because a piece of behaviour
may be seen from different points of view (and thus quite appropriately
142
ranked under different notions) it can never definitely be said to
constitute one kind of action rather than another. On the contrary,
provided the man's behaviour- conforms to the notion of 'treachery1,
then it is. an act of teachery; provided it conforms to the notion
of 'self-preservation', it is. an act of self-preservation. (The
'is' here is, of course, an 'is of identity', not an 'is of
predication'.) Moreover, it is both these actions (and no doubt
several others as well) whether or not anyone passes a judgement
and ranks it under a notion. Once notions of actions have become
part of the vocabulary of mankind behaviour can conform or fail to
conform to those notions. In ranking an action under a notion we
judge that a certain conformity does in fact hold. Which notion
(or notions) we select depends on the point of view from which we
look at the action.
The fact that a given piece of behaviour may be seen in a
variety of ways does have an important consequence for the theory
of moral judgements. There appears to be no reason in the nature
of the case why a particular action should be seen in one way
rather than in another. To take an extreme example, the Emperor
Heliogabalus allegedly slaughtered people because he found the sight
of red blood on green grass beautiful. If this story is true, it
might be said that Heliogabalus adopted the aesthetic, rather than
the moral point of view. What others would rank under the moral
notions such as 'murder' and 'cruelty', he thought of as acts of
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creation. Nov;, whatever else may be said about the Emperor* s
position, it does not appear logically incoherento If such a
morally outrageous position is logically sound, it follows that
the universality and sovereignty of the moral point of view is not
10
something which can be taken for granted.
The justification which Locke offers for what we have termed
the moral point of view will be discussed in a later chapter.
The remainder of the present chapter will be taken up, first, with
an assessment of the theory of moral judgements which we have
elicited from Locke's account of notions; second,with a criticism
of his account concerning the definability of notions.
The importance of what may, perhaps most fairly, be termed the
'Lockean* theory of moral judgements, lies primarily in this: as
we have expounded it, the theory provides a defence of moral
objectivity against moral subjectivismo This is not to say that
9 Heliogabalus's aesthetic tastes are mentioned by Professor
Hare in Freedom and Reason, p. 161. For a detailed account
of a life lived from the aesthetic, as opposed^to the moral,
point of view, see Joris-Karl Huysmans' novel A Rebcurs.
10 It is sometimes maintained that universality and sovereignty
are the defining characteristics of the moral point of view,
or of moral principles. Granted this, if Heliogabalus is
prepared to universalize his principle and to agree that he
himself might be slaughtered for an aesthetic end, then he
can be said to have adopted the moral point of view. Cf.
Hare, Op. cit., p. 170. However, if the account of typical
moral judgements which has been sketched in above is
sound, there is no need to accept this paradoxical conclusion.
What we do need is a further account of the moral point of
view and a justification for the overriding force of morality.
Locke intended his account of notions to constitute such a defenceo
In the seventeenth-century moral subjectivism did not exist as a
serious rival to objectivismo Even Hobbes, who was accused of
reducing morality to governmental will, claimed to be explicating
the objective natural law» The 'axiom of knowledge' had been
badly shaken, but this gave rise to the question of how, and whether
the objective standards of right and wrong were to be known. It
did not immediately produce the theory that these standards were
a myth. It is not till David Hume that an unabashed subjectivism
is put forward as a serious theory of morals. The way in which
the Lockean theory constitutes a defence of moral objectivism can
best be shown by measuring it against one of the arguments for
subjectivism to be found in Hurneo
In Book III,Part I, Section 1 of A Treatise of Human Mature,
Hume sets out to prove that moral distinctions are not derived from
reason. His argument in large part revolves about a single
illustration:
o . o let us chuse any inanimate object, such as an oak
or elm; and let us suppose, that by the dropping of
its seed, it produces a sapling below it, which springing
up by degrees, at last overtops and destroys the parent
tree: I ask, if in this instance there be wanting any
relation, which is discoverable in parricide or
ingratitude? Is not the one tree the cause of the other's
existence; and the latter the cause of the destruction of
the former, in the same manner as when a child murders his
parent? 'Tis not sufficient to reply, that a choice or
will is wanting. For in the case of parricide, a vail does
not give rise to any different relations, but is only the
cause from which the action is deriv'd; and consequently
produces the same relations, that in the oak or elm arise
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from some other principles • . . Here then the same relations
have different causes; but still the relations are the same:
And as their discovery is not in both cases attended with a
notion of immorality, it follows that that notion does not
arise from such a discovery.^
This 'entirely decisive' argument, Hume continues, proves not only,
"that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects
of science; but . . . that it consists not in any matter of fact.
which can be discover'd by the understanding . . . Take any action
allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it
in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or
real existence, which you call vice. In whichever way you take it,
you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts . . .
The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object.
You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your
own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in
12
you, towards this action".
Hume's argument assumes that, if moral distinctions are to have
an objective status, they must exist independently of the mind
in the same way as material objects have an indenendent existence.
On this assumption, there would be moral facts in the world even if
there vrere no human beings. The kind of answer Locke would have given
11 Treatise ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, p. 467.
12 Op. cito, pp. 468 - 469. Cf. Julius Kovesi's comments on this
passage in Moral Notions, pp. 69 f• My assessment of Locke's
account of notions and its relevance to morality owes much to
the work done by Mr Kovesi.
Hume can be seen in the following passage. Locke is explaining that
notions of actions do not mirror patterns in the external world:
For what greater connexion in nature has the jdea of a
man, than the idea of a sheep, with killing, that this
is made a particular species of an action, signified by
the word murder, and the other not? Or what union is
there in nature between the idea of the relation of a
father, with killing, than that of a son or neighbour,
that those are combined into one complex idea and
thereby make the essence of the distinct species
parricide, whilst the other makes no distinct species
at all? . . . Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily
unites into complex ideas such as it finds convenient,
whilst others that have altogether as much union in
nature are left loose, and never combined into one
idea, because they have no need of one nameo /ill, v, §~/
The difference between the case of the tree and the sapling and the
child murdering his parent consists simply in this: we have the
moral notion 'parricide' which applies in the latter case; we
have no moral notion which applies in the former.. The objection
that, as notions are arbitrary creations of the mind, we could
frame one to cover the example of the tree and the sapling has no
force. Morality concerns human agents, and the moral notions we
do frame accord with our interests in the behaviour of human beingso
Moral facts belong to the reality which has been made possible
by the mind's creation of notions which signify actions. Thus,
the world of moral action, as distinct from the world of substances,
does not have its existence in complete independence of the mind.
Nevertheless, it does exist objectively. If a man does something
which conforms to a moral notion, he has performed an action which
has moral significance.. This is so whether or not a moral judgement
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is actually passed on what he does. It is equally a fact that the
man has done something, and that what he has done has moral
significanceo These facts are possible only because the mind has
framed notions, but this dependence does not detract from their
objective status.
Nor does Locke suppose the individual at liberty to apply moral
notions in a Humpty Dumpty fashion. An action cannot sensibly be
called murder or theft according to a private use of these notions:
It is not enough that men have ideas . . . for which
they make . . . signs stand; but they must also take
care to apply their vrords as near as may be to such
ideas as common use has annexed them to. For words,
. . o being no man's private possession but the common
measure of commerce and communication, it is not for
anyone at pleasure to change the stamp they are current
in. /ill, xi, 11., cfo IV, iv, Si?
As the criteria for the application of moral notions being thus
public, it is quite possible for men to rank actions under the
wrong notions; and it is also possible for their errors to be
corrected. On Hume's account, in arriving at a moral judgement
a man must introspect a moral sentiment in his own breast. If the
feeling of approval or disapproval is not present, then, for Mm the
object of judgement has no moral relevance. There is no question
of his being mistaken, for there are no objective mox-al standards
13
against which he could be said to be in error.
13 Locke's 'defence of moral objectivity' does not preclude the
possibility of human feelings entering into the formation of
moral notions /Cf. Kovesi: Op. cit., p. 72°7 Nor, of course,
is it to be taken as a complete answer to Hume's moral
subjectivism.
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Having so far largeley endorsed Locke's account of notions,
it is time to balance the picture with a consideration of its main
weakness. As we saw above, Locke realizes that one type of overt
behaviour can count as many different actions. Therefore, in most
cases one cannot tell what action is being performed merely by
observing the behaviour of the agent. Consequently most notions
of actions are incapable of ostensive definition. In this they
differ from ideas of substances; for the sensible qualities
existing together in nature, from the observation of which we
construct our ideas of substances, can be shown. In recompense,
however, notions can be completely and exactly defined:
For they being combinations of several ideas that
the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without
reference to any archetypes, men may, if they please,
exactly know the ideas that go to each composition,
and so both use these words in a certain and undoubted
signification, and perfectly declare ... what they
stand for. /ill* xi, 157
These definitions will be 'real definitions'; for with notions the
nominal and real essence are one and the same. Thus, in defining
the notion we express the real essence, or form, of the thing
signified.
The method of definition Locke recommends for notions is the
same as that which he thinks suitable for ideas of substances (to be
exact, for the words signifying those ideas); "by enumerating those
simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term
defined". /llI, iii, 10., Of. II, xxii, §] Real definitions of
substances are beyond our reach, as our ideas cannot capture their
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real essences. Nevertheless, we can, by observation and experiment,
greatly improve our ideas of substanceso Observation reveals
further properties of bodies which can be incorporated into our
ideas. The natural philosopher cannot achieve his traditional aim
of exhibiting substances in their essences. However he can, and
should, compile natural histories of substances. If properly
carried through, this task would culminate in a great dictionary
in which the various kinds of substances were defined in terms of
all their discovered properties. 2^7 The ideal
presented is a perfectly precise system of classification expressed
in a perfectly precise language. For the ordinary affairs of life
our imprecise ideas of substances do well enough, but, when used
in philosophical discussion, they give rise to endless verbal
disputes. ZlII> ix, 15 - 16? As it is doubtful that we will
ever be able to observe bodies at the level of their minute internal
structures, the language of substances is never likeljr to be
perfected. However, the definition of moral notions comes up
against no such impediment. Hence, a perfect language of morals
is a distinct possibility. Parallel to the dictionary of the
physical world Locke envisages a dictionary of the world of human
action. If such a project were carried through it would define,
"the greatest part of the words made us of in divinity, ethics,
law, and politics, and several other sciences". /ll, xxii, 12/
Whether or not Locke's method of definition is viable when
applied to substances, it is quite unsuitable for moral notions.
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A perfect language of morals, in which each notion was broken
down into a definite number of simple elements, would fundamentally
distort our moral notions and render them useless for the purposes
they serve. Such a language would be a distortion because, in
any given case, the number of factors which might count for or
against a piece of behaviour falling under a specific moral notion
is indefiniteo Indefiniteness here is a necessary consequence
of the use to which moral notions are put in the making of moral
judgements.
We have argued that, at least typically, making a moral
judgement consists in ranking an action under a moral notion .
Now in so doing we never merely classify the action. It is a
logical truth that actions are performed by agents. A judgement
which ranks an action under a. moral notion always carries at least
a tacit reference to an agent. This holds whether the action is
one which has been performed by a particular agent, one which a
particular agent is contemplating performing, or a type of action
considered apart from any particular performance. For example,
if an historically performed action is judged to be murder, the agent
who performed it is thereby judged to have committed murder. Sim-
ilarily, if a contemplated action is so judged it is implied that,
if the agent does perform it, he will commit murder; if it is a
type of action, the implication is that any agent who has performed
it, or will perform it, commits murder. Conversely, if the agent
himself is judged to commit murder, then Ms action is ranked under
the notion, 'murder*. We cannot make either judgement without, at
least implicitly, making the other. If either judgement is shown
to be incorrect the other must also be withdrawn. For instance,
we cannot judge the agent's action to be murder and deny that he
committed murder; nor judge that he committed murder and deny that
his action is murder.
Now in the case of any judgement ascribing an action to an
agent, there are an indefinite number of factors whj ch might count
as a rebuttal of that judgements The rebuttal need not, and
usually does not, take the form of a deMal that the 'doings'
wMch, under normal circumstances, constitute the action in question
are present. Host often these facts will be conceded, but the
circumstances will be said to be abnormal. Thus, to take the case
of murder, the agent, while admitting that he killed the victim,
may claim that he acted in self-defence, or to save the life of
another person, or that he did not know the gun was loaded, and so
on. He attempts to excuse, justify, or mitigate Ms behaviour.
If he succeeds in Ms claim of special circumstances, he successfully
rebuts the charge against Mm. He can no longer be said to have
committed murder; and therefore, Ms action can no longer be
ranked under the notion of 'murder'. The procedure of rebuttal
is equally appropriate when the action under consideration is a type
of action, abstracted from any actual or contemplated performance
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by a particular agent. In this case one need jonly cite theoretical
exceptional circumstances; and these are always available. However,
it might be objected there are some moral notions signifying actions
in which (like the notion of 'running') there is a simple one-one
correlation between behaviour and the action performer. Here
there would seem to be no room for rebuttal. For example, it might
be argued that the moral notion of 'drunkeness' groups together a
limited number of elements, and that if these elements are present
there is no question but the action is one of drunkeness. But
even in a case such as this, the charge that a certain action has
been performed may be turned. For instance, the agent might claim
that he thought the liquid he drank to be water. If this is
accepted, although the agent's state is no doubt one of intoxication,
14
his action cannot be ranked under the moral notion of drunkeness.
It is true that from the observation of the consequences of an
action we can very often deduce the cause of those consequences.
However, it is not true that we thereby deduce the action itself.
It should not be thought that the list of factors which can
count against the ascription of an action to an agent is indefinite
in the sense that it is far too long to enumerate. Its indefiniteness
is due to the fact that, whether a given factor does count as a
14 It should be noted that the procedure of rebuttal is just as
appropriate when the action is ranked under a pro-moral notion
such as 'kindness'. For virtues, as well as vices, may be
disclaimed.
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rebuttal itself depends on other factors. For example, 'blind
rage' may sometimes serve as an excuse lessening the charge of murder
to one of manslaughter. At other times, it may be no excuse what¬
ever. Whether or not a rebuttal is successful depends upon an
interplay of circumstances in each particular case. No matter
how far we extended our list of factors we could never hope to
exhaust the possibilities of this interplay; for new moves can
always be thought up.
The definitions of moral notions which Locke envisages would
consist in complete lists of necessary and sufficient, conditions.
Thus, if a notion were defined in terms of elements x, y, z, the
presence of these elements in the world would entail the presence
of the action signified by the notion. The fact that the ascription
of an action to an agent is always open to rebuttal explains why the
presence of a limited number of elements cannot entail the presence
of the action. Thus, any definition of a moral notion given
purely in terms of elements needs a cetris paribus clause. We can
say that the presence of certain elements means the behaviour in
question falls under a certain moral notion, if all other things
are equal. Here the cetris paribus clause is essential; without
it what we say is false.
Standing behind Locke's opinion of the complete definibility
of moral notions is his general view of ideas; of both ideas of
substances, and notions. It was argued in Chapter IV that, for
154
Locke, ideas are essentially patterns which picture reality and
serve as the criteria whereby we classify particular thingso
Despite his realization of the considerable difference between
notions of actions ana ideas of substances, Locke never doubted the
correctness of this general view. Both kinds of ideas are patterns
men carry in their minds:
. . o in mixed modes, at least the most considerable parts
of them, which are moral beings, we consider the original
patterns as being in the mind; and to those we refer for
1 v ■" ' '
ishing of particular beings under nameso
If we assume (that which is false) that the idea of a physical
substance such as 'gold1 is used only to classify particular pieces
of gold, there is limited plausibility in the view that an idea is
a kind of pattern. A man who knows that gold is something yellow,
correctlyo We suppose that the more properties he adds to his
pattern, the less likelihood there is of his being mistaken in
an identification.) The ideal pattern will be one in which all
the properties of gold are listed. So long as this pattern was
scrupulously applied, the misidentification of a particular piece
of gold would be an impossibility. If moral notions are likewise
conceived as patterns to be used in the classification of particulars,
it is easy to slip into the belief that they would be similarly
perfected by a complete listing of elements. Locke grants that the
elements combined in moral notions are not all ideas of sensible
malleable, etc will generally be able to identify pieces of gold
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qualities. Actions are, "distinguished hy their causes, means,
objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances",
j/ll, xxii, \6J Nevertheless, he believes that all these are, or
break down into, simple ideas which may be enumerated just as
easily as simple ideas of sensible qualities. It is true that
they can be enumerated. The mistake is to suppose that they can be
completely enumerated. Locke's theory collapses because he pays
insufficient attention to the vague 'other circumstances'.
Yet we do rank actions under moral notions. If, when we do
this, we are not applying a pattern, what are we doing? The short
answer is that we are exercising a capacity; e.g. the capacity to
recognize in a concrete situation what counts for or against a
certain action falling under a specific moral notion. We saw in
the previous chapter how the entity theory of ideas to which Locke
subscribes cannot explain human thought, and that it may be replaced
by a capacity, or dispositional theory of ideas. There is another
reason why the entity theory should be rejected; it is positively
misleading. If having an idea is being possessed of a particular
entity 'in one's mind', there is no reason why having one idea
should involve the possession of any other ideas. Yet is is plain
from the above discussion that ranking an action under a moral notion
involves a quite extensive interrelation of ideas. It involves,
for instance, ideas such as 'justification' and 'excuse'. If a man
does not understand (or have) ideas such as these, he will not be
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able to rank actions under moral notionso The fact that ideas
are interrelated in their uses is easily grasped once 'having an
idea' is thought of as having a capacity to do things. For we are
quite used to the fact that human capacities seldom, if ever, exist
in isolation one from the other.
Reflection on the nature of moral notions also serves to
reveal the bankruptcy of the Cartesian picture of man, which Locke
implicitly accepts. The solitary individual who builds ideas
from experience (either of the internal world of his own mental
processes or the postulated external world) could not possibly
acquire the capacities which constitute the possession of moral
notions. A man can never come to understand ideas such as 'excuse'
and 'justification' except by being shown examples illustrating
these ideas. But it is only because he participates in the world
in which excuses and justifications figure that he can understand
these examples. If he were a completely external observer he could
have no point of contact with the moral world. We might say
finally that to understand a moral notion is to understand the
15
weaknesses of human beings and the exigencies of human life»
In conclusion, something needs to be said about the manner in
15 It might well prove quite impossible to explain human moral
notions to a creature whose way of life and general condition
were entirely different from ours. Consider the trouble
Gulliver has in explaining the comparatively simple notion of
lying to the 'naturally virtuous' Houyhnhnm. See Gulliver's
Travels.Fart IV, ch. iv0
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which. Locke's 'perfect language of morals' distorts the way in which
we actually use moral notions. It should he noted that such a
language could be constructed; but it would not be a language of
morals. Each moral notion could be given a definition in terms
of a limited number of elements, and it could be stipulated that if
and only if the elements contained in the notion were present was
the action to be ranked under that notion. We can imagine this
being done as one of the rules in a board game called 'morality'.
However such stipulations would destroy the activity of morality
as it is in fact carried on in the world. There are two main
reasons why it would do so. In the first place we can arrive at a
properly moral judgement of a particular action only after we have
weighed any rebuttals which are forthcoming. If it is laid down in
advance that only a certain limited number of factors count in the
appraisal of an action, each particular action will have been pre¬
judged. It will be quite impossible for an action to be judged
'on its own merits'. Secondly, once a man has acquired moral
notions he is able, not only to pass moral judgements on the actions
of others, but to consciously conform his own actions to moral notions.
Here again Locke's precise definitions would not be a help but a
hinderance. Moral notions indicate the factors which, under normal
circumstances, count for an action being of a specific kind.
Knowing this the agent can act so as to avoid or include these factors
in his own conduct. But very often the agent will have to decide
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whether his circumstances are normal. If the definitions Locke
hopes for were operative there would be no room for such moral
decisions. The moral life of the agent would be simplified to
the extent of automatic conformity. Locke conceived the perfect
language of morals to be (like the perfect language of substances)
a philosophical language, free of the imprecisions and vagueness
of ordinary language:
Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses; and both, though
confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and
the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors have
words wherewithall to dispatch their ordinary affairs;
and so, I think, might philosophers 'and disputants too,
if they had a mind to understand and be clearly understood.
/in, xi, io7
However morality is the business of 'merchants and lovers' etc.,
and for this business a certain lack of precision is not an
imperfection in moral notions, but an essential feature.
Locke's account of notions points in two directions. Firstly,
it suggests a theory of moral judgements which (if it can be
defended against certain objections yet to be considered) guarantees
their status as cognative judgements. However Locke himself does
not follow up this suggestion. It is the second direction which
captures his imagination. The 'ultimate definability1 of moral
notions provides the mainstay for Locke's belief that morality can
be made a demonstrative science:
Upon this ground it is that I am bold to think that
morality is capable of demonstration, as well as
mathematics: since the precise real essence of the
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things moral words stand for may he perfectly known,
and so the congruit-y or incongruity of the things
themselves be certainly discovered, in which consists
perfect knowledgeo J_III, xi, 16/
This ground we have seen to be hollow. Nevertheless, even as a
mistake Locke's claim deserves further investigationo
16 Cfo Locke's far less optimistic remark to Molyneux: "Though
by the view I had of moral ideas, whilst I was considering
that subject, I thought I saw that morality might be
demonstratively made out; yet whether I am able so to make it
out, is another question". Locke to Molyneux, 20 Sept.,
1692. /Works, 9, p° 294/
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Chapter VI
THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY
Two pictures make up the background for Locke's belief in a
science of morality; a picture of perfectly certain knowledge and a
picture of morality as an integral part of a rational world order.
Within the sphere of moral philosophy both pictures are more or less
misleading. As they are combined by Locke, they give rise to an
epistemological ambition which cannot be fulfilled; the construction
of an apodeictic system of morals.
We have already said something of Locke's conception of know¬
ledge. It is a body of universal, necessary propositions, expressing
relations between ideas. The component part of knowledge are ,then,
known a priori; they are 'truths of reason', not 'truths of faet'.^
Lccke finds this picture instantiated in mathematics, particularly
in geometry. The objects with which the mathematician deals have
a purely ideal existence. The question of whether there are any
examples of mathematically perfect rectangles or circles in nature
is irrelevant to the truth of mathematical propositions. What is
important, and what makes mathematics 'real knowledge', is the fact
1 "There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those
of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite
is impossible, and those of fact are contingent and their
opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary its reason can
be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and
truths until we reach those which are primitive". .^Leibniz:
The Monadology, 8 53. Cf. New Essays concerning Human Under¬
stand ingt IV, ii, 17 Locke makes a similar distinction in his
Journal entry for June 26th, quoted above ch. Ill, footnote 9°
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that, if anything in the physical world is a circle it is such by
virtue of its conformity to the idea of a circle:
The mathematician considers the truth and properties
belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are in
idea in his own mind . . . But yet the knowledge he has of
any truths or properties belonging to a circle, or any
other mathematical figure, are nevertheless true and
certain, even of real things existing: because real things
are no further concerned, nor intended to be meant by any
such propositions, than as things really agree to those
archetypes in his mind . . . And therefore he is certain
all his knowledge concerning such ideas is real knowledge
ZlV, iv, 6/
The fact that mathematical ideas are not intended to mirror things
in the world, but only to provide standards to which things may attain,
also explains the status of mathematical knowledge. As mathematical
ideas are completely independent of the facts of the world, it
follows that the propositions of mathematics can neither be confirmed
nor falsified by experience. It would, for example, be no uso
trying to prove the proposition that triangles on. equal bases between
equal parallel lines are equal in area by taking measurements of
actual triangles drawn between parallel lines. If our measurements
clashed with this proposition it would not disprove a geometrical
2
theorem, but show our measurement or our drawing to be faultyo
Mathematical knowledge thus belongs to a realm exempt from the
contingencies revealed to experienceo As necessity is the hallmark
3
a priori knowledge, so contingency marks knowledge a posteriori.
2 Cfo Woollrouse: Locke's Philosophy of Science and Knowledge, p.2.
3 Cf. Kant ; Critique of Pure Reason, B.4» (trans. Kemp Smith,
pp» 43 - 44)
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According to Locke we acquire mathematical knowledge ■by-
perceiving relations holding between ideaso It is therefore essential
that we begin with exact ideas of mathematical objects:
Suppose a man not to have a perfect exact idea of a
right angle, a scalene, or trapezium; and there is
nothing more certain than that he will in vain seek
any demonstration about them. Z?V, xii, ii7
As mathematical ideas are notions, in which real and nominal essence
coincide, in them we are able to achieve exactitude. However, exact
ideas are nothing more than a prerequisite for knowledge. Insofar
as they are instructive, the propositions of mathematics express
relations between ideas which are not immediately obvious from a
contemplation of the ideas themselves. These propositions constitute
demonstrative, not merely intuitive, knowledge. Mathematics
represents the only body of demonstrative knowledge we actually
have:
The art of finding proofs, and the admirable methods they
/the mathematicians/ have invented for the singling our and
laying in order those intermediate ideas that demonstratively
show the equality or inequality of inapplicable qualities,
is that which has carried them so far and -produced such
wonderful and unexpected discoveries. /TV, xii, 27
It is the mathematical method which Locke hopes to see extended into
other fields:
This, I think, I may say: that, if other ideas that are the
real as well as nominal essences of their species were
pursued in the way familiar to mathematicians, they would
carry our thoughts further and with greater evidence and.
clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine. /ibid./
It might be thought that what makes mathematics a demonstrative science
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is the fact that it deals solely with quantitative relations
expressible in numerical terms. However, Locke believes qualit¬
ative relations to be equally amenable to demonstration:
For whatever ideas we have wherein the mind can perceive the
immediate agreement or disagreement that is between them,
there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge; and
where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any
two ideas, by an intuitive perception of the agreement or
disagreement they have with any intermediate ideas, there
the mind is capable of demonstration, which is not limited
to ideas of extension, figure, number, and their modes.
Provided that there is a coincidence of real and nominal essence in
the ideas in question the knowledge so gained will be real knowledge.
We saw in Chapter III that intuition is a necessary condition
for demonstration. Now it is unproblematic that there are examples
of intuitive knowledge. Cautiously, we may say that a truth is
known intuitively if a man's dissenting from the proposition in which
it is expressed is sufficient grounds for judging that he has failed
to understand at least one of the ideas involved in the proposition
For example, we know that 'lead is a metal', and if a man were to
deny this we could say, ipso facto, that he has not grasped either
one, or both, of the ideas 'lead' and 'metal'. However, propositions
such as 'lead is a metal' are what Locke calls 'trifling propositions;
he contrasts with 'instructive propositions':
4 Locke distinguishes two sorts of trifling propositions at IV,
viii: (a) purely identical propositions, e.g. 'a soul is a soul
(b) propositions in which, "a part of the complex idea is
predicted of the name of the whole: a part of the definition of
the word defined". 'Lead is a metal' is trifling in the latter
sense.
Ztv, ii, 27
they "bring no increase to our knowledge". These
We can know . . . the truth of two sorts of propositions
with perfect certainty: the one is of those trifling
propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is
but a verbal certainty, but not instructive. And
secondly, we can know the truth and so may be certain
in propositions which affirm something of another, which
is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea,
but not contained in it. /IV, viii, 8/5
As an example of an instructive certain proposition Locke cites,
•the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the
opposite internal angles'. A man may fully understand all the
ideas involved in this proposition yet not grasp its truth. But
how is the truth of a proposition such as this, to be grasped? • The
notion of one idea being 'contained* in another to some degree explain
the possibility of intuitive knowledge. A man who understands the
idea of 'lead' cannot dissent from the proposition 'lead is a metal'
because lead is by definition a metal. In terms of Locke's theory
of definition this means the complex idea 'lead' contains the idea
'metal'. However, instructive propositions are not examples of
containment. In their case, the relation between the ideas
involved is that of ground and consequence, not containment. Locke
understands demonstration to be the process whereby the necessary
consequences of ideas are drawn out and exhibited. Each step in
this process is intuitively guaranteed.
5 Cf. Draft A., "all universall propositions that are certain are
only verball or words applyed to our owne Ideas and not
instructive; and vice-versa all universall propositions that
are instructive (i.e. informe us any thing about the nature
/cont'd
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The demonstration of a proposition consists in, "showing the
agreement or disagreement of two ideas hy the intervention of one
or more proofs which have a constant, immutable, and visible
connexion one with another". jjvfxv, j7 The visual metaphor
employed here is to be taken seriously. For Locke, it is hardly
a metaphor. Demonstrations, he writes in Draft A. "are as
the word denotes the beare shewing of the things or proposing
them to our senses or understandings soe as to make us take notice
of them". jj. 4X7 "the same place he states that "certain
knowledg or demonstration makes it self clearly appeare and be
perceived by the things them selves put togeather in our sight or
their clear distinct Ideas put togeather and as it were lying
before us in view of our understandings". We arrive at instructive
certain propositions, then, by a process of laying out our ideas
in a kind of chain in which the connexion between each link is
visible to intuition, thus revealing the remote connexion between
the two ideas at the extremes.
A reading of the chapter, 'Of Reason' in the fourth book of the
Essay makes it plain that the doctrine of demonstration is meant as
5 cont'd
qualitys and operations of things existing without us) are all
\mcertain". Zpp. 46 - 4jj However, it can be seen from the
passage in parenthesis that by 'instructive propositions' Locke
here means those which express something about the external world.
These are still considered uncertain in the Essay. Moreover,
in the same draft he states that "Mathematicall universal
propositions are both true and instructive". jj. 5jj
166
an account of ratiocination. Locke puts it forward as an
alternative to the account which restricts human reasoning to the
formal syllogistic mode.^ As is well known, Locke believes that,
"God has not been so sparing to men, to make them barely two-legged
creatures, and. left it to Aristotle to make them rational".
£v, xvii, Locke does not consider the syllogism an illegitimate
method of reasoning. What he does maintain is that the figures
of the syllogism neither describe the ways men in fact reason, nor
improve the exercise of reason, for "the understanding ... has
a native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its
ideas, and can range them right without any such perplexing
repetitions /i.e. syllogisms/". ZThjLd_./ On Locke's analysis,
the faculty of reason has four major functions: First, it discovers
intermediate ideas, or proofs. Second, it disposes these in a
regular order, making their connexion readily perceivable. Third,
it perceives the connexions between proofs. Fourth, via the
perception of intermediate connexions, reason arrives at the remote
relation between the two ideas under consideration. That is, it
draws out the necessary consequences of these ideas. /iV, xvii, //
The question now arises as to the character of the connexions
between ideas which reason is said to exhibit. In the first edition
6 Cfo Yolton: Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding, pp.91ff*
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of the Essay Locke explicates the necessary connexion between two
ideas in terms of the minds inability to think of them as unconnected,
or as connected in any different way:
In some of our ideas there are certain relations,
habitudes, and connexions so visibly included in the
nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive
them separable from them by any power whatsoever.
And in these only we are capable of certain and
universal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-
lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality
of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive
this relation, this connexion of these two ideas, to
be possibly mutable or to depend on any arbitrary
power, which of choice made it thus or could make it
otherwise. /TV, iii, 2§]
However, in the chapter 'Of the Association of Ideas' which he adds
to the fourth edition, Locke attempts to separate the connexions
between ideas from any psychological considerations whatsoever:
Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and
connexion one with another; it is the office and
excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold
them together in that union and correspondence which
is founded in their peculiar beings. ./ll? xxxiii, 57
Here the natural connexion between ideas is contrasted with false
connexions set up by the mind; e.g. as when a man feels sick at
the mention of honey because he once suffered from an overdose of
that substance. The psychological association of ideas is an
aberration and is a source of error and confusion. Reasoning is
quite distinct from association. It discovers the links which
objectively exist between ideas. Demonstration is the laying out
of our ideas in their natural order.
At first sight it may seem out of place to talk of mathematical
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ideas as having natural^ connexions« As notions they are, in Locke's
terminology, constructions of the human mind. It would appear,
therefore, that the connexions existing between them are artificial,
made by us, rather than natural, discovered by us. The oddness
here is somewhat lessened once we recall that notions are not random
inventions of the mind. In comparison with ideas of substances
they are arbitrary creations; for they are not made in accordance
with external patterns. Nevertheless, they are made to suit
human interests and purposes; and these dictate the manner and
materials of their construction. Hence, Locke is not necessarily
committed to a strict conventionalist view of mathematics. But
there is no need for us to go into the much neglected subject of
Locke's philosophy of mathematics. Whatever his view3 on the latter,
the thesis that there are natural connexions between ideas is
sufficiently canvassed in what he has to say about ideas of substances.
We have seen that, as our ideas of substances are all inadequate,
they cannot enter into demonstrative knowledge. However, it should
be remembered that this is due to the limitations of human under¬
standing, and not in any way due to substances themselves. If we
were capable of forming ideas of substances which mirrored their
real essences (in the sense of their forms), then we could develop
an a priori science of nature. Locke does not doubt that creatures
standing above man in the Chain of Being do possess such adequate
ideas and such a science. A laying out of these adequate ideas
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would reveal necessary connexions holding between then because the
ideas themselves would mirror necessary relations existing between
objects in nature.
Broadly, Locke's thesis that there are natural connexions
between ideas may be said to reflect his assumption of a rationally
ordered universe. Here stress is to be put on the term 1 rational*.
That the universe is in some sense ordered (i.e. that it is not a
chaos of random events) may be taken as evident. That it is
rational in the way Locke conceives the rationality of things is open
to debate. Locke admits that men can give an account of the order
of the universe only in terms of observed regularities. However,
this fails to be a properly scientific account because it does not
reveal the rationality of the order it describes. It does not show
the necessity of things being as they are. For Locke the rationality
of the universe means that its order is perspicuous to reason, albeit
only to a reason of superhuman capacity. That is to say, it must
ultimately be expressible in terms of necessary relations between
ideas. But these ideas are related because, being adequate ideas,
theymirror the necessary connexions holding between substances in
the world. Thus, Locke does not develop his thesis of natural
connexions between ideas from an observation of links actually
existing between ideas in the mind. If he did it would be a thesis
in descriptive psychology, as is his account of the association of
ideas. Rather he begins with the presupposition of a necessary
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order of tilings external to the mind. It is this order which we
endeavour to mirror in our ideaso If we are successful, then, vie
are able to perceive the natural connexions between ideas.
The science of mathematics shows reason functioning, as it
were, at full strength. The inevitable inadequacy of our ideas
of substances means that the methods of mathematics cannot be
extended throughout natural philosophy. The physical order of
the universe must, therefore, remain beyond the compass of human
reason. Moral notions, however, are all adequate. Like
mathematical ideas they are ontologically' prior to anything they
may represent in the world. As Locke puts it: "the truth and
certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men and
the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat . . .
If it be true in speculation, i.e. in idea, that murder deserves
death, it will also be true in reality of any action that exists
conformable to that idea of murder. Av, iv, 8/ Herein lies
the main analogy between the ideas of morality and the ideas of
mathematics; the analogy which sustains Locke's belief in the
possibility of demonstrative moral knowledge.
Even if it is accepted that Locke's analysis of mathematical
demonstration is substantially correct, that mathematicians proceed
by way of perceiving necessary connexions between the ideas they
make use of, an important question remains to be answered. What
grounds are there for supposing natural connexions to exist between
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moral notions? Granted, that moral notions and mathematical ideas
are similar in that, in both cases, there is a coincidence of real
with nominal essence, and consequently an independence from observable
reality; yet there would seem no reason why moral notions should not
be dissimilar from mathematical ideas in being conceptually separate
from each other. On the face of it, the moral notions we have so
far considered (e.g. 'murder', adultery') would appear to be
conceptually separate.
To find an answer to the above question we must look at the
second of the two pictures which make up the background to Locke's
belief in a demonstration of morality. Moral notions are the terms
in which men express the content of the law of nature. They signify
actions, but not merely as actions? Each individual moral notion
falls within one of two categories; it is either a virtue or a vice.
In Locke's scheme 'virtue' and 'vice' are the two most general moral
notions. Thus, when an action is ranked under a moral notion it is
classified as virtuous or vicious; "these ideas of virtues and
vices /are/ of transient actions, nowhere permanent, but only the
ideas conceived in our minds to examine and denominate our actions
by". /Draft B, § 156, p. 298~J The classification of actions into
virtues and vices articulates the content of the objective law of
nature. /cf., Essays p. i6jJ how the law of nature was trad¬
itionally conceived as the moral aspect of the overall order of the
universe. Locke assumes the rationality of the physical order to
mean that it is explicable (to an understanding of sufficient capacity)
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in terms of necessary connexions between ideas. From this assumption
it is but a short step to the view that the moi'al order is likewise
explicable. Given the fact that our moral notions are free from
the inadequacy inevitably attendant upon our ideas of substances,
it follows that the human understanding is capable of perceiving
the natural connexions between them:
... the ideas that ethics are conversant about being all
real essences, such as I imagine have a discoverable
connexion and agreement one with another: so far as we
can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be
possessed of certain, real, and general truths; and I
doubt not but, if a right method were taken, a great part
of morality might be made out with that clearness that
could leave, to a considering man, no more reason to doubt,
that he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions
in mathematics which have been demonstrated to him.
/Tv, xii, 87
The 'right method' is, of course, the demonstrative method of "the
mathematicians.
Locke's picture of a rationally ordered universe is intimately
bound up with his doctrine that things have real essences, or forms,
which make them 'to be what they are'. We saw at the end of
Chapter IV that Locke's doctrine of real essences is of but doubtful
coherence when applied to the physical world. The doctrine of
forms does give support to the thesis of necessary connexions existing
between things in nature. However, Locke wishes to combine this
doctrine with the corpuscular philosophy of nature. Obviously the
corpuscular philosophy does allow for the regular connexion of things
in nature. However, it is extremely doubtful that it can allow
these connexions to be logically necessary. If the corpuscular
account of nature is accepted it would seem that forms must he
rejected; hut if forms are rejected the ground is taken from under
the conception of a purely rational natural order, i.e. one which is
completely expressible in terms of a priori necessary connexions
between ideas. Once it is seen that the physical aspect of the
order of nature is not 'rational' the picture of morality as a
similarly rational aspect of that order loses its force and plausibility.
Hence, the basis for a belief in a system of morals explicating' the
natural connexions holding between moral notions collapses.
While the parallel between 'rational' nature and 'rational'
morality turns out to be vacuous; the analogy between mathematics
(although in some ways it is instructive) breaks down at the point
on which Locke places most weight. There are, Locke maintains,
two reasons why morality has been thought incapable of demonstration.
In the first place, moral notions, unlike ideas such as 'triangle'
and 'circle', cannot be sensibly represented. Secondly, the simple
ideas making up the complex ideas of mathematical objects are
generally fewer in number than those combined in moral notions. On
both counts it is difficult to keep moral notions in mind during
the steps of an intricate demonstration. However, these disadvantages
in moral notions, "may in a good measure be remedied by definitions,
setting down that collection of simple Ideas which every term shall
stand for, and then using the terms steadily and constantly-for that
precise collection". /iV, iii, 40; Cf. Ill, xi, vJJ Definition
is, therefore, an essential step in the demonstration of morality,
and,like mathematical ideas, moral notions can be defined completelyo
For good or ill, Locke's theory of definition has had a
7
considerable influence on subsequent philosophy. Whatever may be
said for or against it as a general theory, one thing is clear; it
does not cover the definition of moral terms. As \fe saw in the
preceding chapter, a moral notion cannot be analysed into a definite
number of component elements; and the attempt to carry through such
an analysis can only result in a truncated notion which is capable
of performing its role in moral discourse. This is not to say that
moral notions are all indefinable. The standard definition of
•murder' as the 'killing of a person with malice aforethought* is
quite suitable for a wide range of purposes. It serves, for example,
to distinguish the act of murder from accidental killing. But
even if this definition embraced all instances of murder (which it
does not), it would not be a precise definition in Locke's sense.
For 'malice' is itself a moral notion which would in turn have to be
broken down into its ultimate components. But the important point
which applies to all moral notions is that, no matter how long we
persevere in our analysis there will always be need for a final
cetris paribus clause. In the end we will have to say that an action
constituted by such and such elements is a case of murder, all other
7 Cf. for example, G.E. Moore's Frinclpia Ethica, Ch. I, §7-8
in which the account given of definition exactly parallels Locke.
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things being; equal* For the everyday use of moral notions (the
making of moral judgements, decisions etc.) this rider is essential.
Unless a man understands the necessity for the cetrls paribus clause
and is able to judge the circumstances in which other things are not
equal, he cannot properly participate in the activity of morality.
Up to a point the analogy between mathematics and morality is
instructive. With both mathematical ideas and moral notions real
and nominal essence come to one and the same thing. Locke's mis¬
take is to press the analogy founded on this insight in the wrong
direction. Mathematical ideas are not only capable of precise
definition, but, if they are to function within mathematics, they
must be precisely defined. Moral notions, on the contrary, are
incapable of precise definition because their function in morality
demands imprecision. This important and instructive disanalogy
between mathematics and morality may be expressed in the dictum
that, mathematical ideas are necessarily closed, or complete, while
8
moral notions are necessarily 'open textured'. That this is so
but illustrates the banal truth that morality is not a mathematical
discipline.
Insofar as Locke's hopes for a science of morality rest on
the precise definability of our moral notions, he is predestined to
8 For the term 'open texture' see, Friedrich Waismann: "Veri-
fiability" in Logic and Language (Second Series)
1,76
disappointment.. However, we have yet to consider the most common
objection urged against Locke's 'demonstration of morality'.
It has often been stated that, whatever Locke had in mind when
he spoke of the demonstration of morality, his project rests upon a
fundamental confusion; he does not see the difference between
logical validity and moral obligation. No matter what conceptual
links there may be between moral notions, analysis of these notions
cannot demonstrate that we ought to do anything. What places moral
notions in an entirely different category from mathematical ideas
is the fact that the former enter into propositions which express
obligation, while the latter enter into propositions which express
g
nothing more than logical relations. The simple answer to this
criticism is that Locke does not suppose the analysis of moral
notions to reveal the obligatory force of morality. His legalist
theory .of obligation is abundantly clear in the Essays on the Law
of Nature. Moral obligation can be founded only in the will of a
superior to whom we are rightly subject. In the unfinished MS
Of Ethics in General^ Locke explicitly distinguishes the analysis
of moral notions from the explication of obligation:
Y/hoever treats of morality so as to give us only the
definitions of justice and temperance, theft and
9 See, for example, Aaron: John Locke, p. 264; Von Leyden:
Introduction to Essays on the Law of Nature, p. 55<>
10 This MS. was first published by Lord King in his Life of John
Locke, Vol.2, pp. 122 - 133« Von Leyden points out that Locke
originally intended it to form chapter XX of Book IV of the
Essay. ^.See Introduction to the Essays, p. 667
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incontinency, and tell us which are virtues, which are
vices, does not only settle certain complex ideas of modes
with their names to them . . . But whilst they discourse
ever so acutely of temperance or justice, but show no
lav? of a superior that px*escribes temperance, to the
observation or breach of which lav? there are rewards and
punishments annexed, the force of morality is lost . . .
for without showing a law that commands or forbids them
. . . those actions which the schools here call virtues
or vices, may by the same authority be called bjr contrary
names in another country; and if these be nothing more
than their decisions and determinations in the case, they
will be still nevertheless indifferent as to any man's
practice, which will by such kind of determinations be
under no obligation to observe them<> /King, 2, pp. 129 -
1307 11
Unless a man knows there to be a lav? which binds his actions, the
analysis of moral terms can teach him nothing more than "the skill
how to speak properly, or at most to knov? what actions in the
country he lives in are thought laudable or disgraceful; i.e<.
are called virtues and vices". /ibid, p. 1
The answer to the above objection brings into focus a fact
which has been surprisingly neglected by most commentators; Locke
conceives the science of morality as having two distinct stageso
In commenting on Locke's moral philosophy Bishop Berkeley remarks
rather scornfully:
To demonstrate Morality it seems one need only make
a Dictionary of Words and see which included which, at ^
least. This is the greatest part and bulk of the Work,
11 Cfo Draft B. S 157, pp. 298 - 299»
12 Philosophical Commentaries, 690 in ¥orks ed» Luce and
Jessop, Volo 1, p. 84c
178
That a dictionary of moral notions would make up the hulk of the
work is true enough; but Berkeley's implication that it would
constitute nearly all of the projected moral theory is misleading.
Equipped with complete and precise definitions of moral notions,
Locke supposes we could proceed to exhibit the conceptual links
between them. However this is to be the final stage of the
science of morality; and in itself it would be of minimal
importance.
The first stage of Locke's project consists in showing the
true foundations of moral obligation:
The idea of a supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness,
and wisdom, whose workmanship we are and on whom we depend,
and the idea of ourselves as understanding rational beings
. . . would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued,
afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as
might place morality amongst the sciences capable of
demonstration: wherein I doubt not but from self-evident
propositions, by necessary consequences as incontestable
as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong
might be made out . . . J_TV, iii, 187 13
It will be noted that the ideas cited in this passage are not what
we have called moral notions, i.e. they are not ideas signifying
actions under the aspect of virtue and vice. Nor are they notions
in the general sense of the term defined by Locke. Cur ideas of
God and man do not impose a form on God and man. Both have their
13 Locke's Journal entry corresponding to this passage reads, "he
that has a true Idea of god and his fellow creatures and of
Justice goodnesse law happynesse & c. is capable of knowing
moral things or have a demonstrative certainty in them". Sund.
Jun. 26, 1681. /Aaron and Gibb, p. 116J
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real essences independently of the nominal essences of the ideas
we frame; and to us these real essences are unknowable. Locke
realizes that other ideas besides moral notions enter into his moral
theory, but he does not consider this a serious objection against
the programme of demonstration:
For as to substances, when concerned in moral discourses,
their divers natures are not so much inquired into as
supposed: v.g. when we say that man is subject to law,
we mean nothing by man but a corporeal rational creature;
what the real essence or other qualities of that creature
are in this case is no way considered. /ill, xi, \§J
The ideas of God and man are prominent in the Essays on the Law of
Nature; and here Locke is mainly concerned to establish morality
and its obligation on a firm theological foundation. Though it
may well be doubted that Locke's arguments in the Essays are all
examples of the elucidation of necessaiy connexions between ideas,
they can be said to make up the first stage in the demonstration of
morality. But the Essays stop short at an account of the content of
morality. The second stage of the demonstration of morality would
consist in a conceptual mapping of our moral notions. This would.
exhibit man's duties (but not his obligation) in a quasi-mathematical
fashion. It would be what William Molyneux calls a "book of
offices".^
We have seen why this last stage cannot be carried through.
At IV, iii, 18, Locke gives two examples of moral propositions which
he claims are certain by virtue of the ideas involved: "Where
14 Molyneux to Locke, 14 March, 1695-96. /works. 9, p. 37/7
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there is no property there is no injustice" and "Wo government allows
absolute liberty"., The feebleness of these examples serves more
to illuminate Locke1s failure than to raise expectations of a
complete demonstration of morality. On the analyses Locke gives,
the idea 'injustice' contains the idea 'property' and the idea
•government' contains the idea of restraints on absolute liberty.
It is therefore difficult to see hov; he could defend himself against
Berkeley's remarks that these, "instances of Demonstration in
15
Morality are according to his own Rule trifling Propositions".
Furthermore, as a later critic points out, it is not clear exactly
how these propositions are morally relevant; for, of themselves,
16
they do not function as guides to action.
There is one more objection which might appear strong enough
not only to demolish Locke's projected demonstration of morality,
but also the theory of moral judgements which we have abstracted
from his account of notions. It has been said that our moral
notions are the terms in which moral duties are formulated and
expressed. However, Locke holds moral notions to be creations of
the human mind. As thqyare such, it appears unavoidable that a
reliance placed on them in the guidance of action must reduce morality
to a matter of subjective opinion, the very pitfall Locke's doctrine
15 OpoCit., p0 84« Berkeley's charge has been frequently
repeated. Cf. Gibson: Locke's Theory of Knowledge, p. 160;
Aaron: John Locke, p. 262.
16 Cfo J. Kemp: Reason, Action and Morality, p. 21o
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of an objective law of nature is designed to fence. Henry Lee,
one of Locke's early critics, puts the problem in sharp focus.
On Locke's showing, "the Reason why Morality may be demonstrated,
i3 because every one making his Ideas of Virtues and Vices, according
to his Fancy, he will be upon as sure Grounds as if he demonstrated,
because no body will be able to judge but himself, whether his Ideas
17
be right or wrong, and consequently he can never be confuted".
Locke does not maintain the liberty of each individual to form moral
notions according to whim. If men are to talk sensibly of moral
matters they must use notions according to their commonly accepted
meanings. Arbitrariness is no more allowable in moral discourse
than it in mathematics. IV, iv, ^7 Nevertheless Lee's
remark does present a real problem. Whether moral notions are
developed by individuals or by society at large they are human
creations. How, then, can Locke escape the charge that his theory
leads to moral relativism and subjectivism?
Locke is acutely aware of the fact that what counts as virtue
and vice differ from place to place and from age to age. He is
always careful to distinguish the proper foundation of morality
from its pseudo-foundation in custom and the opinions of men. This
distinction is the major thane in Of Ethics in General;
But there is another sort of morality or rules of our actions,
which though they may in many parts be coincident and agreeable
17 Anti-Scepticism, p. 235
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v/ith the former, /the moral standards which_are in fact
preached in a given country at a given time/ yet have a
different foundation, and we come to the knowledge of them
a different way; these notions or standards of our actions
not being ideas of our own making, to which we give names,
but depend upon something without us, and so not made by us,
but for us, and these are the rules set to our actions by
the declared will or laws of another, who hath power to
punish our aberrations. /pp.Clt., p. 130/
If our moral notions are to be in order, if they are really to express
the moral law, they must themselves conform to a given standards. As
Locke states in the Essay:
To conceive rightly of moral actions, we must take notice
of them under this two-fold consideration, First, as they
are in themselves, each made up of such a collection of
simple ideas. Thus drunkeness or lying signify such
or such a collection of simple ideas . . . and in this
sense they are . . . positive absolute ideas . . .
Secondly,- our actions are considered as good, bad, or
indifferent; and in this respect they are relative, it
being their conformity to, or disagreement with, some
rule that makes them to he regular or irregular, good
or bad, /fl, xxviii, 1
The question of how men are to know their duties now becomes a question
of how they are to know whether the moral notions they form are
genuine reflections of the law of nature.
If Locke's epistemology is confined within the circle of ideas,
there appears to be no way of answering this question., However,
18 Cf, Draft B, § 162, p. 305: "• « « whencesoever we take the
rule of moral actions; or by what standard soever we frame in
our minds the ideas of virtues or vices, they consist only,
and are made up of collections of simple ideas, which we
originally received from sense or reflection: and their
rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement
with the patterns described by some law".
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we have argued that although, on Locke's strict definition, know¬
ledge is confined to ideas, this does not mean he places a similarly
19
rigorous restriction on knowing. Locke's theory of moral
knowledge does fail; for he conceives it, like he conceives all
knowledge, as conforming to the paradigm set by mathematics.
Nevertheless, Locke does expound a separate theory of how men come
to know their duties. It consists in two theses; one is a
negative thesis aimed against the wide-spread view that the law
of nature is known innately; the other is a positive account of
what may be termed moral discovery. In the two chapters following
we will endeavour to chart Locke's doctrine under each of these
aspects.




The polemic against innate ideas in the first book of the
Essay has often puzzled Locke's commentators. His arguments seem
to be directed against the doctrine that men are born into the world
knowing certain truths; and it has always proved difficult to find
a philosopher who actually maintains this naive version of innatism.
Nevertheless, Book I should not be dismissed as a belabouring of
the empty air. There is a far less primitive version of innate
knowledge which did enjoy considerable currency in the seventeenth-
century, and which was by many looked upon as the only viable solution
to the problem of moral epistemology. It is not knowledge which is
said to be innate, but the disposition to receive knowledge. Eon
the human mind is so constructed that all men who have the use of
reason cannot but assent to the truth of a specific range of
propositions once the terms in which they are expressed are under¬
stood. The majority of Locke's contemporary critics were quite
prepared to see the naive doctrine jettisoned, but they were not
willing to give up the dispositional doctrine. Taken on its own,
without the context of the rest of the Essay, the thesis that
there are no innate ideas could be accepted as true hut platitu¬
dinous. However, seen in the light of Locke's complimentary thesis,
that the mind is originally, "white paper, void of all characters"
/II, i, 27, the arguments of Book I were understood as directed
against both the naive, and the sophisticated dispositional versions
of innatism.
Henry Lee, whose Anti-Scepticism is one of the most detailed
contemporary examinations of the Essay, is typical of the reaction
against Locke. No one, Lee maintains, does, or sensibly could,
hold the mind of the embryo to be literally stocked with ideas or
implanted with principles. The philosophers' talk of innate
knowledge is to be understood figuratively. Nevertheless, the
doctrine of innatism has a definite literal meaning:
. . . the Soul of Man is so framed by the Author of Nature,
as not to be equally disposed to all sorts of Perceptions,
to embrace all Propositions with an Indifferency, to
judge them true or false; but antecedently to all the
Effects of Custom, Experience, Education,or any other
contingent Causes ... is necessarily inclined to believe
some Propositions true, others false; some Actions good,
others evil: and so is not altogether like a rasa tabula,
on which you may set any Impression indifferently . . .
/On the contrary/ the Soul has an innate Power of perceiving.
affirming, denying, willing, refusing; but that Power is
not exerted till a proper Object is offer'd for its Perception
and Judgement.1
It can be seen that Lee grants innate status to two kinds of knowledge
the mind is naturally disposed to correctly judge the truth or
falsity of some propositions and the good or evil of some actions.
The knowledge for which innateness was traditionally claimed may be
marshalled under two heads: speculative principles and practical
principles. The former were invariably truths of the widest gen¬
erality, such as the lav: of identity; but the latter vrere often
quite detailed moral riales. Lee, for instance, compiles a list of
innate.practical principles which ranges from the duty of preserving
1 Anti-Scepticism, Preface /p. \J
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one's life to the keeping of contracts. Innate speculative
principles have recently been resurrected .in a highly complex form
3
to suit the purposes of modem linguistic theory. Innate practical
principles, however, have never been totally eclipsed. They have
survived in one form or another in the doctrine'which has come to
be known as ethical intuitionism. Locke attaches both categories
of innate knowledge, but it is with his arguments against innate
practical principles that we are here primarily concerned.
Professor Yolton has shown that,in the moral sphere,even naive
innatism was not without its advocates. The doctrine, Yolton points
out, had an important conservative function. For if the existing
values of a society are consigned to the realm of innate knowledge
4
they are thereby placed beyond dispute. Certainly the appeal to
innateness, whether in the naive or dispositional form, does
constitute a useful device in the hands of those who wish to preserve
2 Anti-Scepticism, p. 5•
3 On the modern, renaissance of innate ideas, especially in
linguistic theory, see, Jonathan Barnes: "Mr Locke's Darling
Notion", in The Philosophical Quarterly, 1972; Harry M.
Bracken: "Innate Ideas - Then and Now J* in Dialogue, 1967 -
68; David E. Cooper: "Innateness: Old and New',' in The
Philosophical Review. 1972.
4 John Locke and the Nay of Ideas, p. 29. Similarly Aaron views
innatism as giving, "a show of authority and finality which
teachers and preachers can put to effective use". /John
Locke, p. 87/ The doctrine of innate moral knowledge was
considerably enhanced by an appeal to St Paul's remark, at
Romans II, xv, that the law of God is written in the heart.
Cf. Leibniz: New Essays concerning Human Understanding,
Preface, p. 43*
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traditional values. However, the dispositional version of the
doctrine is much more subtle than simply a conservative attempt to
maintain the moral status quOo
The seventeenth-century defenders of dispositional innatism
did not see themselves as merely asserting an empirical fact about
the mindj that it is so made as to be incapable of doubting a num¬
ber of propositions. Prom this nothing would follow as to the
truth or falsity of those propositions. Understood as a
psychological fact, the mind's incapacity for doubt might extend
to false as well as true propositions. The dispositional theory
is a piece of metaphysics rather than empirical observation. If
a man knows something innately he is held to be in contact with a
realm of truth existing external to, and independent of, his mind.
Innate knowledge differs from other knowledge in that, in the case
of the former, doubt is not only psychologically impossible (as it
might be with respect to a well attested empirical truth), it is
impossible because there exists a special relation between the mind
and truth. The mind and the external realm of truth are, as it
were, geared to each other; so that, once contact between the two
has been established, truth has a necessary purclia.se on the mind.
Thus Lee writes:
. . . the only reason I can frame, why any Perceptions,
Thoughts or Notions can be said to be innate, is because,
according to the present Constitution of our Souls and
Bodies, and their Relation to other parts of the Universe,
there is a necessary Connexion fix'd and establish'd
between some sorts of Hotions or Impressions from external
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Objects, and. some sort of Perceptions or Thoughts, and
they may properly enough be call'd natural or innate;
because by the arbitrary Constitution of.the Wise Author
of Nature in uniting our Souls to our Bodies, there is a
necessary and mutual Communication between both, that
such Motions should produce such Perceptions.
In ethics the realm with which the mind is said to be in necessary
contact is that of objective moral values.
The similarity between dispositional innatism and the many-
faced doctrine which goes under the title of ethical intuitionism
is obvious. Whatever their differences, all ethical intuitionists
may be said to hold two things. First, that the truth of, at
least certain basic, propositions of morality, or the value of
certain definable actions or states of affairs, is evident to all
normal human beings. Second, that these intuitive truths and
values are not, and cannot be, supported by argument. If a man
dissents from a moral truth he can only be told to 'look again';
for no argument can avail against a failure of the individual's own
moral perception. The main differences between the various
intuitionist theories centre on the question of the nature of the
intuitive act. Some intuitionists hold that moral truths are
discernible by a special 'moral sense'. Thus, the perception of
moral truth is conceived as analagous to sense perception. Others
hold that man's reason, is the means whereby he attains moral
truth. Its perception is thus analagous to the perception of
5 Op. Cit., p. 6.
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mathematical truth. Notwithstanding these differences, there is
a unity of purpose in ethical intuitionism; it is a defence of what
may be called the autonomy of morals. For the intuitionist, moral
values and distinctions are sui generis; they are independent of
any non-moral facts. This being so, intuition must be the way
moral truth is apprehended. An argument from non-moral facts might
be useful in leading up to an intuition of moral truth. However,
by itself it can never show a man any moral truth, nor can it entail
any moral truth. Consequently the intuitionist rejects any other
moral epistemology as false on the grounds that it must neglect
the essential autonomy of morals; it must reduce morality to
something non-moral.
Most of Locke's critics who defended innatism conceived the
human capacity for innate truth as being at least closely related
to the faculty of reason. James Lowde talks of the soul having,
"a native power of finding or framing such Principles or Propositions,
the Truth or Knowledge whereof no way depends upon the evidence of
sense or observation".^ Thomas Becconsall maintains, "that the
Soul retains a Faculty of Thinking and Reasoning in an established
way: Insomuch, thut when Objects are fairly presented to the Mind,
and the Kind dwells and deliberates upon 'em, she will still be
determin'd according to the Nature, Properties, and Agreement or
6 A Discourse concerning the Nature of Man, p. 53•
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Disagreement of the things 1emselves". In the same vein, John
Milner remarks that, "of such things, as so soon as they are
alledged, all Men acknowledge them to be true or good, they require
no Proof or farther Descourse to be assured of the Truth or Goodness
of them, we need not fear to say, that they seem to have a good
0
Title, to be receiv'd for common Notions or Catholick Truths".
However, a less rationalistic note is struck by Thomas Burnet, who
holds, "that the Distinction, supposed of Gratitude and Ingratitude,
HLdelity and Infidelity, Justice and Injustice, and such others, is
as sudden without any Ratiocination, and as sensible and piercing,
9
as the difference I feel from the Scent of a Rose, and of Assafoetida".
This move away from a rational capacity for moral truth to one founded
in sense (and finally in sentiment) achieves a kind of apotheosis
in an otherwise undistinguished pamphlet published anonymously in
177S« Here it stated that, "we have innate moral principles, which
do not consist of propositions or maxims; but of internal sentiments,
or conscious feelings, prior to all moral maxims; and without
which . . . morals could have no foundation in nature, not could be
7 The Grounds and Foundation of Natural Religion, p. 17.
8 An Account of Mr Lock's Religion, p. 177.
9 Remarks upon an Essay concerning Humane Understanding;
p0 Cf. Burnet's definition of 'Natural Conscience'




In general, the defence of innatism was also a defence of the
autonomous nature of morality. Moral distinctions were taken to
be in Ralph Cudworth's phrase, 'eternal and immutable'. The
example of mathematics was commonly called upon in illustration of
this point. Moral worth is internally related to actions much as
three-sidedness is internally related to triangles. A wrong
action is wrong for all times and for all possible worlds. The
morality of an action is, therefore, quite independent of all non-
moral factors. The criticism aimed against Locke took two forms.
In the first place, it was argued that, in denying innate morality,
he based moral distinctions on mutable custom and private opinion.
Secondly, on a somewhat different level, he was accused of resolving
morality into the arbitrary will of God. The second criticism
reflected an extreme view of what is involved in the independence
of moral values; for, finally, it led to the complete divorce of
God from morality.
Lee takes a moderate view of the relation between God and
Morality. Equally with Lcclce, he stresses God's role as a moral
law-giver. Nevertheless, he is adamant in his opinion that, in
rejecting innatism, Locke is forced to embrace moral relativism.
He warns his readers that, in Locke's usage, terms such as 'Law of
10 Dialogues concerning Innate Principles, containing An
Examination of Mr Locke's Doctrine on that Subject, p. 52*
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Nature' and. 'Laws of God' have changed their common meaning:
For, if the Author of Nature has contributed nothing to
our gaining the knowledge of them in the original
Constitution of our Souls and Bodies; but left us
wholly in the dark, wholly at liberty to gain our
Knowledge of them from Experience and Conversation;
then the Laws of Nature, the Laws of God, may be
words interpreted to signifie only such Rules of
Action as every man voluntarily makes to himself,
and shapes by the mutable Sentiments and exemplary
Practice of his own Familiars or Superiors.
But it is James Lowae who gives the most succinct statement of the
view that innate knowledge and an immutable realm of moral values
are inseparable:
. . . the Law of Nature is either the same with these
naturall inscriptions, or innate notions, or the one
so Founded, in the other, that they must both stand,
or fall together.^
Lowae insists on the complete independence of morality from all non-
moral factors. Moral rules cannot be derived from a consideration
of human nature, for God might have made men differently. Moral
knowledge can only be innate, or intuitive. This position is
taken to its logical conclusion by Thomas Burnet. Burnet does
not so much accuse Locke of basing morality on custom and opinion,
as of reducing it to the will ofGod:
But has the Will of the Law-Maker no Rule to go by? And
is not that which is a Rule to his Will, a Rule also to
ours, and indeed the Original Rule?^3
11 Op.Cit,, Preface, /jr>. aJ Much the same charge is made by
Becconsall, Op.Git..p. 46 and by Milner, Op.Cit., p. 60.
12 Moral Essays, p. 50.
15 Remarks upon an Essay concerning Humane Understanding, p. 6.
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On Burnet's showing God and man are equally under an immutable law
which is independent of both. Here the separation of morality from
theology is utter and complete.
The weakness of ethical intuitionism,or dispositional innatism,
is best brought out by attention to the development we first noted
in Burnet; the replacement of reason as the source of moral
knowledge by sense or feeling. The consequences of this move
are not far to seek. It is part of our conception of reason that
it is the same in all men; indeed in all rational beings. There¬
fore the thesis that moral truth is discernible by reason has
built into it a guarantee that all men, who make proper use of
their reason, will discern the same truth. In this way the object¬
ivity of morality is provided for. The thesis that moral values
are discernible by feeling carries no such guarantee. Two men
might experience the same moral feeling with respect to a given
object; equally they might not. If they do not, there is no way
in which their differences can be resolved. Ultimately the attempt
to base moral discernment on feeling reduces it to a matter of taste,
and 'in matters of taste there is no disputing'. On the other
hand, it is characteristic of 'matters of reason' that there is
disputing, and in this lies the universality and objectivity of
reason and the subjectivity of taste. Dispute is possible in
matters of reason because there are decision procedures in accordance
with which rational differences can be resolved. The reasoner
invokes publicly agreed rules. Deviation from the rules of
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reasoning can be corrected, either by the reasoner himself or by
others. Conversely, dispute is net possible in matters of taste
or feeling because there are no rules in accordance with which
tastes can be corrected. An eccentricity of taste must be accepted
as a fact of the individual's psychological make-up. (This is,
of course, not to say that we may not deplore such an eccentricity
and seek to change the individual's make-up). Thus, so long as
moral truth is held to be discerned by reason, morality retains
an air of objectivity; but once discernment is placed in feeling,
or sense, or sentiment the collapse into subjectivity becomes
inevitable.^
It can be argued that the move from reason to feeling is
inherent in the ethical intuitionist position. Those who maintain
this position insist on the immediate apprehension of, at least
certain key, moral propositions. Apprehension is immediate in
the sense that, once the knower understands the terms in which the
propositions are expressed, no argument is.necessary, nor can be
14 Cf. Hume's remarks to Francis Hutcheson: "I vri sh from my
Heart, I coud avoid concluding, that since Morality, according
to your Opinion as well as mine, is determin*d merely by
Sentiment, it regards only human Nature and human Life ...
If Morality were determin'd by Reason, that is the same to
all rational Beingst But nothing but Experience can assure
us, that the Sentiments are the same. What Experience have
we with regard to superior Beings? How can we ascribe to
them any Sentiments at all? They have implanted those
Sentiments in us for the Conduct of Life like our bodily
Sensations, which they possess not themselves". Letters of
David Hume, ed. Greig, Vol. I, p. 40. Hume's problem arises
even if discussion is confined to human beings, for the
evidence of experience suggests that the supposed moral
sentiments differ from man to man.
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given, to convince him of their truth. That is, their truth is
self-evident. Now it is undeniable that self-evident propositions
do exist. Within this category fall analytic, or what Locke calls
•trifling', propositions, e.g. •all bachelors are male'. Some
philosophers have maintained that the category also includes
propositions which are synthetic, or in Locke's terminology
•instructive'. 'Everything that is red is coloured' is sometimes
cited as an example of a synthetic a priori proposition. This
proposition clearly is self-evident on the criterion given aboveo
The thorny problem of whether it is also synthetic need not detain
us. What is important is the one thing tho two cited propositions
have in common; what might be called a 'failure of meaning* is
involved in the assertion of their denial. That is, we simply
would not understand a man who asserted that, 'some bachelors
(i.e. unmarried males) are not male', or that 'some red things are
not coloured'. This notion of a 'failure of meaning' is, of
course, very vague. Nevertheless, it does serve in a rough and
ready fashion to demarcate propositions which can be said to be
self-evident to reason, and it has the virtue of allowing the
possibility of synthetic a priori propositions. More to the point,
it highlights an interesting difference between self-evident non-
moral propositions and putative self-evident moral propositions.
The propositions put forward by the ethical intuitionists are not
analytic, but synthetic, or instructive. They express moral duties,
the value of states of affairs, and so on. However, the assertion
of the denial of any of these propositions does not involve what
we have called a failure of meaning. We do understand a man who
denies that he has a certain duty or that a certain thing is of
value,, whatever the duty or the value in question may he. We
even understand the nihilist when he denies all duties and values.
It might be argued from this that the ethical intuitionist has no
grounds on which to establish the self-evidence of his moral
propositions.
Nevertheless we would underestimate the strength of the
ethical intuitionist position if we took the above argument to he
a conclusive refutation. Generally, the intuitionist would agree
that his self-evident moral propositions can he denied, as an
intellectual exercise. What he does claim is that they cannot he
denied 'in the heart'. This defence is well put by' Lea, who takes
as illustration moral propositions which are self-evidently false
and actions which are self-evidently evil:
Expose your Children; Murder or expose to wind and weather
and wild Beasts your Parents, or any Person very Aged or
Sick, beyond hopes of Recovery; Bury your Children alive;
Geld your own Children, got on Female Captives for that
purpose, & c. The Question, I ask, is, whether Human
Nature, antecedent to Custom, Education or Law, be so
form'd as to be free to believe such Propositions true,
such Actions good? Or rather, whether, in the moulding
of our Souls and Bodies, the Author of our Natures has
not preposses'd us vrith Inclinations to judge them false,
and the Actions agreeable to them evil and mischievous? '6
Expounded thus, the intuitionist position has a not inconsiderable
16 Op.Cit.. p. 12
force. There are moral propositions which it seems impossible for
a normal person sincerely to deny. But ' sincerity' is a terra
belonging to the vocabulary of feeling, not of reason. Once
sincerity is brought into account for the self-evidence of moral
propositions the move away from reason in the direction of feeline
is accomplished.
Having said something of the position taken up by Locke's
critics we can now turn to what Locke himself has to say in his
T7
polemic against innate knowledge. Book I of the Essay is a
refutation of both innate speculative and innate practical principles
However, we will examine Locke's arguments only insofar as they
have relevance to practical principles, or moral propositions.
It is true that much of Locke's language in Book I suggests
that his target is naive innatism. For example, he makes much
play with the fact that young children are not possessed of ideas
such as 'identity'. Yet Locke was very well acquainted with the
thought of his contemporaries, and it is quite incredible that he
should have believed naive innatism to be the sum total of the
innate knowledge hypothesis. It is probable that the terms in
which Locke presents his refutation are dictated by his suspicion.
17 It is customary to refer to Book I as the 'polemic against
innate ideas*. However Locke's target is clearly innate
principles, or propositions, considered as units of knowledge.
That there are no innate ideas is but another argument against
such principles. For ideas are the parts which go to make up
propositions; "if the ideas be not innate, there was a time
when the mind was without those principles; and then they will
not be innate, but be derived from some other original".
Jjy iv, JJ
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of metaphor. The proponents of the innatist thesis frequently
resort to metaphor, and one way of attacking a metaphorically
expressed doctrine is to take the metaphor literally. Locke's
stratagem of treating his opponents as if they believed in a kind
of knowledge actually present in the mind from its very beginnings
may be understood as an attempt to uncover the non-metaphorical
cash value of the innatist thesis.
Locke deploys several arguments against innate knowledge,
and at first sight it might seem that these are unified only by
the fact that they are all directed against the one,rather vague,
thesis. However, on examination a quite definite pattern emerges.
The first argument may be termed the argument of universal consent.
It is aimed ostensibly against naive innatiso. But, by the
dialectic of objection and answer, it leads on to the more interesting
argument which is also effective against dispositional innatism.
The argument of universal consent is in the main part an
appeal to experience. It may be summed up thus: Universal consent
is a necessary condition for a principle's being innate in the naive
sense. The practical principles cited as innate do not command
universal consent. Therefore, they are not innate:
He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and
look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with
indifferency survey their actions, will be able to satisfy
himself that there is scarce that principle of morality
to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on (those
only excepted, that are absolutely necessary to hold
society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt
distinct societies) which is not, somewhere or other,
slighted and. condemned by the general fashion of whole
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societies of men, governed "by practical opinions and
rules of living quite opposite to others. Jj., iii, 107
In support of this rather sweeping statement Locke places much
reliance on travellers' tales reporting outlandish moral practices®
Now the display of the varieties of moral practice is a familiar
first move in the argument for the relativity of morals. But
there is an equally familiar counter-move. The fact of radical
differences and contradictions in the moral practices of different
peoples is granted. However, it is argued that this does not
entail differences in moral principles. In some societies, let
us say, it is the practice to eat one's aged parents. In
European society filial anthropophagism is strongly frowned upon®
Yet the members of both societies might still acknowledge the
same practical principles: that children ought to respect and
care for their parents® Y/hat they differ in is the way in which
they fulfil this principles, and this difference is explicable in
terms of differing factual beliefs and the circumstances of their
18
respective environments®
Although Locke does not mention this anti-relativist argument,
his comments on Lord Herbert of Cherbury's innatism constitute an
answer to it. He agrees that the various 'common notions' listed
by Lord Herbert are "clear truths and such as, if rightly explained,
a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his assent to".
18 Cf. J. D. Mabbott; An Introduction to Ethics, p. 34.
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77, .iii, 1j£7 His main objection is that the self-evidence of
these principles is due to the vagueness and generality of the
terms in which they are expressed. As the terms are so vague
the principles are almost completely uninformative, and quite
useless in the guidance of action:
I imagine it will scarce seem possible that God should
engrave principles in men's minds in words of uncertain
signification, such as virtues and sins, which amongst
different men stand for different things: nav, it cannot
be supposed to be in words at all which, being in most of
these principles very general names, cannot be understood
but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them<>
77, iii, 127
Similarly, it may be objected that the plausibility of the anti-
relativist's argument depends on the use of vague terras (e.g.
'respect'); and that the vagueness of these terms robs the so-
called universal principles of their status as practical principles.
If the anti-relativist were to tighten tip bis terms he would find
that his principles are not compatible with a wide variety in
behaviour. Experience will then teach him that there are no
practical principles which can be said to enjoy strictly universal
consent®
Locke's argument against universal consent may inflict
severe damage upon the doctrine of naive innatism, but it leaves
the much more complex doctrine of dispositional innatism unscathed®
The defenders of the latter theory need only demand general consent
for their principles. The mind1 s natural capacity for the
perception of moral truths is said to be an ability which develops
201
in the individualo Therefore, one would not expect to find it
fully operative in children or idiotso Furthermore, this capacity
can be perverted and inhibited by education, custom and passiono
It is therefore false that every single person must acknowledge
the truth of innate moral principles® It is only necessary that
they bsaccepted by those whose reason, or whose moral sense, functions
properly.
To this Locke replies that, if general consent is all that is
deemed necessary for innateness, there is no way of telling a
genuine innate principle from which is only pretended to be such.
For it is allowed that the perception of innate principles can
be blocked,the way is open to any group of men to proclaim their
own principles innate and therefore exempt from criticism. Locke
writes of the proponents of this form of innatism that, "their
argument stands thus: the principles which all mankind allow for
true are innate; those that men of right reason admit are the
principles allowed by all mankind; we and those of our mind are
men of reason; therefore we agreeing, our principles are innate:
which is a very pretty way of arguing and a short cut to
infallibility". /l, iii, 2oJ The demand for universal consent
does have this advantage; it provides a fairly hard and fast
criterion for distinguishing real from spurious innate principles.
The weakened demand for general consent ends by allowing any pro¬
position which can drum up fervent support.
Locke5s remarks concerning general consent indicate the prime
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reason behind his opposition to innatism and to all forms of ethical
intuition!sm. We saw in Chapter I that, for Locke, the problem of
moral knowledge arises from the problem posed by conscienceo The
dictates of conscience present themselves as knowledge; yet
conscience "is nothing else but our own opinion or judgement of
the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions". /l, iii, 87
As judgements,the dictates of conscience may be true or they may
be false. What is needed is seme standard or criterion whereby
the dictates of conscience can themselves be judged. This
standard must be established outside conscience. The ethical
intuitionists endeavour to set up a standard within conscience.
They elevate certain of its dictates to the level of truths known
immediately and without argument. I/)eke holds all the dictates
of conscience to be on one level in that not even the most widely
accepted of them carries a surety of its own truth.
Second^, Locke argu.es that neither strict universal nor
general consent can justify the unique status accorded innate pro¬
positions. Dispositional innatism demands only that the truth
of innate propositions be immediately recognized by all those who
understand the terms in which they are expressed. Locke is far
from wishing to deny that there are such self-evident propositions.
Whenever the mind immediately perceives the connexion of any two
ideas (as it does in every case of intuitive knowledge) the
proposition in which the ideas are combined is self-evident. But
if all self-evident propositions are granted innate status the
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number of innate truths will be legion and the great majority of
them will be trivial. Such a generous supply of innate propositions
defeats the purpose of the innate knowledge hypothesis. For
innate knowledge is supposedly knowledge of first principles
from which all other knowledge can be derived. It would be
manifestly absurd to assign each and every self-evident proposition
to the categories of first principles. /i, ii, 18 - 20j Thus,
even universal consent is nothing more than a mark of self-evidence,
and self-evident propositions are in no way to be confused with
innate truths.
Locke's theory of intuitive knowledge admits part of his
opponents case, but not the important part. Certainly there are
propositions which command the mind's immediate assent. Further¬
more Locke agrees that the propositions most often listed as innate
speculative principles are self-evident. So far Locke is at one
with the theory of dispositional innatism. Indeed some of his
early critics concluded the difference between their episteraology
19
and his to be at bottom no more than a difference in terminology.
Nevertheless, Locke firmly parts company with innatism when it
comes to so-called speculative first principles. The way to truth
is not, as the defenders of innate knowledge contend, to be found
in syllogistic d.eductions from special intuitive truths. The main
19 Lee, for example, writes: "I am apt to think this Debate, about
Innate Principles, is altogether needless; and that, if the
Question was stated in common Words, this Author's Sentiments
wou'd not appear so widely different from others, who speak
Sense on this Subject". Op.Cit.. p. 4.
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business of reason is the demonstration of connexions between ideas.
The method of reasoning is the analysis of ideas into their components
(i.e. definition) and. the laying out of those ideas so as to dis¬
play their interrelations. At best the syllogism can serve as
one way of displaying ideas in a demonstrative order; at worst it
is a positive hindrance to the perception of connexions between
ideaso Locke concedes self-evident speculative principles, such as
the law of identity, to have a secondary, and negative, function in
reasoning; "They are of use in disputes, for the silencing of
obstinate wranglers and bringing those contests to some conclusion".
TjV, vii, 1J7
While Locke grants the minor part of the dispositional innatism
doctrine with respect to 'speculative principles', his rejection of
ethical intuitionism is complete. There are no self-evident moral
propositions:
Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical
principles is that I think there cannot any or.e more rale
be proposed whereof a man may not justly demand a reason:
which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd if they
were innate, or so much as self-evident, which every innate
principle must needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain
its truth, not want any reason to gain it approbation . . .
should that most unshaken rule of morality and foundation
of all social virtue, that One should do as he would be done
unto, be proposed to one who never heard of it before, but
yet is of capacity to understand its meaning, might he not
without any absurdity ask a reason why? And were not he
that proposed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness
of it to Mm? Jl, iii, 47
The upholders of an intuitionist theory of ethics, of course, simply
disagree with Locke on this point. They claim that there are moral
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propositions which carry their own evidence with them, and which are
as immune from doubt as any analytic propositions. Writers like
Lee, and much more recent intuitionists, are quite ready to list
20
these propositionso Over this issue moral philosophers separate
into two opposing camps. In the one are those who proclaim the
autonomy of morals. Any given moral proposition must either be
known intuitively or it must follow from a moral proposition which
is known intuitively; no moral proposition can be derived solely
from a proposition expressing a non-moral fact. In the other are
those (including Locke) who proclaim with equal voice that none
of this is so; that morality is not autonomous. These two camps
are well established in moral philosophy. In fact they represent
what are perhaps the two fundamental types of ethical theory.
However, the non-autonomy thesis can boast one,not inconsiderable,
advantage over its rival. The proponent of moral autonomy always
finds difficulty in wrorking out a satisfactory moral epistemology;
for his position makes it hard for him to maintain a belief in
the existence of moral knowledge.
We have seen how ethical intuitionism prompts the move from
reason to some kind of moral sense or sentiment. Once sentiment
is taken as the source of ethical intuitions the bollapse into
subjectivism appears unavoidable; for there is no means whereby a
20 See, for example, the self-evident prima facie duties listed by
Sir David Ross in The Right and the Good, pp. 21 - 22.
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conflict between ethical intuitions can be resolved. But subj¬
ectivism is finally a denial of the existence of moral knowledge.
Ethical .intuitionism presupposes the same picture as any other
epistemology of morals, i.e. that there are moral facts external
to the knower and that these constitute the objects of moral
knowledge. It follows that if one man claims to know a specific
moral fact and another man claims to know the contrary both claims
cannot be correct. If one is a genuine case of knowledge, if the
content of the claim does truly reflect the moral facts, then the
other can be no more than a case of (false) belief or opinion.
However, if subjectivism is accepted this distinction between
knowledge and belief becomes vacuous; for, in practice what is
properly knowledge cannot be distinguished from what is properly
mere belief. That is, terms such as 'knowledge*, 'opinion', ana
'belief lack rules of application when it comes to intuitions
founded in sentiment. Of ethical intuitionism it may be said that
it declines, by -way of subjectivism, into ethical non-cognativism;
the view that there are no moral propositions expressing facts but
only moral utterances which serve to evince the private feelings
and attitudes of the individual (or perhaps the collective attitudes
of society).
Locke's early critics were convinced that ethical intuitionism
represented the only viable epistemology of morals. Unless the mind
is naturally disposed to the reception of specific moral truths the
moral realm must he unknowable. The only alternative is a
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relativism which reduces the principles of morality to custom and
subjective opinions which are formed more or less at random. Locke's
attack on innate practical principles is in intent a rejection of
this dichotomy. Not only is the hypothesis that there are moral
propositions which command immediate assent false, it is gratuitous.
It does nob solve the problem of moral knowledge, rather it oss¬
ifies private moral opinions into dogmas. As Locke has already
stated in the Essays on the Law of Nature, moral truths are found
out by reason working on the materials gathered in experience.
The way they are found out has nothing to do with an immediate
illumination of the mindo It is a process of discovery, and one
which includes much more than the apprehension of moral truths.
Men must come to know that they have duties before they can ascertain
what their duties are. This means men must know there to be a
God who has set a law to their conduct. For, "what duty is cannot
be understood without a law, nor a law be known or supposed without
a law-maker, or without rewards and punishment". Jl, iii, 12/
Reason, the faculty employed in the discovery of moral truth,
is innate. Ken are born with the ability to perceive connexions
between ideas, both immediately and by demonstration. There is,
then, a grain of truth in dispositional innatism. But as Locke's
marginal replies in his copy of Burnet's third set of Remarks
make plain, he does not concede anything to ethical intuitionism:
If moral Ideas or moral rules (which are the moral principles
I deny to be innate) are innate, I say children must know them
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as well as men. If by moral principles you mean a faculty
to finde out in time the moral difference of actions. Besides
that this is an improper way of speaking to cal a power
principles; I never deny'a such a power to be innate, but that
which I deny'd was that any Ideas or connexion of Ideas was
innate.21
Locke's critics misread him when they took the 'white paper' metaphor
as a declaration of the mind's complete passivity. The passage
quoted in the early part of this chapter from Lee's Anti-Scepticism
in which it is maintained that the mind does not receive all
propositions "with an Indifferency" but ha3 "an innate Power of
perceiving, affirming, denying." etc. might have been written by
22
Locke himself. The difference between the two philosophers lies
in what they understand by this innate power. For Lee the human
mind is (in a manner which in the last analysis remains ineffable)
capable of direct contact with a realm of moral truth© For Locke
the mind simply has the power to discover moral truths, a power
which it exercises equally in the discovery of non-moral truths©
We said earlier that, despite its obvious shortcomings, ethical
intuitionism does have one significant card to play© Moral pro¬
positions may not carry their own evidence with them in the same
way as self-evident non-moral propositions; nevertheless, we do
21 Quoted in Yolton: John Locke and the Way of Ideas, p. 56, from
Locke's copy of Burnet's Third Remarks in the Yale University
Library.
22 On the activity of the mind in Locke's philosophy see Yolton:
"Locke's Concept of Experience" in Martin and Armstrong.
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feel that there are at least some moral propositions which could
not he sincerely denied by any man who understood the terms in which
they are expressed. They may be rejected in the intellect but
they cannot be rejected in the heart. Locke's third, and final,
argument against innate morality consists in an explanation of this
feeling. On Locke's account it is the result of education:
... such who are careful ... to principle children well
. . . instil into the unwary and, as yet, unprejudiced
understanding . . . those doctrines they would have them
retain and profess. These, being taught them as soon as
they have any apprehension and still as they grow up
confirmed to them, either by the open profession or tacit
consent of all they have to do with, or at least by those
of whose wisdom, knowledge, and piety they have an
opinion « . . come by these means to have the reputation
of unquestionable, self-evident, and innate truths©
Jl, iii, 22/
It is, therefore, small wonder that there are many moral propositions
accompanied in the minds of men by a strong feeling of certitu.de.
But this feeling in no way guarantees their truth. Far less does
it give them any special status in the theory of moral knowledge.
210
Chapter VIII
THE DISCOVERY OF MORALITY
Locke's rejection of innate morality is the negative aspect
of his theory of how men know their duties; they do not know them
intuitively. Before examining Locke's theory under its positive
aspect, it will he useful to review the main stations in his general
position. Morality, it will be remembered,is inseparable from
law. This is the basic assumption underlying all of Locke's moral
philosophy. Were there no law set by God there could be neither
virtue nor vice, and all actions would be morally indifferent. This
does not mean that the content of morality is determined by arbitrary
commands. Law, or, to be exact, the authority of the divine leg¬
islator, is the formal cause of obligation. It determines the fact
that men have moral obligations; it does not determine the content,
or matter, of their obligations. What is truly the content of the
moral law depends (roughly) on the facts of human nature. However,
men themselves invent moral notions® These notions group together
otherwise disparate features of reality and give them moral import.
Moral notions make up the vocabulary of the moral point of view; i.e.
the stand from which men see human actions as virtues to be cul¬
tivated and vices to be eschewed. They are the terms in which men
articulate their duties; or what thev take be be their duties.
There is, therefore, a logical gap between the objective content of
the law of nature and the morality expressed in terms of moral notions.
Insofar as moral, notions are human constructs the duties they are
used to express are human conventions. These conventions may
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coincide with the objective precepts of the law of nature, but mora.
notions by themselves yield no guarantee that they do coincide.
They might just as easily be used to express pseudo-duties lacking
any objective warranty. The hypothesis of innate morality does
nothing to bridge the gap between what may be called conventional
morality and the law of nature. Instead, it elevates certain of
the propositions of conventional morality to an eminence where they
are beyond dispute. Even if the propositions selected did, as a
matter of fact, mirror the lav; of nature, innatism (ethical
intuitionism) would still fail as a moral epistemology. For Locke
no moral propositions are self-evident (or at least none which are
not analytic and hence uninformative)«. The thesis that there are
self-evident moral truths is only the shadow cast by the feeling
of conviction which some moral propositions produce.' Therefore
innatism does not provide a secure foundation for moral knowledge.
Locke's positive theory begins from a description of, what he
understands to be, the phenomenon of morality. All men, Locke
supposes, think of themselves as being under some kind of moral rul
distinct from the positive laws of the society to which they belong
In the paper Of Ethics in General he writes,
I do not remember that I have heard of any nation of men who
have not acknowledged that there has been right and wrong in
men's actions ... some measures there have been every
where owned, though very different; some rules and bound¬
aries to men's actions, by which they were judged to be good
or bad; nor is there, I think, any people amongst whom
there is no distinction between virtue and vice; some
kind of morality is to be found every where received; I
will not say perfect and exact, but yet enough to let us
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know that the notion of it is more or less every where, and
that men think that even where politics, societies, and
magistrates are silent, _men yet are under some laws to which
they owe obedience. /King, 2, p. 12^7
That is to say, all men classify actions as good or bad and recognise
themselves under obligations with respect to the actions thus classified.
This practice of classification plus the recognition of obligations
beyond those imposed by civil lav; constitutes the moral categories of
virtue and vice. In theory it is possible that men might distinguish
between good and bad actions yet not recognize any obligation what¬
soever. If this were so, men would lack the categories of virtue
and vice. For, "the rectitu.de of actions ... is noething but the
relation or conformity of the actions of men to some rule and this is
that which we call moral goodnesse and badnesse." /Draft A. p. 1.1]
There are, Locke states, three different laws against which men
measure their actions and determine their obligations: the divine
law; the civil law: the law of opinion or reputation. The first is
the moral law proper, set by God and promulgated both by revelation
and the 1 light of nature'. Actions according as they are contrary
to, or in conformity with, the divine lav; are sins or virtues. With
respect to the civil law, actions are either criminal or innocent.
However, the civil lav/ is irrelevant in the determination of men's
moral duties. Most men in fact judge what they moralljr ought to do
on the criteria set by the law of opinion:
Virtue and vice are names pretended and supposed everywhere
to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong;
and as far as they really are so applied, they so far are
coincident with the divine lav/ . «, . But yet, whatever is
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pretended, this is visible: that these names, virtue and.
vice in the particular instances of their application,
through the several nations and societies of men in the world,
are constantly attributed on^ to such actions as in each
country and society are in reputation or discredit . . o
Thus the measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed
virtue and vice is this approbation or dislike, praise or
blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes
itself in the several societies, tribes, and clubes of men
in the world, whereby several actions come to find credit
or disgrace amongst them according to the judgement, maxims,
or fashions of that placeo /jl, xxviii, id/*
Locke's contemporaries were not behindhand in seizing upon this and
similar passages as proof of Locke's commitment to moral relativism.
However, as is quite plain from the context and as Locke emphasises
in a subsequent reply to his critics, the law of opinion is
introduced as a description of how men visually judge the moral worth
of actions. His account of the law of opinion in no way contradicts
his assertion that the divine lav; is, "the only true touchstone
1 Cf. Locke's unpublished paper Philanthrowoy /sic/ or 'The Christian
Philosophers. (1675): "Mankind is supported in the ways of
Virtue or Vice by the Society he is of or by Conversation he
keeps. Example & Fashion being the great Governours of this
World. The 1st Question, every man ought to aske in all things
he doth, or undertakes; is, how is this acceptable to God?
But the first Question mcst men aske is, how wi11 this mend /commend/
me to my Company, and those, whose esteeme I value? He that
askes neither of these Questions, is a Melancholy Rogue; and
all ways of the most dangerous & worst of men. This is the
foundation of all the Sects & orders, either of Religion or
Philosophy, that have been in the World. Men are supported,
& delighted, with the friendship, & protection, they enjov,
from all the rest of the same way". /JlS.c. 27, Fol. 30.2/
of moral rectitude", Jri, xxviii, s72
The law of opinion is the conventional morality which men
develop and articulate in terms of their moral notions. Although
it is not the proper standard of virtue and vice Locke believes
the law of opinion to be, in general, a trustworthy reflection of
the moral law:
And though, perhaps, by the different temper, education,
fashion, maxims, or interest of different sorts of men, it
fell out that what was thought praiseworthy in one pla.ce
escaped not censure in another, and so in different
societies, virtues and vices were changed: yet as to the
main, they for the most part kept the same everywhere. For
since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with
esteem and reputation that wherein everyone finds his
advantage, and to blame and discountenance the contrary,
it is no wonder that esteem and discredit, virtue and vice,
should in a great measure everywhere correspond with the
unchangeable rule of right and wrong, which the law of
God hath established: there being nothing that so directly
and visibly secures and advances the general good of
mankind in this world as obedience to the laws he has set
them, and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion
as the neglect of them. Jj-1, xxviii, 117
In knowing the law of opinion, then, a man will very often be
acquainted with the precepts of the moral law. However, he cannot
be said thereby to know the moral law. If he judges an action's
moral worth solely in the light of the opinions popular among his
2 The 'Epistle to the Reader' in the second edition of the Essay
(1694) contains a long reply to James Lowde, in which Locke
explains the purpose for which he introduced the 'law of opinion'
'I was there not laying down moral rules, but showing the
original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the rules
men make use of in moral relations, whether those rules were true
or false . . . [The law of opinion/ alters not the nature of
things, though men generally do judge of and denominate their
actions according to the esteeme and fashion of the place or
sect they are of". /Yolton's edition of the Essay. Vol. 1,
p. 2987
3
fellows, his judgement will be a matter of belief not of knowledge.
The law of opinion merely indicates where moral truth might lie, it
4
cannot be the basis of moral truth.
There are three points to be noted in the above passage.
Firstly, Locke assumes the law of opinion will very often correspond
to the moral law because men naturally esteem that which promotes
their general advantage in this world. Locke must, therefore,
conceive the content of the moral law to be concerned, at least
primarily, with the promotion of temporal human good. Second, the
contradictions in the law of opinion as it is manifested among the
various societies of mankind are due to the "different temper,
education, fashion, maxims, or interest of different sorts of men".
Third, the diversity of morals represents a falling away from an
original uniformity, for Locke maintains that, 'vices and virtues
were changed'. There is a connexion between the second and third
point. In view of his polemic against innate morality, it is clear
Locke is not suggesting that men originally had a natural capacity
for the apprehension of self-evident moral principles and that this
has been obscured by the factors mentioned. What has been obscured
3 Cf. Locke's argument in Essays on the Law of Nature, pp. 177 - 17
4 Locke reiterates this point in Some Thoughts concerning Education
"Concerning Reputation, I shall only remark this one Thing more
of it; That thought it be not the true Principle and Measure of
Vertue, (for that is the Knowledge of a Man's Duty, and the
Satisfaction it is to obey his Maker, in following the Dictates
of that Light God has given him, with the Hopes of Acceptation
and Reward) yet it is that, which comes nearest to it". 6^_/
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is not a special capacity for moral truth, "but knowledge which was
first acquired (as is all knowledge) in experience. If this is so
it would seem that the best way to clear the obscurity will be to
recapture the state in which men first came to know moral truth®
It should then be possible to test the moral beliefs constituting
conventional morality against their originals.
In the Conduct of the Understanding Locke discusses a method
of inquiry which he takes to be of primary importance:
Most of the difficulties that come in our way, when well
considered and traced, lead us to some proposition which,
known to be true, clears the doubt,•and gives an easy
solution of the question, whilst topical and superficial
arguments, of which there is store to be found on both
sides, filling the head with variety of thoughts and the
mouth with copious discourse, serve only to amuse the
understanding, and entertain company, without coming to
the bottom of the question, the only place of rest and
stability for an inquisitive mind whose tendency is only
to truth and knowledge. /Sect. XLIV/
•Bottoming' is Locke's alternative to the topical disputation of the
schools. A problem is bottomed once it is bracketed off from the
assumptions and preconceived patterns of arguments which surround it*
Then it lies open to the light of man's reason. For, "Every man
carries about him a touchstone, if he will make use of it, to
distinguish substantial gold from superficial glitterings, truth
from appearances. And indeed the use and benefit of thi3 touch¬
stone, which is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assumed
prejudices, overwearing presumption, and narrowing our minds".
/Conduct. Sect. Ill/ The Essay itself is a sustained exercise of
this method; the problem of human understanding being bottomed on
the empirical origin of ideas. But it is in the second of the
Two Treatises of Government that Locke applies his method specifically
to the world of human action and values. The problem of political
power is bottomed on the 'state of nature*. So too, it will be
argued, is the problem of man* s original knowledge of the moral law.
Locke's conception of the state of nature has prompted a number
of interpretations. It has been debated whether Locke understands
by the 'state of nature' an actual historical period, a logical
5construction or a heuristic mytho One thing does appear quite
clearly; the concept encapsulates what Locke understands to be the
fundamental features of the human condition..
The state of nature is said to be the state of men living
together without civil government. Locke characterizes it as a
state of freedom and equalityo Freedom consists in each individual's
right to act independently of the will of any other man. Equality
in the state of nature is closely related to freedom. For, as no
man is naturally in a position of authority over others, "all the
Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal". /2nd Treatise, § Now
if Locke's state of nature is interpreted simply as the condition of
5 The literature in the debate is extensive. For example: Peter
Laslett supposes the state of nature to be the inferred original
state of man /introduction to the Two Treatises, p. 11J7 c. b.
MacPherson understands it as "a curious mixture of historical
imagination and logical abstraction from civil society" /The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, p. 209/ John
Dunn, on the other hand, argues that it is completely ahistorical,
functioning as, "an axiom of theology". /The Political Thought
of John Locke, p. 103/ For Hans Aarsleff it is an exercise in
'conjectural history'. /"The state of nature and the nature of
man in Locke", in John Locke - Problems and Perspectives, p. 10//
218
men before civil authority is established, his assertion that it is
a state of freedom and equality looks like a mere tautology. Before
government there is, by definition, no authority (at least none on
earth) to which the individual can be subject. Thus, logically
each man must be in a state of freedom and equality with respect to
his fellows.^ However, Locke's characterization is more substantial
than a tautology. If we are to understand his state of nature
aright it is important to bear in mind that in it men are under the
law of nature.
A man in the state of nature cannot be bound by the will of
another man. Nevertheless, his freedom is not absolute nor is it
arbitrary. All men are naturally in, "a State of Liberty, yet it
is not a State of Licence ... The State of Nature has a Law of
Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is
that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it". /2nd. Trea¬
tise, § 6/ Indeed the law of nature is not a restriction on human
freedom, but the necessary condition of freedom:
For Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the limitation
as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his
proper Interest, and prescribes no farther than is for
the general Good of those under that Law ... So that,
however it may be mistaken, the end of Law is not to
abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge Freedom:
For in all the states of created beings capable of Laws,
where there is no Law, there is no Freedom. For Liberty
is to be free from restraint and violence from others which
cannot be, where there is no Law . . . For who could be free,
when every other Kan's Humour might domineer over him?
/2nd Treatise, § V]J
6 Cf. J. D. Kabbott: John Locke, p. 142.
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It is the law of nature, then, which gives form and direction to
man's freedom. Likewise, human equality is dependent on the law
of nature. Locke is careful to explain that he does not suppose
men equal in everything. Age, virtue, excellence, alliances
entered into, benefits given or received all in various ways place
one man above another even in the state of nature. /2nd Treatise.
§ 54/ The equality of 'power and jurisdiction' which all men
possess in the absence of instituted civil authority consists in,
"the Execution of the Law of Nature . . . whereby every one has a
right to punish the transgressors of that'Law to such a Degree, as
may hinder its Violation". /2nd Treatise. § 7/ Locke has already
in the First Treatise proved against Sir Robert Filmer that God did not
originally invest any one individual with executive power. It
follows that each man must originally have such power:
For the law of Nature would, as all other Laws that concern
Men in this World, be in vain, if there were no body that in
the State of Nature, had a Power to Execute that Law, and
thereby preserve the innocent and. restrain offenders.
/ibid./
As is the case with freedom so it is with equalitjs the notion is
given meaning by the law of nature. It is, therefore, not the
absence of civil government which makes the state of nature one of
freedom and equality, but the presence of the law of nature.
The law of nature furnishes the base on which Locke builds
his conception of the state of nature. The latter may be initially
summa.rized as the state in which men are related one to another by
the law of nature. The law regulates the conduct of all men in
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order that their actions may be consistent with the freedom of each
man<, Understood thus, the state of nature is not something which
can be transcended. For men qua men are always subject to the law of
nature. The view of the state of nature as a period preceding
the institution of civil government (whether it be considered an
historical time or an historical construction) is not essential
to the concept itself. Rather, it belongs to the manner in which
Locke presents his theory of political power.
Locke's account of government is given in quasi-historical
terms. The transition from the apolitical community of men living
together to civil society is accomplished by a social compact which
conveys executive power into the hands of elected rulers. In this
manner the advent of government abolishes the equality which
characterizes the state of nature. For, in consenting to govern¬
ment, men submit themselves to the arbitration of those duly
placed above them. Nevertheless, it should not be thought that the
individual possession of executive power is thereby annulled once
and for all. The social compact is a two way affair. The
government thus established is entrusted with power by the peopleo
If it betrays its trust the people are freed from their side of the
compact and government is, in effect, dissolved. Consequently the
possession of executive power reverts to the individual. A
government acts contrary to its trust when it fails to promote the
end for which it was first established. Eroadly, government is
established as a remedy for the "inconveniences of the State of
Nature". /2nd Treatise, S 90? Where there is no third party to
whom appeal can be made for judgement in a dispute or redress of an
injury every individual roust fend for himself. It is the task of
government to forestall disputes between individuals, or, if they do
arise, to ensure that they are resolved in an orderly manner.
If Locke were seeking nothing more than a pragmatic justification
for government the doctrine of the law of nature would be of no
particular relevance. His argument might then be put thus: All
men being of equal authority in the state of nature their condition
will inevitably be one of disorder. Only by agreeing to institute
government and submitting to its authority can men escape from this
condition. A government which achieves the purpose for which it
has been created is justified. If a government fails in this, then
the state of nature has in fact returned, and the original compact
is null and void. However, Locke's intention is to place government
on a moral foundation, and for this reason the law of nature is
essential to his conception of the state of nature.
A pragmatic justification of government, based on the prefer-
ability of ordered civil society to the disorder consequent upon the
absence of political authority, would have to admit absolute rule
as, at least, one suitable form of government. But Locke rejects
political absolutism as inconsistent with civil society:
As if when Ken quitting the State of Nature entered into
Society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under
the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain all
the Liberty of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and
made licentious by Impunity. This is to think that Men are
so foolish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may he
done them by Pole-Cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think
it Safety, to be devoured by Lions. /2nd.Treatise, a 9^7
It is not simply the inconveniences of disorder which Locke is
considering, but a specific kind of inconvenience; that to which
the moral man who follows the law of nature is subject when he comes
in contact with men who disobey the lawo The instituted government
takes over the executive power of the law of nature, but in so doing
it does not so much strip the individual of a right as remove a bur¬
den from his shoulders. He no longer has to safeguard himself
against the encroachments of the immoral man. Government is not
justified on the grounds that it provides political order, but because
the political order it does provide facilitates the working of an
original moral order, which is the law of nature. Hence, political
absolutism is contrary to the purpose of government. The absolute
ruler, being regarded as the one source of law, is placed above all
law. Against his encroachments the subjects can have no appeal.
Therefore, far from remedying the inconveniences of the state of
nature, absolute government concentrates them in one supremely-
powerful individual. In Locke's view all men, rulers and subjects,
7
are equally bound by the law of nature ; and against the government
which pretends to absolute authority there is always what he terms
7 Cfo 2ndo Treatise, I 195: "I will not dispute ... whether
Princes are exempt from the Laws of their Countrey; but this
I am sure, they owe subjection to the Laws of God and Nature".
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the 'appeal to Heaven'; the right of the people to rebelo Thus,
Locke places government within a pre-existing order, and justifies
it in terms of that order.
Strictly speaking, the advent of government does not abolish
the state of nature, but adds to it. All men, whether or not they
live under a government, are bound by the law of nature. That is,
they are naturally subject to God's authority. On entering civil
society men subject themselves to a second, artificial authority.
While men follow their reason they will conform their actions to
the lav? of nature. If such rational behaviour were universal
there would be no need, and hence no justification, for the insti¬
tution of government. However, reason is not the sole element in
the make-up of human nature; "Principles of actions . . . there
are lodged in men's appetites . . . that, if they were left to
their full swing, ... would carry men to the over-turning of all
morality". _/l, iii, 127 The fact of these non-rational appetites
in human nature is the ratson d'etre of government.
The state of nature also sets the boundaries of government.
The natural freedom of men which is formed and directed by the lav?
of nature is not an 'inconvenience*. By talcing over the power to
•preserve the innocent and restrain offenders' government ensures
that freedom is operative among men. Any act of government contrary
to freedom (i.e. against the law of nature) must be illegitimate.
In this way the state of nature, or the condition of men under the
lav? of nature, limits the sphere of political authority. This does
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not mean that the positive laws of the civil state are restricted
to a republication of the law of nature. A government must have
the power to bind things which are morally indifferent; for in the
life of the civil state circumstances often arise which demand
positive legislation. These are catered for in Locke1s rubric
that the, "end of Government is the good of Mankind". /2nd Treatise,
§ 22^7 The law of nature does not tell the magistrate what he must
do; rather it limits government by circumscribing an area of
morality within which political authority is incompetent.
On the interpretation givon here the state of nature is
essentially a timeless condition0 Locke need not prove that there
ever was a period when all men exercised the executive power of the
law of nature, nor that this period was brought to a close by a
social compact. Indeed, taken simply as a piece of-history the
state of nature cannot serve as a basis for government. For what
bearing could a period in the long distant past have on the present
day existence of political authority? If government is to be
vindicated and the proper sphere of political power delineated,
the conditions on 'which they are founded must constantly apply. The
state of nature is, then, best understood not as an original state
which is superceded by the state of civil society, but as a
condition which,as it is the foundation of civil society, is always
present. The quasi-historical language of the Second Treatise is
not integral to Locke's argument, hut arises from an intellectual
presupposition common to much seventeenth-century thought; that a
phenomenon is fully explained, only when it is traced back to its
first cause or generative principle«
The idea that L0cke'st state of nature is essentially an
historical period has led to a certain amount of confusion in the
interpretation of his political philosophy; for Locke appears to
give two incompatible descriptions of the state. In criticising
those philosophers who confound the state of nature with what he
terms the 'state of war' Locke writes that the two, "are as far
distant, as a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and
Preservation, and a State of Enmity, Malice, Violence, and Mutual
Destruction are one from another". /2nd Treatise, § 1fy On the
strength of this passage some commentators have concluded that, in
contrast to Eobbes, Locke sees the state of nature as a 'golden
9
age'o But if the state of nature is thus idyllic, what reason
can men have for leaving it? Locke's answer to the question of
why men should leave the state of nature is unequivocal. The
individual's enjoyment of the rights he has in that state, "is very
uncertain, ana constantly exposed to the Invasion of others. For
all beings Kings as much as he . . . and the greater part no
strict Observers of Equity and Justice, the enjoyment of the
property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This
8 Cf. Hans Aarsleff, Op. Cit.. p. 103. This presupposition might
itself be traced back to Aristotle. See, for example,
Analytics Posteriora. Bk. I, 2, 71*\ 2=
9 See, for example, Phyllis Doyle: A Histpit of Political Thought,,
pp. 186f.
makes him willing to quit a Condition, which however free, is
full of fears and continual dangers"* /2nd.Treatise, § 122710
Passages such as this have led other commentators to the conclusion
that Locke's view is quite close to Hohhes's, or even that he is a
committed Hohbesian in disguise*^ Whatever the overall inter¬
pretation placed on Locke's political philosophy, one thing is
evident; Locke cannot consistently hold the state of nature to be
one of peace and fellowship yet claim that it is also fraught vdth
12
fears and dangers* In fact Locke holds neither view; for the
dichotomy is a false one, generated only when the state of nature
is understood as essentially historical.
A reading of the 'idyllic5 passage in its context reveals that
Locke is not contrasting two mutually exclusive states, but clarifying
10 Cf. Epistola de Toierantia: "But since men are so dishonest
/improbita_s/_that most of them prefer to enjoy the fruits cf
other men's labour rather than work to provide for themselves;
therefore, to protect their possessions, their wealth and pro¬
perty, and also their liberty and bodily strength, which are
their means of livelihood, they are obliged to enter into
society with one another, so that by mutual assistance and
combined, forces each man ma;*- have secure and private possession
of the things that are useful for life", /trans. Gough, p. 12^/
11 The extreme 'Hobbesian' interpretation of Locke has been elab¬
orated by Leo Strauss /Natural Right and History, Ch.v/ and
R.H. Cox /hocke on War and Peace/. It is not often one can
say of an interpretation of a philosopher's work that it is
patently false. This can, I believe, be said of the Strauss-
Cox thesis. For a criticism see Aarsleff: "Some observations
on recent Locke scholarship" in John Locke-Problems and Pers¬
pectives, and Yolton: "Locke on the Law of Nature" in The
Philosophical Review, 1958.
12 Cf. J. J. Jenkins: "Locke and Natural Rights" in Philosophy,
1967.
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two concepts. At the end of the passage he sums up the distinction
he wishes to make:
Want of a common Judge with Authority, puts all Men in a State
of Nature: Force without Right, upon a Man's Person, makes a
State of War, both where there is, and is not, a common
Judge. /2nd.Treatise, §
Later in the chapter he explains that, "in the State of Nature, for
want of positive Laws, and Judges with Authority to appeal to, the
State of War once begun, continues". /2nd. Treatise, § 207 The
state of war, the, is something which can occur both in the state of
nature and in civil society. Its tendency to continue in the former
"is one great reason of Kens putting themselves into Society". /2nd
Treatise. § 2\J Those who equate the state of nature with the
state of war are not misdescribing a period of man's history. Their
error reflects a misconception of the law of nature. The 'idyllic'
passage harks back to Locke's argument, in the eighth of the Essays
on the Law of Nature, that the law cannot be based on individual
self-interest. For, on the assumption that it is so based, "men
are ... by the law of nature in a state of war". /Essays, p.21
On the contrary, all men are naturally bound by a law which,
"willeth the Peace and Preservation of all Mankind". /2nd Treatise,
§77 If obedience to the law were universal, human life would be
idyllic. However, as a matter of empirical fact, men are often
led astray by passion, prejudice and ignorance. Locke does not
13 See above, Ch. II, p. 50.
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derive this fact from an anthropological investigation of man's
primitive state, but from observation of the world in which he him¬
self lives. The state of war exists within civil society; and
(given the irrational elements in man's nature) in the absence of
government it would be even more prevalent. This is not to say
the state of war would be universal. Human nature is rational and
so far as men follow their reason they obey the law of nature without
coercion by positive law. Nevertheless, the occurrence of the
state of war even within civil society is frequent enough to
warrant the institution of government.
Having abstracted the state of nature from its home in Locke's
political philosophy we may now consider its relevance to his moral
epistemology. The state of nature we have seen to be the con¬
dition of men living together under the law of nature. It might
9
be called simply the state of man. Citizens living within civil
society are still men; the fact that they are bound by the law of
nature remains the fundamental feature of their condition. As men
are under the law they must have the capacity to know what the lav;
dictates. A lav; of nature which was unknowable would not only be
otiose; as was argued in Chapter I, it would be a contradiction in
terms. In the state of nature the law is, "as intelligible and
plain to a rational Creature, and a Studier of that Law, as the
positive Laws of Common-wealths, nay possibly plainer; As much as
Beason is easier to be understood, than the Phansies and intricate
Contrivances of Men, following contrary and hidden interests put
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into Words". /2nd. Treatise, § 12J Locke, of course, does not mean
the law of nature is 'intelligible and plain' in the sense that its
precepts are literally present in the mind from the very beginning,
1i
nor that they constitute a series of self-evident moral propositions.
The law is knowable in the sense explained in the Essays on the Law
15
of Nature; it is discovered by reason. But reason, as it is a
faculty, must start from something given. For, "Nothing ... is
achieved by reason . . . unless there is first something posited
and taken for granted". /Essays, p. 12jf/ What, then, is given to
reason in the state of nature?
So far two features of the state of nature have been noted:
men are under the law of nature and men live together. For Locke,
sociability is a part of human nature:
God having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own
Judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him
tuader strong Obligations of Neccesity, Convenience, and
14 Nonetheless several commentators have seized upon this passage
as another illustration of Locke's inconsistency; while he
denies innate practical principles in the Essay, he clearly
accepts them for the purposes of his political philosophy.
See, for example, Laslett's Introduction to Two Treatises,
esp. pp. 94-95; C. Eo Vaughan: Studies in the History of
Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau, Vol. 3, pp. 162 -
163. Yet, even if there were nothing else, the phrase, 'a
Studier of that Law' counts strongly against this interpretation.
If the law is innate, either in the naive or dispositional
sense, why should a man need to study in order to know it?
Here the charge of inconsistency seems to be based largely on
the assumption that Locke is inconsistent.
15 As Locke writes in the. Essay, the law of nature is not innate
but, "something that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the
knowledge of, by the use jand due application of our natural
faculties". /i, iii, 1ji/
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Inclination to drive him into Society, as well as fitted
him with Understanding and Language to continue and enjoy
it. f 2nd. Treatise. § 77/^
However, there is a third feature which, although it is not specif¬
ically dealt with in the Two Treatises, is of considerable importance
in Locke's picture of the human condition. This is the individual's
desire for happiness. While all men are naturally sociable and
desire to live in groups, each man is engaged in an essentially
egoistic search for happiness. It takes no very acute powers of
discernment to perceive the possibilities for conflict between men
latent in these features. The desire for happiness is Janus-
faced. On the one hand it embraces those natural principles of
action which work against the ideal harmony dictated by the law of
nature. On the other hand, it supplies the point and meaning of
morality. It is the spring of all human actions:
Nature . . . has put into man a desire of happiness and an
aversion to misery: these indeed are innate practical
principles which . . . d.o continue constantly to operate
and influence all our actions without ceasing; these may
be observed in all persons and all ages, steady and universal
. . . these are inclinations of the appetite to good ...
JIt iii, i7
The law of nature aims at the good of men in general. The main
function of the law is, therefore, the regulation of this natural
hedonistic drive so that all men may achieve happiness.
16 Cf. Essays, p. 157: "^an7 feels himself not only to be
impelled by life's experience and pressing needs to procure
ana preserve a life in society with other men, but also to be
prepared for the maintenance of society by the gift of speech
and through the intercourse cf language".
o 1
Locke's belief in man's innate social inclinations and the
thesis that the desire for happiness is the spring of human action
a.re amply covered in his published works® Yet he published nothing
explicitly on the crucial question of how, given these facts of
human natiire, reason can discover the lav; of nature in its content.
In the Essay, (notwithstanding his speculations concerning the
demonstration of morality), he confines himself to an account of how
men in fact come by their moral notions and judge their actions. He
disclaims any direct concern with the correctness of everyday moral
17
notions and judgements. In the Two Treatises he is content to
state men's capacity to know the law while leaving the mechanism
of knowing in obscurity. It is in the works he chose to leave
unpublished that the epistemological question comes to the fore.
We have already examined his full length treatment of the law of
nature as presented in the Essays. But the Essays we saw step short
of a satisfactory moral epistemology* Locke returns to the problem
at a much later date, in several, as yet unpublished, MSS retained
in the Lovelace Collection. Of these the most important is a
—718
paper entitled Morality /MS c. 28. Fol. 159 - 140/ Here the
concept of happiness occupies a dominant position.
17 Cf. Locke's letter to James Tyrrell, 4 Aug., 1690, in Lord
King: The Life of John Locke. Vol. I, pp. 366 - 373®
18 The paper is undated, but there can be little doubt that It
represents part of the materials mentioned to William Molyneux
as put aside towards a demonstration of morality. See Locke
to Molyneux, 30 Mar., 1696. /Works. 9, p. 37Jy
Locke begins with a definition of morality as, "ye rule of
19
man's actions for ye attaining happynesse". All men constantly
aim at happiness, and therefore nothing could be a rule of conduct
for them unless following it promoted their happiness and ignoring
20
it led to their miseryo Locke defines happiness as pleasure and.
misery as pain. Good is said to consist , "in what gives or
increases pleasure or takes away or diminishes pain & Evill, in the
contrary". Given God's power, it is at least possible that even
after death men may be capable of pleasure and pain. Hence, a
state of future rewards and punishment is a possibility. But Locke
does not draw out the implications of this in Moralityo Instead
he limits his inquiry to the rules necessary for mundane happiness.
He lays down two evident truths: (1) "Kan made not himself nor
any other man"; (2) "Man made not the world he.found made at
his birth". Taken together, these yield the conclusion that no
man can have an original right, over and above the right of another,
to anything the world naturally provides. Such a right could
arise only from dependency, and originally nothing in the world
21
depends on man. But if all the goods of the earth were to be
19 Cf. the definition of Ethics given in the Essay: "the seeking
out those rules and measures of human actions which lead to
happiness, and the means to practice them". /iV, xzi, //
20 Cf. 2nd Treatise, § 57: "Could they /men/ be happier without
it, the Law, as an useless thing would of it self vanish".
21 Thus, as we have seen God's rightful authority over man is a
function of man's dependency. Locke's whole theory of moral
/ cont'd
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left in common each man would attempt to obtain as much as he could
for himself. The general condition of mankind would be one of,
"want rapine & force". In such circumstances happiness would be
beyond each man's attainment. To avoid this condition men enter
into compacts establishing individual rights. Thus, "Justice is
established as a duty & will be the first & generall rule of our
happynesse".
Locke's argument has a familiar ring to it. On the supposition
that all men first and foremost seek happiness, the individual's
rational preference will always be for a world in which the rule of
justice is established. For it is this world which provides the
stability and security which is a prerequisite for the successful
pursuit of individual happiness. However, let us suppose that
justice has been established. It is true that, in the world of
justice, it will very often be to the individual's advantage to act
justly towards his fellows. But it is also true that there will
arise occasions in which injustice is more to his advantage, or 'when
justice is contrary to his happiness. As, ex hypothesis human
happiness is the rationale behind justice, it would seem that when
acts against justice better further a man's advantage these must be
permitted.
21 Cont'd
obligation is stated clearly and briefly in a paper entitled
Ethica B. c. 28 Folo 1417 "The originall & foundation of
all Law is dependency« A dependent intelligent being is under
the power & direction of him on whom he depends & must be for
the ends appointed Mm by y^ superior being. If man were indep¬
endent he could have noe law but Ms own will noe end but him¬
self. He would be a god to himself, & satisfaction of Ms own
will the sole measure & end of all Ms actions".
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Locke's solution to the above difficulty is of considerable
interest, for it reveals a new aspect of role assigned to lav; in his
moral philosophy. As well as being the formal cause of moral
obligation, the concept of a moral law has an essential role in
determining the content of man's duties:
All men being equally under one and the same rule if it be
permitted to me to break my word for my advantage it is
also permitted every one else & then whatever I possesse
will be subject to the force or deceit of all the men in
ye world in wcn state it is impossible for any man to be
happy unless he was both stronger & wiser than all the
rest of man kinde for in such a state of rapine & force
it is impossible any one man should be master of those
things whose possession is necessary' to his well being,
c 28. Fol. 140/
Locke's major premise is contained in the first clause. It is
because all men are equally under the one lav; that the individual is
not allowed to make an exception in his own favour. It should be
noted that it would not be irrational for the individual to make an
exception. As all men constantly aim at happiness in all they do,
the fact that an action will result in the agent's happiness gives
him an overriding reason for performing that action. However it
is contrary to reason for a man to suppose that, in making an excep¬
tion in favour of his own happiness, he can be acting in accord with
the law of nature. If he believes his action to be morally lawful
he is bound to conclude the like action performed by another man in
the like circumstances to be equally lawful. Thus, in the case
under consideration, if a man deems it lawful for himself to ignore
the compacts which establish individual rights to the goods of the
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world, he must concede that others may lawfully invade his rights.
But if he concedes this, he must suppose the law of nature to be
founded in pure self-interest* Consequently he must conceive the
natural condition of man to be a perpetual and universal state of
war in which the attainment of happiness is impossible. This is
tantamount to denying that there is any such law as the lav; of
nature.
The argument in Mora lit:,; shows the way reason derives the law
of justice from a reflection on the basic features of the human
condition, features which are originally gathered in experience. It
need hardly be added that this derivation is not an example of the
perception of necessary relations between ideas. The law of justice
is deduced from contingent facts concerning, for example, human
nature. The element of contingency means that the derivation is
2?
not, in Locke's strict sense, a case of demonstrative knowledge.
The lav; of justice itself may be looked upon in two ways. It
might be thought of as one precept of the lav; of nature, or as the
fundamental precept from which other, more detailed, rules of
conduct derive. We saw previously that Locke does believe that
there is a 'primary and fundamental' lav; of nature which serves as
23
'the standard and measure of all other laws depending on it'.
Justice, as "the first & generall rule of our happynesse', seems the
most plausible candidate for the office of primary lav;. If justice
22 Cf. J. V/. Gough: John Locke's Political Philosophy, p. 9*
23 Cf. above, Ch. II, p. 49«
is primary how are the other, secondary, laws to he derived from
justice?
Locke's argument in Morality is expressed in historical terms.
Justice is presented as a discovery made at a certain point in time.
The establishment of justice is seen as marking man's transition
from the pre-moral to the moral period. Nevertheless, as with
Locke's conception of the state of nature, the historical presentation
is not essential to the argument. Men in fact do not live in a
pre-moral society. They are born into communities in which moral
notions have already been developed. (Locke would suppose this
true even of primitive societies). A steady reflection on the law
of justice in an attempt to discover what further rules of conduct
follow from that lav; is likely to produce little more than acute
mental cramp. However, the fact that we already have a system of
morals is an important addition to the data presented to reason. It
was suggested earlier that the question of how men are to know their
duties comes down to the question of how they are to know 'whether or
not the notions making up the conventional morality of a society
reflect the objective law of nature. Reason, then, is not under
the necessity of deducing completely unknown rules of conduct from
the primary law of justice. It need only test the known lav; of
opinion against the law of justice. Justice vri.ll, in Locke's words,
act as a 'standard and measure'.
Moral notions divide up into those which signify actions (or
action dispositions) as virtues and those which signify them as
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vices. The complete list of virtues and vices exhausts the content
of the law of nature. On the hypothesis that justice is the
primary law of nature against which the moral notions of mankind
are to be tested, all virtues should be species of justice and
all vices species of injustice. A moral notion will be valid if
it fulfills two conditions: First, if it signifies an action which
properly falls under the lav; of justice. Second, if it signifies
the action correctly, i.e. within the class of virtuous actions
when just and within the class of vicious actions when unjust.
There are two objections which may be raised here. In the first
place, in Locke's account, justice appears restricted to the
distribution and protection of property rights. Whatever merit
or demerit may attach to the emphasis Locke places on property
in his political theory,' it seems clear that a theory of moral
justice developed from this concept is sure to be impoverished.
A fortiori, a complete system of moral duties derived from such
a theory must be hopelessly truncated. Secondly, it may be
objected that, no matter how 'justice' is explicated, the concept
is not rich enough to generate all of morality.
Certainly in the paper on Morality justice is introduced as
a law which preserves the individual's right to material possessions.
•Property' and 'justice' are, in Locke's mind two very closely
24
connected concepts. However, Locke's concept of property is
24 Cf. Some Thoughts concerning Education, § 110: "Children
cannot well comprehend what Injustice is, till they understand
/cont'd
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somewhat wider than might he expected. In the Second Treatise
'property® means not merely material possessions, but "Life, Liberty
25
and Estate". Once 'property® is understood in this extended
sense a theory of justice founded on property appears correspondingly
larger in scopeo It will be possible to construe a quite wide
range of actions as falling under the law of justice. For instance,
murder, as it deprives a man of life, will be an act against
property and for that reason unjust. The concept might also be
said to embrace a man's character so that vices such as slander
will be included as contrary to justice. Nevertheless, even on
this enriched theory, the reduction of all morality to various
aspects of the- one fundamental law of justice comes up against a
two-pronged difficulty. Firstly, whatever the definition of
justice, it seems impossible to give anything like a comprehensive
account of all the virtues in terms of justice. Secondly, it is
generally supposed that men have duties towards themselves as well
as towards others, and these cannot be comprehended under the law
of justice.
Whatever else is included in the concept, it is clear that
acts of justice involve rights belonging to men, and that such acts
24 cont'd
Property, and how particular Persons come by it"; Essays, p.
213; "For what justice is there where there is no personal
property"; and the first example given of an instructive,
certain proposition in morality at Essay, IV, iii, 18.
25 Cf. 2nd. Treatise, § 123: "/Ren/ unite for the mutual
Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which
I call by the general Name, Property". See also, §§ 87, 173«
23S
relate to someone other than the agento Many, perhaps most, vir¬
tuous actions do not involve a person's rights. For example, acts
of kindness, of generosity and benevolence go beyond what a man
has a right to expect from his fellows. Further, there are some
virtues which are incompatible with a strict following of justice.
Mercy, for example, is said to temper justice, i.e. it relaxes the
strict demands of justice and allows a man less than is his due.
The difficulty here reflects an important asymmetry holding between
virtue and vice. Virtue is thought of as, in some way, contributing
to human good. Conversely, vice is thought of as contributing to
human harmo This is no idle 'association of ideas'o It would
be absurd to classify an action as virtuous yet maintain that its
performance has no effect on human good; or to classify it as
26
vicious yet maintain that it does not contribute to human harmo
Now it may be possible, by dint of a careful analysis of the
concepts involved, to construe actions which contribute to human
harm as invasions of a man's rights, and therefore as acts of
injusticeo But acts of justice are acts whereby a man's rights
are preserved and respected. The most that could be claimed
for justice in its relation to human good and harm is that it is
a law whereby the individual is protected from harm. In this sense
justice may be said to contribute a negative good.. However, when
26 This point is controversial only when the notion of human
good and harm is given some specific content.
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good is done to a man we usually suppose his well-heing not only
preserved, but increased. In general, virtue promotes human good;
it does not merely ensure the conservation of human good. Although,
in the absence of a precise definition we cannot afford to be
dogmatic, 'justice' does seem essentially a negative concept. The
world of justice is a world in which, "no one.ought to harm another
in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions". /2nd. Treatise, § §7
Most virtues are viewed as essentially positive; their practice
adds to the sum total of goodness. Therefore, while it may be
possible to use 'injustice' (the defect of justice) as a generic
term covering all cases of vice, one cannot use 'justice' to cover
all virtues.
The second prong of the objection is based on the social nature
of justice. Strictly speaking, a man cannot act justly or unjustly
towards himself. His actions can be characterized as just or
unjust only insofar as they relate to others. However, it is often
maintained that even a lone individual on a desert island has some
moral dutieso He might be said, for example, to have a duty not to
commit suicide or to develop his talents. Some philosophers have
argued that the notion of duties to oneself is incoherent because
27
morality presupposes a social context. But it is highly doubtful
that Locke would have accepted this argument. The sphere of
morality described in the fourth of the Essays on the Law of Nature
27 Cf. Kurt Baier: The Moral Point of View, esp. Oh. 10.
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embraces not only what men owe to their neighbours, but also what
28
they owe to God. and to themselves. Even if man's duties to
God could somehow be manoeuvred under the concept of justice, the
individual's moral obligations to himself must remain outside
justice.
On the evidence of Locke's text it cannot be said that he
definitely does believe justice to be the one fundamental law of
nature. It has been argued only that, whatever Locke's opinion,
the whole ofmorality cannot plausibly be considered as following
from the one law of justice. The attempt to determine the
validity of moral notions by testing them against the law of jus¬
tice would, as it were, decimate conventional morality. Of course,
Locke does not suppose the law of opinion an exact mirror of the law
of nature. He does allow for the revision of popular moral
beliefs. Nevertheless, this can be revision only up to a point.
Locke does hold the law of opinion, or conventional morality, to be
by and large a faithful reflection of the law of nature. A
revision as radical as that implied by the testing of ordinary
moral notions against the law of justice is therefore out of the
question.^
28 Cf. Locke's Journal entry, dated 25th February, 1676: "There
are virtues & vices antecedent to & abstract from .society, v.g.
love of god, unnatural lust". Jjis* f 1, Fol. 12j>/
29 Locke's rejection of Hobbes's fundamental principle of self-
preservation is in a similar vein to the argument given above:
"An Hobbist, with his principle of self-preservation, whereof him¬
self is to be judge, will, not easily admit a gre_at many plain
duties of morality". /"Study", King, I, p. 191/
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In a short paper dated 1681, Locke gives a definition of
virtue and vice:
Virtue, a3 in its obligation it is the will of God,
discovered by natural reason, and thus has the force
of a law; so in the matter of it, it is nothing else but
doing of good, either to oneself or others; and the
contrary hereunto, vice, is nothing else but doing of
harm. Thus the bounds of temperance are prescribed
by the health, estates, and the use of our time:
Justice, truth, and mercy, by the good or svil they
are likely to produce. /hing, 2, p. 947
This definition might be understood as expressing a more fundamental
principle of morality than Justice. For here Justice is presented
as one virtue amongst others. What characterizes the whole class
of virtuous actions is their tendency towards human good; what
characterizes•all vicious actions is their tendency towards harm.
Both the good and the harm may be done tc the agent himself or to
others. If good and harm are adopted as the two standards against
which moral notions are to be measured, the difficulties encountered
when Justice is taken as the fundamental principle of morality are
apparently resolved. Vithin the new scheme, there will be ample
21
room for the usual virtues and for duties to oneself.
The thesis that virtue and vice are characterized by their
20 King misdates this paper to 1661. His mistake has been
corrected by Abrams. /see, Introduction to Two Tracts, p. 9jl7
21 Similarly, St. Thomas Aquinas holds the first command of the
law to be, 11 'that good is to be sought and done, evil to be
avoided' : all other commands of natural law are based on this.
Accordingly, then, natural-law commands extend to all doing or
avoiding of things recognized by the practical reason of itself
as being human goods". /summa Theologiae. 1a, 2ae. 94, 27
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respective tendencies towards human good and harm may be termed the
utilitarian theory of the content of morality. It is not to be
confused with the utilitarian theory of morality. The latter
theory states that actions are morally right, or virtuous, because
they tend to human good, and morally wrong, or vicious, because
they tend to human harm. That is, for the utilitarian, the fact
that actions are productive of good and harm provides the necessary
and the sufficient conditions for the existence of morality. The
fact that a given action has a tendency towards human good char¬
acterizes it as virtuous and imposes a moral obligation on the
agent with respect to that action. In view of the wide-spread
opinion that (in his published writings) Locke takes up a position
which is closer to utilitarianism than it is to any other type of
ethical theory, it is worth repeating here that Locke always remains
an ethical legalist. On his theory the utility of an action can
determine no more than the matter of obligation; it is lav/, and
law alone, which constitutes the form of obligation. Thus, where
there is no lav/ there can be no such thing as morality. In the
nature of the case there would still be actions v/hich tended to
good or to harm; but men v/ould be under no obligation either to
perform or refrain from those actions.
Does the utilitarian theory of the content of morality provide
a principle strong enough and comprehensive enough to determine the
validity of ordinary moral notions? The short answer is that,
unless, the concepts of human good and harm are defined, the theory
cannot provide such a principle® We have said that it would be
absurd to put forward an action as virtuous or as vicious, yet
maintain that its performance, in no sense whatsoever, contributed
to either human good or harm. But this means the principle that
all virtues tend towards good and all vices towards harm is a truism.
It serves to rule out of court moral absurdities and perverse
attempts to call vices virtues, but it leaves untouched the vast
range of putative vices and virtues for which a connexion with
good and harm is claimed. Views of the nature of human good and
harm vary considerably. The defenders of the authonomy of morals
generally assert that goodness resides in the virtuous act itself
(and that harm, or evil, resides in the vicious act). Virtue
contributes to good in the sense that the performance of a
virtuous action is intrinsically good. To look for good conse¬
quences extrinsic to the action is to misconceive the nature of
morality. Even if non-moral goodness is always to be found in
the presence of virtue, it in no way determines virtue."
32 The view that non-moral consequences have no relevance to the
moral status of an action is concisely put by Wittgenstein;
"o . o it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with
punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. This question
as to the consequences of an action must therefore be
irrelevant® At least these consequences will not be events.
For there must be something right in that formulation of the
question. There must be some sort of ethical reward and
ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself".
/Tractatus Logico-Phi1osophlcus. 6.4227 See also, D. 2.
Phillips: "Does It Pay to be Good?" in Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 1964 - 1965.
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Locke rejects this aspect of the doctrine of mortal autonomy
as completely as he rejects ethical intuiticnism. His ethical
theory is thoroughly teleological. Virtue is not good in itself.
On the contrary goodness is the end at which virtue aims. Thus,
the whole point of acting virtuously, or in accord with the law of
nature, is that good should flourish among men, not that virtue
should flourish. Locke does allow the common distinction between
natural and moral good. However, he differentiates them only by
reference to the source from whence they come:
The difference between moral and natural good and evil
is only this; that we call that naturally good and evil,
which, by the natural efficiency of the thing, produces
pleasure or pain in us; and that is morally good or
evil which, by the intervention of the will of an
intelligent free agent, draws pleasure or pain after it,
not by any natural consequences, but by the intervention
of that power. /yOf Ethics in General", Q-p.Cit., pp.
128 - 1227
Moral good and evil, then, consist in the rewards and punishments
following upon a man's action, and these are imposed either by God,
or by some other intelligent agent who has authority under the
law of nature. Taken in itself, something which is morally good
33
or evil is of the same nature as a natural good or evil.
33 Cf. Essay, II, xxviii, 5« Thomas Burnet, in his Second
Remarks upon An Essay concerning Humane Understanding, accuses
Locke of failing to distinguish Bonum Utile and Bonum Honesturn:
"In your way either the Parts are coincident, or Bonum Utile
is superior to Bonum Honestum". /p. 2%J Burnet's charge
is substantially correct; Locke has no use for a good which
terminates in virtue. His position is quite clear in a
shorthand note on "Pleasure and Pain": "... honestum ...
were /it/ not ordained by God to procure the .jucundum and be a
means to help us to happiness, ... I do not see how /i_t/
cont'd
Locke's account of the nature of good and evil is consistently
hedonistic:
Things . * . are good or evil only in reference to pleasure
or pain. That we call good which is ant to cause or
increase pleasure, or diminish pain is us, or else to
procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or
absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that
evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or
diminish any pleasure in us, or else to procure us any evil,
or deprive us of any good. /ll, xx7 2/
He is careful to add that pleasures and pains can be mental as well
as bodily. Goodness, therefore, is not restricted to the so-called
sensual pleasures. Happiness, which is the spur of all human action
"in its full extent, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and
misery the utmost pain; and the lowest degree of what can be called
happiness is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure
as without which anyone cannot be content". /ll, xxi, 4^7 Human
good, then, is pleasure and human harm is pain. Formulated in
terms of this hedonistic definition, the utilitarian theory of the
content of morality will read thus: Virtuen are those actions
the performance of which tend to promote pleasure; vices are those
33 cont'd
would be reckoned good at all ... What makes temperance a
good and gluttony an evil but that the one serves to procure
us health and ease in this world and happiness in the other,
when gluttony does quite the contrary?" /Deciphered by Von
Leyden, Essays, pp. 268 - 26^7 Notwithstanding his occasional
use of the term 'moral goodness' to mean 'moral rectitude'
.(See above, p0 212), there is no doubt that this note represents
Locke's final position. For a very able contemporary defence
of Locke against Burnet's criticise see Mrs Catharine Cockburn:
A Defence of the Essay of Human Understandingo See also,
George H. Moulds: "The 'Right' and the 'Good' in Locke's
Writings" in The Locke Newsletter, 1972.
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actions the performance of which tend to cause pain. Unlike the
world of justice, in which each individual is merely left alone to
attain happiness as "best he can by his own efforts, the world in
which the utilitarian virtues are cultivated will be one of mutual
assistance in the common pursuit of happiness.
The testing of moral notions against the utilitarian, standard,
as it has now been explicated, might appear an empirical task of
no great complex!ty<> If a notion signifies an action which is
productive of pleasure, then it will be a valid moral notion and
the action signified will be virtuouso Conversely, the validity
of moral notions falling within the general category of vice will
be determined .by reference to pain. Notions which pass this test-
truly belong to the content of the law of nature; those which
fail may be dismissed as the product of human error and prejudice.
However, the concepts of pleasure and pain are almost as highly
contested as the concepts of good and harm. If the utilitarian
standard is to be properly operative as the determinant of virtue
and vice, * pleasure' and 'pain' must themselves be elucidated.
Unfortunately, Locke's account of pleasure and pain renders
the concepts ineluctably contestable. He understand pleasure and
pain to be psychological states accompanying sensations and thoughts«
The ideas we have of them are simple; and these, "like other simple
ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of
knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by
experience". XX, j7 This means that each individual's idea
of pleasure, or of pain, is strictly limited by the bounds of his
own experience. Whereas a man may come to know a complex idea by
description or by definition, he can know a simple idea only by
acquaintance. It follows that a man's judgement that an action
produces pleasure can amount to no more than a judgement that the
action causes him pleasure. Further, his judgement will be
incorrigible in the sense that, if it is mistaken, no one but the
34
man himself can be in a position to correct it. Therefore, if
one man judges an action to be productive of pleasure and another
man judges the contrary, there is no means whereby their dis¬
agreement can be resolved. Indeed it is not at all clear that
there is a disagreement involved here. It might be said that one
man is claiming simply that, in his case, a certain action arouses
a certain feeling, while the other claims that, in his case, the
same action arouses a different feeling. These assertions do not
contradict one another and both may well be true.
There is a move which, although it does not provide a complete
answer to the above objection, might be thought to forestall its full
force. One of Locke's shorthand Journal entries, dated 16th July
34 This is not to say the judgement is infallible. Locke sees
reflection, or introspection, as closely akin to sense per¬
ception. On this analysis there is no reason why a man should
not be mistaken in his introspective awareness of his own
mental state just as he can be mistaken in sense perception.
Nevertheless, if pleasure and pain are only known as internal
mental states, the individual is the only one in a position




God has so framed the constitutions of our minds and bodies
that several things are apt to produce in both of them
pleasure and pain, delight and trouble, by ways that we
know not, but for ends suitable to His goodness and. wisdom..
/von Leyden, p. 2&£J
On the very large assumption that human nature is uniform with
respect to the things that cause pleasure and pain, it might be
argued that, although irresolvable disagreement is a logical
possibility, it -fall in fact not occur. A difference of opinion
as to whether an action causes pleasure will always be resolvable
by a further introspective 'look'o However, in a passage added
to the second edition of the Essay Locke deprives himself of even
this doubtful line of defence. He admits the fact that different
men find their pleasures in different objects:
For, as pleasant tastes depend not on the things themselves
but their agreeableness to this or that particular palate,
wherein there is great variety, so the greatest happiness
consists in the having those things which produce the
greatest pleasure, and in the absence of those which cause
any disturbance, any pain. Now these, to different men,
are very different things. /ll, xxi, 5^7
If pleasure is thus subjective the utilitarian standard cannot
provide a satisfactory test for the validity of moral notions.
Whether or not an action causes pleasure mil be relative to each
individual's private experience. Working on this data reason
might arrive at various systems of private goods and evils, but it
will.not be able to discover a system of virtues and vices. The
35 Cf. Essay. II, vii, 2-6.
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concept of a private system of virtues and \rices is incoherent;
for if an action is conceived as virtuous or vicious it is thought
to he so with respect to all men, whether they realise it or not.
It is this universality which sets morality apart from other systems
regulating human behaviour. For example, the rules of etiquette
in one society often prescribe conduct of a type contrary to that
prescribed in another society. A man crossing from one group to
the other will, for the sake of politeness, vary his behaviour.
An analogous difference in moral practices will not elicit any
alteration in the conduct of a man seriously concerned with living
a moral life. Moral differences prompt dispute, not acceptance.
For Locke, the universality which is distinctive of morality depends
on there being an objective moral law binding equally on all men.
However, even a philosopher who denies the existence of such a law
must grant universality to be an essential feature of morality.
Therefore, any moral theory which fails to accommodate this feature
^nust be inadequate.
Both justice and what we have called the utilitarian theory
fail to provide a fundamental principle whereby reason can make out
the content of the law of nature. The former is too narrow to
encompass all of morality; the latter ends in subjectivism. Never¬
theless, it would be wrong to conclude that Locke has done nothing
to vindicate his belief in a rational basis of morals.
Locke's state of nature was said to be his assessment of the
human situation in its essentials; man is naturally a social creature.
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Each man is intent on achieving his own happiness. All men are
equal under the one law set by God. From this data it is possible
to derive at least the outline of what may be termed a minimal
morality. In order for men to live together there must be some
rule, or set of rules, harmonizing individual quests for private
happiness. Given Locke's extended definition of property, the law
of justice, as it is set out in the paper on Morality, does con¬
stitute such a minimal morality. It dictates the fundamental
conditions necessary for the existence of society. This derivation
of justice, it should be noted, is not affected by the absence of
a precise definition of happiness. Different men may, and in fact,
do form very different ideas of happiness; yet there clearly are
circumstances which will prevent a man's happiness, no matter what
his idea may be. For instance, if a man is killed his quest for
happiness is terminated. Therefore, it is possible to indicate
types of action incompatible with the existence of a society in
j-fhich each individual seeks to fulfil his own idea of happiness.
Hence we can compile a minimal list of moral notions, or virtues
and vices.
Locke is aware of the necessity of minimal morality. He is
also aware that it is minimal; that such rules do not cover the
full extent of what we call morality:
... it cannot be supposed that any men should associate
together and unite in the same community, and at the same
time allow that for commendable, i.e. count it a virtue,
nay not discountenance and treat such actions as blameable,
i.e. count them vices, which tend to the dissolution of
that society in which they were united; but all other
actions that are not thought to have such an immediate
influence on society I find not . . . but that in some
countries or societies they are virtues, in others vices,
and in others indifferent, according as the authority of
some esteemed wise men in some places, or as inclination
or fashion of people in other places, have happened to
establish them virtues or vices* /?0f Ethics in General",
Op.Cit.. p. 1267
It is the secondary area of non-minimal morality which most concerns
Locke. For it is here that disagreement and debate typically arise,
and what Locke hopes for is a system of duties concerning which
rational men could as little disagree as they can over the cert¬
ainties of mathematics. That he never found the key to this system
is not surprising, for no such key exists. Moral notions, unlike
the notions employed by mathematicians, are open textured. What is
more they must be open textured if they are to function properly.
As this is so, moral disagreement and debate, even between men who
make use of the same notions, is always possible. Morality,
therefore, cannot be reduced to a quasi-mathematical discipline.
The kind of certitude Locke seeks is neither available, nor
appropriate, in the study of morals.
^ Nevertheless, Locke's contention that moral law is discovered
by reason working on the materials of experience is far more fruitful
than the alternative epistemologies current among his contemporaries.
The thesis that each man has an infallible conscience within his
own breast inevitably ends with subjectivism and relativism, i.e.
with a theory in direct antithesis to a theory of moral knowledge.
The closely allied thesis that moral propositions are self-evident
to intuition is more a way of closing the subject than of solving
the problem of moral knowledge. On Locke's theory men construct
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moral notions in accordance with their own interests, and the
overriding interest of all men is happiness. Morality, then,
originates in the human endeavour to devise rules for the attainment
of happiness. It is this endeavour which gives unity and coherence
to what we have called the moral point of view. For when men
deal with the world from this point of view they do not rank actions
under a random collection of notions, but rank them under notions
developed with one specific object in mind; the attainment of
happiness.
Locke's analysis of happiness in terms of pleasure and pain,
and his subjective account of the latter, precludes a stringent
test for the validity of moral notions. However, the stress he
lays on human happiness as the end and object of morality does set
a limit to the sphere of morality and thereby imposes a shape on
debates concerning virtue and vice. Although it is impossible to
give a concise definition of happiness, the concept is clearly not
vacuous. It is not vacuous because we can cite states of affairs
which are definitely incompatible with human happiness. For
example, it is true that physical pain is incompatible with happiness.
This is a general truth even though, in exceptional circumstances,
we might truly say of a particular man that he is both in pain and
happy. Therefore a man cannot sensibly pitch upon just anything
and maintain that it constitutes his private idea of happiness.
Of course, it may be objected that Locke's characterization of morality
as the 'rule of man's actions for attaining happiness' is itself
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problematic, that it is nothing more than an expression of Locke's
personal moral 'intuition' . However, the philosopher who makes
this objection must either deny that morality has any object what¬
soever, or he must bear the onus of explaining what morality is
about, what gives the moral point of view coherence.
Locke does see himself as failing to solve the problem of
moral knowledge. In his own eyes he fails because he finds it
impossible to exhibit, in a manner perspicuous to unaided reason,
the one set of moral commands which he knows to be true. What
may be taken as Locke's final thoughts on the problem of moral
knowledge occur in The Reasonableness of Chrjstianity:
Whatsoever should ... be universally useful, as a standard
to which men should conform their manners, must have its
authority, either from reason or revelation . . . It is
true, there is a law of nature: but who is there that
ever did, or undertook to give it us all entire, as a law;
no more, nor no less, than what was contained in, and
had the obligation of that law? Who ever made out all the
parts of it, put them together, and showed the world their
obligation? Where was there any such code, that mankind
might have recourse to, as their unerring rule, before our
Saviour's time? . . . such a lav;, which might be the sure
guide of those who had a desire to go right; and, if they
had a mind, need not mistake their duty, but might be
certain when they had performed, when failed in it. Such
a law of morality Jesus Christ hath given us in the New
Testement; but by the latter of these ways, by revelation.
We have from him a full and sufficient rule for our
direction, and conformable to that of reason. /works. 7,
pp. 142 - 1457
Locke has not given up his belief in a law accessible to unaided
reason. What he does maintain is that reason has never yet been
completely successful in displaying the law in all its parts and the
full force of its obligation. In other words, ethics has yet to
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find its Newton. However, even without a fully rational morality,
men are not left in the dark as to their duties. The lav: of
opinion (what, in more modern terms may be called 'common moral
consciousness') is, in the main, a safe guide to the objective law
of nature. It is so because it is the law which men have dev¬
eloped in their corporate endeavours after happiness. Moreover
the evangelized part of mankind do possess moral certitude; but
it is a certitude founded not in reason but in divine revelationo
Locke finally rests (not without reluctance) with a morality which,
although it is not initially discovered by reason, is completely
acceptable to reason.
Chapter IX
MORAL JUDGEMENTS AMD MORAL ACTION
In Chapter V. we endeavoured to construct (out of the materials
supplied in Locke's account of notions) a theory of moral judgements
which allows them a cognitive status equal to that enjoyed by
judgements concerning non-moral facts. It was said that, at least
typically, a moral judgement consists in the ranking of an action
under a moral notion. If the action in fact falls under the notion,
we can say that the judgement in which the notion is used is true.
Subsequently we saw that, if Locke's theory is to guarantee the
objectivity of morals, this cognitive analysis of moral judgements
needs to be augmented by some standard whereby the validity of moral
notions can be tested. Up to a point,Locke's rule of justice, taken
together with the view that human happiness is the object of morality,
provides such a standard. It is not one from which a complete and
final li3t of virtues and vices can be derived with the rigorous
certainty Locke stipulated as the hallmark of knowledge. Neverthe¬
less, it does narrow the scope of moral debate. Moreover, it enables
us to characterize the criticism, defence and revision of established
moral notions as activities in which objective facts, and not merely
subjective attitudes and emotions, are involved. However, what we
have termed the Lockean theory of moral judgements is still subject
to a number of objections; and no final assessment of the theory can
be reached until it has been considered in the light of these
objections.
Vere it not for the prominence of so-called 'non-cognitivism'
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in recent ethical theory the statement that moral judgements are
cognitive would appear to labour the obvious. Ordinary usage
sanctions the words 'know' and 'knowledge' in connexion with moral
judgements. The moral judgement that a thing is wrong or that it
is murder seems to assert a fact in the same way as the, undoubtedly
factual, judgement that a thing is red or that it is a table. Never¬
theless, the permission of ordinary usage and the grammatical
similarity between moral judgements and the paradigmatic type of
factual judgement hardly proves that the former are examples of
knowledge or that they assert facts. Ordinary usage and grammatical
similarity, it may be said, mask fundamental logical differences.
The grounds for the non-cognitivist critique of ordinary moral
discourse are far too complicated to be given in detail here.^ The
critique itself has given rise to theories as different as the
emotivism of Professors Ayer and Stevenson, the prescriptivism of
Professor Hare, and the existentialism of writers like Jean-Paul
Sartre. What unites these philosophers is the belief that there
are no objective criteria in accordance with which moral judgements
can be said to be true or false. A moral judgement is analysed as an
expression of an emotion, or of an attitude, towards the object
judged, or as a personal decision, taking the form of an imperative,
with respect to the object. To say of a moral judgement made on a
particular occasion that it is true is merely a way of endorsing the
1 For an excellent short survey see J.O. Urmson: The Emotive
Theory of Ethics. Ch. 2.
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feelings and attitude of the speaker, or of agreeing to the pre™
scription he is putting forward® It is a mistake to suppose that,
in moral discourse, terms such as 'true', 'false4, have any reference
to a realm of objective moral truth. Consequently, it is a mistake
to suppose that moral disagreement concerns the content of that
realm. When two men differ in their moral opinions they do not
disagree (as they would over a matter of fact), but diverge in their
feelings, attitudes or the decisions they have reached. Moral
dispute is still possible, its point being to bring about a con¬
vergence of attitudes,or a uniformity in decision. In a moral
argument one man attempts to get the other to 4 see things Ms way'.
Certainly, there is a large cognitive element in moral discourse.
Both the development of an attitude and the making of a decision
involves a knowledge of facts from which the attitude grows and on
wM.ch the decision is based® Similarly, the dialectic of moral
argument involves the exhibition of known facts and the discovery
of new facts® However, the important point is that the cognitive
element does not belong to the moral judgement itself® As there
is no objective moral truth, it is logically possible for two men
to arrive at quite contrary moral judgements from a knowledge of
exactly the same facts® Nor is there any stage in a moral dis¬
agreement at which the outcome must, logically, favour one party
rather than the other. The resolution of a moral disagreement
can only result from a change of heart, or from weariness on the
part of one of the contenders. Thus, although one comes to a
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moral judgement in the light of certain facts, the judgement itself
is in the nature of a leap in the dark* In short, no facts (which
are the proper objects of cognition) entail a moral judgement.
Very broadly, three factors have contributed to the rise of
non-cognitivism in recent ethical thought. In the first place,
there has been a widespread acceptance of the 'naturalistic fallacy'
argument. Secondly, there has been even more widespread dissat¬
isfaction with a specific cognitive analysis of moral judgements
which claimed to avoid this fallacy. finally, it has been thought
that any cognitive analysis must neglect the most essential feature
of moral judgements, that they tell the agent what he ought to do.
The first and second of these factors can be traced to G. E.
Moore's Principia Ethica. Moore's moral theory contains a negative
and a positive thesis. In his negative thesis he sets out to demolish
all naturalistic and metaphysical theories of the foundations of
morality, on the grounds that they commit the ' naturalistic fallacy'.
Few, if any, philosophers would now try to frighten their opponents
with the naturalistic fallacy in the exact terms of Moore's original
formulation. Nevertheless, it is often held that Moore's criticism
is correct in spirit, and that, in some modified version, his
argument does refute all naturalistic and metaphysical ethical
2
theories. In general, the naturalistic fallacy may be said to be
the attempt to identify a moral concept with a non-moral concept.
2 For an infl\*ential revamping of the naturalistic fallacy argument
see R.M. Hare: The Language of Morals, pp. 83-91.
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Thus, to take Moore's example, if we define 'good* as 'pleasure',
the assertion that 'pleasure is good' must he equivalent to the
tautology that 'pleasure is pleasant'» But the first assertion is
clearly not a tautology. Therefore, the putative definition (or
identification) must leave something out; it must fail as a def¬
inition. The same failure occurs whatever 'naturalistic' definition
3
is offered.
Although Moore's naturalistic fallacy argument still enjoys
considerable currency in many quarters, his positive thesis is
generally regarded as a museum piece. Briefly, Moore argues that,
as 'good' cannot be defined in natural terms, the word must stand
for a simple (thus indefinable) 'non-natural' property, goodness.
Ee is thus led to postulate the existence of a very odd entity indeed.
For neither Moore nor anyone else has ever been able.to give a
satisfactory account of what a 'non-natural' property may be. Again,
if the naturalistic fallacy argument is deployed against the attempt
to define other moral concepts besides 'good', a proliferation of
•non-natural' moral properties seems inevitable. As well as
suffering on the score of postulated entities, Moore's positive
thesis has been attacked on two further counts. Firstly, as good-
3 Moore's naturalistic fallacy argument bears a close resemblance
to the argument against ethical voluntarism common in the seven¬
teenth-century: If the criterion of moral rightness or-'good¬
ness is the will of God or of the sovereign then it will be
non- informative to say that what God or the sovereign wills is
right (and contradictory to say that it is wrong). For an
account of Moore's historical antecedents 3ee A.M. Prior:
Logic and the Basis of Ethics, passim®
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ness is a simple, non-natural property belonging to things, its
presence can be detected only by some kind of intuition. Moore is,
therefore, open to the kind of objection we have seen urged by Locke
against innate (self-evident) moral principles: he ends by claiming
a sacrosanct status for propositions which may be no more than his
own moral opinions. But it is the second objection which has done
most to discredit Moore's positive thesis. It is claimed that he
neglects the distinctive relation between moral judgements and action,
and that, as an ethical cognitivist, he cannot but neglect this
relation.
All moral judgements, it is argued, either take the general
form, ' x ought to be the case', or involve a judgement which takes
this general form. On the other hand, all factual judgements take
the general form, 'x is_ the case'. If this is so it is easy to see
that the possible connexions between moral judgements and actions,
and those between factual judgements and actions are going to be
quite different. A moral judgement will tell a man what he ought
to do, whereas a factual judgement can only tell him what he has
done, is doing, or will do. It follows that moral judgements belong
in a different category from factual judgements. For no factual
judgement, nor any combination of factual judgements, can perform the
essential function of a moral judgement. This category difference
is often summed up in the dictum that an ' ought' cannot be derived
from an 'is'. Cognitive analyses of moral judgements, it is said,
are bound to ignore the fundamental difference between these two
categories of judgement. Whether they "be framed in terms of natural,
non-natural or metaphysical properties, they all construe moral
judgements on the model of factual judgements. Hence, they may be
looked upon either as incoherent attempts to move from 'is' to
'ought', or as inadequate analyses which leave the moral 'ought'
entirely out of account.
In"view of what has been said above, we can see that df the
analysis of moral judgements which has been gathered from the discussi
of moral notions is to be acceptable, it must negotiate certain
obstacles. (That these obstacles have come to the fore largely
since Locke's time is, of course, quite irrelevant.) At the outset
-we can put aside the problem of non-natural properties accessible
only to intuition. Locke does not postulate any such entities,
and he is as much opposed to ethical intuitionism as any of Moore's
critics. This leaves the naturalistic fallacy argument and the
demand that an adequate analysis of moral judgement include a coherent
account of the moral ' ought'.
On the Lockean theory,a moral judgement typically consists in
the ranking of an action under a moral notion. For example, if an
action is judged to be murder it is ranked under the notion 'murder'.
This judgement logically depends on certain features of the action
and the surrounding circumstances. Given the presence of these
features, and given that the surrounding circumstances are within the
vague cetris paribus clause which we saw to be a necessary adjunct
to all moral notions, the action in question is murder. We will now
look more closely at this analysis in order to see how extensive an
account of moral judgements it yields. We will take as our example
the judgement that a particular action is murdero (We do, of course,
sometimes pass judgements on kinds of actions, e.g. fthe acquisition
of property is theft'o We also judge actions to "be virtuous, e.g.
to be examples of kindness, courage etc. However, for the present
purposes, nothing of importance turns on this. Whatever is shown
to hold concerning the Lockean analysis in the light of our chosen
example will also hold, mutatis mutandis, with respect to judgements
passed on kinds of actions, and to pro-moral judgements, in which
an action is ranked under a notion signifying a virtue.)
If an action is murder it follows that it is morally wrong.
On the analysis under consideration this is explained by the fact
that the notion of murder falls under the much more general notion
of vice. In Locke's terminology 'vice', or 'vicious' is equivalent
to 'morally wrong'. Thus, the judgement that an action is murder
entails the much broader judgement that it is vicious, or morally
wrong. Now it is the latter type of moral judgement which has
chiefly engaged the attention of moral philosophers. Suppose, then,
we were to begin with the broad moral judgement that the action is
vicious. What account can he given of this in terms of the Lockean
theory? Clearly it does not entail the judgement that the action is
murder. Nevertheless, given the judgement that a particular action
is vicious we can say that the action must fall under some moral
notion signifying a type of vice. A man who simply expresses the
judgement that an action is vicious lays himself open to the demand
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for further specification. A moral judgement, such a.3 the judge¬
ment that an action is vicious, is further specified when the action
in question is ranked under a moral notion which indicates what
type of vice is involved. Here there are two important points to
be noted. First, the further specification of a general moral
judgement is not only something which can be demanded for the pur¬
pose of greater information, it is something which must be forth¬
coming if the judgement is to retain its moral character. For an
action is not vicious simpliciter; but'vicious in that it exemplifies
a type of vice. Therefore, if a man judges an action to be vicious
he must be prepared to specify the way in which it is vicious.
Otherwise, his judgement is a pseudo-moral judgement. He is asking
us to believe in an action which is vicious yet does not exemplify
any particular type of vice. But such an action is an absurdity,
analogous to an object which is coloured yet of no particular colour.
Secondly, moral notions must be used in the further specification
of a moral judgement. Suppose the man attempts to make his broad
judgement more specific by giving a description of the circumstances
of the action, but without giving any indication that those circum¬
stances warrant that action's inclusion under a moral notion. No
matter how detailed the description given in non-moral terms, it
would remain an open question whether the action were vicious or not.
A judgement in which an action is ranked under a moral notion is the
only type of judgement entailing a broad judgement of virtue of vice.
Therefore, if the man is to further specify his judgement that the
action in question is vicious he must make use of a moral notion
signifying a vice.
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We may conclude, then, that the analysis generated from a
consideration of the judgement in which an action is ranked under a
moral notion does provide an account of moral judgements in which
notions of the widest generality are involved. We may also,
tentatively, conclude that the Lockean theory avoids the naturalistic
fallacy. In the course of the analysis no attempt has "been made
to identify moral concepts such as 'vice1 or 'moral wrongness' with
non-moral concepts. It has only keen claimed that the use of these
terms in judgements necessarily involves the use of detailed moral
notions. Nor have these notions been defined in the sense of
definition proscribed by the naturalistic fallacy argument. 'Murder'
has not been identified with something other than 'murder'. It
has been pointed out that moral notions are applied to actions in
accordance vith rules, and that, therefore, one can rank an action
as murder only on the basis of certain facts. This is an obvious,
albeit highly important, truth. Nevertheless, the conclusion that
the naturalistic fallacy has been avoided can, at present, be no more
than tentative. For the naturalistic fallacy argument shades into
what is the most general and far reaching of all objections to a
cognitive theory of moral judgements: that no 'ought' can be derived
from an 'is'. As we have seen, this objection is considered
decisive against any analysis which construes moral judgements on
the model of factual judgements.
The Lockean theory does construe moral judgements on the model
of factual judgements. However, unlike Moore's theory, it does not
take the factual judgement which asserts that an object has a certain
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property as paradigmatic. Instead moral judgements are likened
to the type of factual judgement in which a piece of human behaviour
io identified as an instance of a kind of action. Judging an
action to he murder is akin to judging an action to be fencing or
dancing. In view of this model of moral judgements, the objection
that no 'ought' can be derived from 'is' may be put thus: The
judgement that an action is (say) murder tells a man no more than
that in performing the action he will commit murder. It is true
that from this judgement he can proceed to the judgement that liis
action Mil be vicious, or morally wrong. However, the second
judgement contains nothing not contained in the first, and neither
contain an 'ought'. The man who Mshes to discover what he ought
to do must know further that he ought not to commit murder or that
he ought not do that vrhich is wrong. TMs extra piece of infor¬
mation is not a fact, but a moral rule or moral principle.
There is, however, an important, though seldom noticed,
ambiguity in the doctrine that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an
'is'. Sometimes it is taken as meaning that no moral obligation,
or moral 'ought', can arise from any fact or set of facts. Perhaps
more frequently it is taken as meaning that no fact or set of facts,
in itself, can prompt a man to act. Two quite different things are
being asserted in these formulations. But, as we shall see, there
is a reason wiry the difference should have gone largely unnoticed.
Locke's theory of obligation, as it is expounded in the
Essays on the Law of Nature, may be taken as a denial of the first
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formulation. According to Locke, men have moral obligations
because God exists as the supreme legislator. God's right to
legislate concerning the behaviour of mankind is, by definition,
part of His 'right of creation'. This right belongs to God
essentially; for, again by definition, He is the creator of mankindo
The fact that God has set laws to mankind provides the formal cause
of the moral obligations men are under. Without God's law there
could be no such thing as moral obligation. Therefore, it makes no
sense to say that men morally ought to do anything except against
the background of God's commands. For Locke, except as they are
understood in terms of law words such as 'ought' and 'obligation'
are literally empty sounds. The usual argument against a theistic
basis of moral obligation states that one cannot move from the fact
that God has issued laws to the fact of moral obligation without
importing the synthetic proposition that men ought to obey God as
4
an additional premise. Locke's reply would be that the term
'ought' used in the new premise has meaning only insofar as moral
5
obligation does follow from the fact that God has issued, laws.
Law provides the form, not the matter, of obligation. There¬
fore, from the fact that God has issued laws it follows only that
men are under a moral obligation to do something. The fact tells
4 Cf. P. Ho Nowe11-Smith: Ethics, pp. 37 - 38 n.2.
5 Cf. Essay. I, iii, 12: "... what duty is cannot be under¬
stood without a law, nor a law be known or supposed without a
law-maker". Locke's legalist theory of the moral 'ought' is
echoed in G. E. M. Anscombe's paper "Modern Moral Philosophy"
Philosophy. 1958.
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men nothing of what they are under an obligation to do. Given that
the existence of moral obligation is thus distinct from the content
of that obligation, we can defend the Lockean theory of moral judge¬
ments against the charge that it involves an illegitimate move from
'is' to 'ought'. Prom the judgement that an action is murder it
does not follow that the agent ought not perform that action.
Rather, the agent knows beforehand that he has moral obligations;
and, assuming he understands the notion of murder, he also knows
that 'murder' is a term used in the expression of a negative obligation.
This knowledge is presupposed in his use of a moral notion in making
the moral judgement. In the absence of this knowledge man might
still rank actions under notions such as 'murder', but in this case
he would not express a moral judgement. For a moral judgement does
tell a man what he ought to do in that it expresses the content of
his moral obligations.
Even if Locke's theory of obligation is acceptable,there remains
the seoond formulation of the 'ought/is' objection. It is not denied
that the factual knowledge a man has can, and does, contribute to
the way in which he acts. But it is maintained that the mere know¬
ledge of a matter of fact on its own is powerless to move a man to
act. Action can be initiated only by some psychological state of
the agent, by a desire or a want. For instance, a man's knowledge
that a certain liquid is poisonous in itself has neither the power to
make him drink nor to restrain him from drinking. However, if he
wants to die this 'knowledge will influence him to drink; if he wants
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to stay alive the same knowledge will influence him to refrain from
drinking. ^Tow it is often said to he the distinguishing charact¬
eristic of a moral judgement that it not merely contributes to the
way in which a man acts, but of itself has the power to initiate
action. When a man accepts a moral judgement, he ipso facto
acquires a tendency to act, either to perform the action in the case
of a pro-judgement or to refrain from it in the case of a con-
judgement.^ Or, to put the point slightly differently, a moral
judgement gives the agent a conclusive reason for acting. Therefore,
an analysis which reduces moral judgements to factual judgements,
or which explains them on the model of factual judgements, must be
inadequate.
It may seem strange that this objection stressing the dynamic
quality of moral discourse should be considered under the general
heading of the 'ought/is' rule. Granted that moral judgements are
intimately connected with obligation, that to accept a moral judge¬
ment is to accept (in accordance with the judgement) that one ought
to act in a certain way; might it not be said tha.t this is only to
accept a fact? Granted further that actions are not initiated by
the knowledge of facts; might this not only go to show that moral
action is initiated by something other than a mora.1 judgement? In
other words, why should it not be that the recognition of a moral
6 This insistence on the dynamic quality of moral judgements is
central to the emotive theory of ethics as it is developed by
Charles Stevenson. See, for example, Ms "The Emotive Meaning
of EtMcal Terms" in Facts and Values, Essay 2.
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obligation is one thing, while action in accord with the obligation
is another thing, and that the two are only externally related to
one another? If there is a problem about moral action it will be
distinct from the problem of finding a satisfactory account of moral
obligationo
The objection against this separation of action from the
apprehension of obligation, and the ambiguity of the doctrine that
no 'ought' follows from an 'is', can, at least in large part, be
traced to the concept of obligation itself. In ordinary usage the
term 'obligation' often carries the connotation of constraint or
compulsion. Indeed in some contexts to say that a man is obliged
to do a thing means that he cannot help but do it. Clearly moral
obligation cannot be equated with this degree of constraint. No
one has ever suggested that men cannot but fulfil the moral obligations
they recognize. Nevertheless, the concept of 'being under a moral
obligation' does retain something of this connotation. Hence, we
do tend to doubt that a man in fact recognizes a moral obligation if,
.in the appropriate circumstances, he makes no attempt whatsoever to
act in accord with that obligation. We would generally want to
say that he has not fully understood his obligation, or that he has
not seen its force. The thesis that there is an internal relation
between a moral judgement and a tendency to act may, therefore, be
spelled out thus: a moral judgement tells a man what he ought to do,
but a man cannot be said to have properly acknowledged that he ought
to do a thing unless he is prepared to act.
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Locke is aware of the dynamic dimension of moral discourse.
He subscribes to the common distinction between purely speculative
and practical knowledge, and places morality within the latter-
category. However, he does not believe that moral truth in itself
has the capacity to move the will. In an MS note entitled 'Ethica'
he writes:
Therefor ./sic. There are/ two parts of Ethics the one is the
rules w0*1 men are generally in the right in though perhaps
they have not deduced them as they should from their true
principles. The other is the true motives to practice them
& the ways to bring men to observe them & these are generally
either not well known or not rightly applyd. Without
the latter moral discourses are such as men hear with
pleasure & approve of. The mind being generally delighted
with truths especially if handsomly expressed. But all
this is but the delight of speculation. Something e]se is
requird to practice, w0*1 will never be till men are made
alive to virtue & can taste it. /MS, c. 28, Fol. 11^7
The second part of ethics is Locke's moral psychology. As it
constitutes his account of the practical aspect of moral knowledge,
it may be said to round off and complete his moral epistemology.
But more than this, Locke's moral psychology provides us with a
vantage point from which to view the whole of his ethical theory.
For Locke does not see moral philosophy as a discipline concerned
with the analysis of moral judgements, or with the elucidation of
the logic behind moral discourse, but as, "Hp«.KT v vt 17 » skill of
right applying our own powers and actions, for the attainment of
things good and useful". ./iV, xxi,
The major premise in Locke's theory of human action is one with
that which shapes his idea of the nature of morality; all men seek
to attain their own happiness and avoid their own unhappiness, or
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misery:
Happiness and misery are the "tiro great springs of human
actionsj and though through different ways we find men so
busy in the world, they all aim at happiness, and desire
to avoid misery, as it appears to them in different places
and shapes. /"Of Ethics in General", King. 2, pp® 122 - 12/7
Happiness is not merely the preponderant aim in men's actions; it is
the sole object in each and every action:
If it be o * . asked, what it is moves desire? I answer:
happiness, and that alonec Happiness and misery are the
names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not
o . . But of some degrees of both we have very lively
impressions, made by several instances of delight and joy on
the one side, and torment and sorrow on the other; which,
for shortness's sake, I shall comprehend under the names of
pleasure and pain, there being pleasure and pain of the mind
as well £LS the body® Tii, xxi, 4J7
For Locke; "what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is
that we call good, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call
evil, for no other reason but for its aptness to produce pleasure
and pain in us, wherein consists our happiness and misery'1. /Tl,
xxi, 42/ This shift from psj^chological hedonism, or the doctrine
that happiness (defined in terms of pleasure and. the absence of pain)
is the one object in all desire, to an account of good and evil
deserves careful attention., It is exactly the kind of move which
Moore castigates as, "a naive and artless . . < use of the naturalistic
7
fallacy"o Further, it is the point at which, in the eyes of most
commentators, Locke tacitly discards his original natural law ethic
for a hedonistic doctrine, according to which the morel worth of an
action is determined solely by the pleasantness of its consequences®
7 Principia Ethica. p. 66. Moore is criticizing John Stuart Mill®
273
Fortunately, Locke's defence against the naturalistic fallacy
argument also enables us to see the continuity between his hedonism
and his natural law doctrine.
The naturalistic fallacy argument turns on the fact that
moral judgements are always synthetic, or what Locke would call
•informative propositions'® It is assumed that 'good' is a moral
predicate, and that therefore any judgement of the form 'x is
good' is a moral judgement. 'Good', therefore, cannot be identified
with 'x' (e.g. with pleasure). If it were, the judgement 'x is
good' would express an analytic truth, and be what Locke calls a
'trifling proposition'. But need Locke understand 'good' as a
moral predicate? If it is not so understood, there is no reason
why the judgement 'x is good' should not express a mere analytic
truth. Before attempting to answer this question it is necessary
to look more closely at the connexion Locke forges between psychol¬
ogical hedonism and goodness.
The move from pleasure to good is most clearly seen in the
following passage:
... an understanding free agent naturally follows that
which causes pleasure to it and flies that which causes pain;
i.e. naturally seeks happiness and shuns misery. That,
then, which causes to any one pleasure, that is good to him;
and that which causes him pain, is bad to him ... for good
and bad, being relative terms, do not denote any thing in
the nature of the thing, but only the relation it bears to
another, in its aptness and tendency to produce in it
pleasure or pain; and thus vie see and say, that which is'
good for one man is bad for another. /yOf Ethics in General1,1
King, 2, pp. 127 - 12§7
The most obvious thing about the above passage is that, if 'good'
is taken as a moral predicate, it must be supposed that Locke has
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abandoned his objective natural law ethic for an extreme form of
subjectivism. For he is quite explicit in his claim that the
goodness of things is relative to each individual. It can also be
seen that the argument presented here contains a concealed premise.
Prom the proposition that each agent naturally seeks his own
pleasure, Locke arrives at the conclusion that, in the view of each-
agent, his own pleasure is good. But this conclusion cannot be
derived solely from the given premise. There is, prima facie,
nothing contradictory in a man judging both$ (a) that x gives him
pleasure, (b) that x is bad. What Locke needs is a further premise
to the effect that whatever ends men set themselves in their actions
they always conceive those ends as good. Given this it will follow
that what gives a man pleasure is good to him; and that the man who
judges x to be both pleasurable and bad is contradicting himself.
The thesis that no man chooses an end for himself except under
the aspect of good, and the definition of good as the object of
every appetite, are commonplace in scholastic, and especially Thomist,
g
thoughto The metaphysical scheme which gives meaning to this
thesis is highly complex. Very briefly, it is held that every being
in the order of creation tends towards some other being which is its
natural end. The end of a thing is the being which completes, and
8 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Contra Gentiles, III, iii. The
definition of good is appropriated by St. Thomas from Aristotle:
Nicomachean Ethics. I, i, 1094ai. The Thomist conception of
human action is taken for granted by Hooker, Cf. Ecclesiastical
Policy. I, viii, 1»
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thus perfects, its nature. As the end towards which a thing tends
perfects its nature, it is identical with the good of that thingo
The raetaphysic scheme serves as an explanation for all action, both
the motions of the physical universe and the acts of intellectual
agents. The difference between physical and intellectual agents
consists in the fact that the latter are capable of apprehending
their natural end, or good. Ey the same token, they are capable
of misapprehending it, i.e. acting with a view to what they
incorrectly suppose to be their good. Such a mistake is, of course,
covered by the thesis that men act always under the aspect of good.
If this were not so, if men sometimes acted for an end which did
not at least seem to them good, their acting would be quite
q
inexplicable.
Needless to say, Locke is very far from accepting this meta-
physic in tote. For him it would be a prime example of the venture
1 into the vast ocean of Being' which is beyond the compass of human
understanding. Nevertheless, residual traces of just such a meta¬
physical scheme can be discerned in Locke's thought. For example,
we can see something of it in his belief that, for beings of
sufficient intellectual capacity, an a. priori science of nature is
possible via a knowledge of real essences. However, the only
residue included in Locke's theory of action is the thesis that
whatever men choose as the object of their actions that they consider
9 For an account of this metaphysical theory of action in the
thought of St. Thomas Aquinas see Etienne Gilson: The Elements
Of Christian Philosophy. Ch. 11»
good; and this he incorporates into a system quite different from
the metaphysical scheme which originally gave it meaning. Locke
does not begin from the notion of man* s end, or good, and argue that
men must desire this end, and act to attain it. Rather, he argues
from the proposition that all men desire (and act to attain)
pleasure, to the conclusion that pleasure must be their end, or goodo
The difference between the two arguments is subtle and highly sig¬
nificant. On what may be termed the scholastic argument, the
object of human action is desired because it is good; on Locke's
argument it is good because it is desired. His relativj.stic con¬
clusion would be acceptable to neither Aristotle nor the Thomists.
Having outlined the background against which Locke makes the
transition from psychological hedonism to an account of good, 'we
are now in a position to assess this account vis a vis the so-
called naturalistic fallacy. Certainly, Locke does identify 'good'
with 'pleasure'. He makes this identification on the grounds thai-
pleasure is what all men desire, and that the things which give a
man pleasure are the ends he sets before himself in Ms actions.
In consequence, the judgement that a thing is good is equivalent to
the judgement that it is pleasant. ' Good' is actually defined,
not as pleasure, but as 'that which is the object .'of desire8, and,
for Locke, this definition is a trifling proposition. However, the
naturalistic fallacy argument forbids the definition of good and its
equation with pleasure (or with any other non-moral property) only
if 'good' is then used as a moral predicate. For the logic of its
277
role as a moral predicate demands that any judgement of the form
'x is good' must he synthetic. So far there has been nothing in
Locke's argument to suggest that he uses 1 good' in any way except
as a name for the end of human action, that end being, in his
opinion, pleasure, or happiness. Further, if 'good' is used as
a moral predicate, the judgement that a thing is good must be
understood as a pro-moral judgement ascribing moral worth to the
thing judged. We saw in the previous chapter that Locke (notwith¬
standing occasional inconsistencies in his terminology) does not
use even the term 'moral good' to signify the moral worth of a
thing, but only in reference to the rewards following upon an
action which is.itself of moral worth. His position with respect
to moral worth and goodness is made abundantly clear in a common¬
place book entry dated 1693s
Voluntas: That which has very much confounded men about
the will and its determination has been the confounding
of the notion of moral rectitude and giving it the name
of moral good. The pleasure that a man takes in any
action or expects as a consequence of it is indeed a
good in the /sic/ self able and proper to move the willo
But the moral rectitude of it considered barely in
itself is not good or evil nor any way moves the will,
but as pleasure and pain either accompanies the action
itself or is looked on to be a consequence of it.
Which is evident from the punishments and rewards which
God has annexed to moral rectitu.de or pravity as proper
motives to the will, which would be needless if moral
rectitude were in itself good and moral pravity evil.
/Quoted by Von Leyden, Essays. pp. 72 - 7.27 10
10 Cf. Locke's marginal notation to Burnet's Third Letter: "Men
have a natural tendency to what delights and from what pains
them. This universal observation has established past doubt.
But that the soul has such a tendency to what is morally good
and from evil has not fallen under my observation, and therefore
I cannot grant it". /Quoted by A. C. Eraser in his edition of
Locke's Essay. Vol. I, p. 67, n 1jJ
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The most general term expressive of moral worth which Locke recog¬
nizes is 'rectitude' (or 'virtue')o But by this term he understands
something quite separate from goodness*. That which is morally
worthy is good only insofar as it is either accompanied by pleasure
11
or is the cause of pleasure. Hence, a man may, without any
inconsistency, judge a thing to be both good (i.e. pleasant) and
morally reprehensible (i.e. wrong, or vicious). In Locke's account
•good' is not a moral predicate. Therefore, we may conclude that
his move from psychological hedonism to goodness does not fall under
the naturalistic, fallacy argument.
If it is not a moral predicate, what role does 'good' have in
Locke's moral philosophy? The answer to this question has already
been given: good is, "the proper object of desire in general".
j5i, xxi, 427 As what men desire is pleasure, Locke might without
much loss have dropped the term 'good* altogether. As it is, 'good'
has a role, first and foremost, within his theory of action. Locke,
does not draw any hard and fast distinction between theory of action
and moral theory. The law of nature, being the rule of man's
conduct, must facilitate man's desires. Otherwise, we must suppose
11 As Locke explains in the Essay, "things are judged good or bad
in a double sense. First, that which is properly good or bad
is nothing but barely pleasure or pain. Secondly, but because
not only present pleasure and pain but that also which-is apt
by its efficacy or consequences to bring it upon us at a
distance is a proper object of our desires . . . therefore
things also that draw after them pleasure and pain are considered
as good and evil7 /II, xxi,Ti7
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that God has set a law ever His creatures which aims at frustrating
the nature He has given them. Not only would such a law he con¬
trary to the wisdom of God* its content would he inaccessible to
man's reason, i.e. it could not he the law of nature. In this way
the hedonistic conception of goodness does play an important part
in Locke's attempt to arrive at the content of the law of nature.
However, it is hardly true to say that Locke's increasing interest
in psychological hedonism, and his consequent equation of good with
pleasure, marks the tacit abandonment of his early natural law
ethics in favour of ethical hedonism. What it does show is an
increasing awareness of the problems involved in the explanation of
human action; and, more specifically, an increasing concern with
the problem of moral action.
Even though there is a continuity discernible between Locke's
earlj natural law doctrine and the hedonic definition of good given
in the Essay, psychological hedonism does raise an acute problem within
the context of his moral philosophy. Locke accepts the egoistic
form of hedonism; each man desires pleasure for himself. We saw
in Chapter VIII how, strictly out of a regard for his own happiness,
a man will choose to live in a world in which justice has been
established. It may be added that, out of the same regard, he will
choose a world in which virtues other than justice are established.
Under the rule of justice he can expect to be free from the encroach¬
ments of his fellow man; given the practise of other virtues he can
expect their positive help. Further, reason will tell him that, as
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all virtues belong to the content of a law which hinds all men, he
is not permitted to make an exception in his own favour when it comes
to moral conduct# That is to say, he must agree that he is himself
bound to practice virtue and avoid vice, even when doing so conflicts
with his personal happiness. Nor is a conflict between the agent's
own happiness and the dictates of virtue an unlikely occurrence;
for, as Locke remarks, "a great number of virtues, and the best of
them, consists only in this: that we do good to others at our own
loss". /Essays, p. 20ijj This being so, it seems a man who is
intent solely on the achievement of his own happiness will modify
his original choice. He will prefer a world in which the conduct
of others is governed by the law of nature. Now, given Locke's
doctrine of psychological hedonism, it appears that each individual
is determined to make a choice similar to this when faced with the
possibility of acting either virtuously or viciously. Virtue is
not intrinsically pleasant, nor is vice intrinsically painful..
Therefore, the agent will not he moved by a bare consideration of
virtue and vice. Although he will choose that others should act
virtuously towards himself, he will not act virtuously towards them
unless circumstances are such that by so doing he encompasses Ms
own pleasure. A fortiori, he will not act virtuously if circum¬
stances are such that virtue crosses his own pleasure. Yet men do
follow virtue to their own visible detriment. How can Locke explain
such conduct?
It will be best to break this question down .into two sub-
281
questions: First, how can the agent be rationally justified in
choosing virtue? Second, how is it possible that the agent should
ever spontaneously choose virtue? The grounds for this division lie
partly with the doctrine of psychological hedonism as it has been put-
forward both by Locke and by other philosophers, and partly with
the peculiarities of Locke's exposition of the doctrine. Psycho¬
logical hedonism has often been understood as an empirical doctrine.
There is said to be a gravitational drive towards pleasure in man
which accounts for his actions in much the same way as the Newtonian
theory of gravitation accounts for the motion of the physical
universe. The truth of this 'law of human nature' is finally a
matter of observation. However, besides the theory of hedonic
gravitation, there is another version of psychological hedonism.
The fact that an action \d.ll promote a man's pleasure is understood
to give him a conclusive reason for performing that action. Conversely,
the fact that an action will cause a man pain, or lessen Ms plea¬
sure, is a conclusive reason for Mm not to perform that action.
If human action is defined as rational action, it follows that all
men act for the sake of pleasure. TMs theory might be termed
metaphysical, rather than psychological, hedonism. Although they
1?
differ in important respects, these theories are often conflated.
Locke's own theory of action is most fully worked out in the chapter
12 The two theories seem to be conflated by John Stuart Mill. He
remarks, for example, "that to desire anything, except in pro¬
portion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and meta¬
physical impossibility". Utilitarianism« (Everyman ed.) p.36°
282
'Of Power' in the second book of the Essays Locke extensively
revised this chapter in the second, and subsequent editions, and
the result of Ms revision is two overlapping theories. The first
is akin to what we have termed metaphysical hedonism; the second
resembles psychological hedonism in its quasi-empirical guiseo
The question of the rational justification of virtue may be
phrased in terms of a choice between points of view. TMs will
bring it into line with the Lockean theory of moral judgements.
The man who takes up the moral point of view sees Ms own actions,
and the actions of others, as subject to the categories of virtue
and vice. He acknowledges an obligation, binding on himself as
well as others, to pursue virtue and avoid vice; and this irre¬
spective of any advantage or disadvantage he may incur in particular
caseso Thus, for the man deciding what he should do from the
moral point of view, the fact that an action falls under a notion
signifying a vice is sufficient to rule that action out of court.
He will not, for instance, debate whether he should commit murder.
Similarly, the fact that an action falls under a notion signifying
13
a virtue is a prima facie reason for performing that action.
13 Here we should note an important asymmetry between the demands
of morality with respect to vice and with respect to virtue.
Vice is thought of as something prohibited absolutely, so that
(from the moral point of view) the fact that an action is
vicious constitutes a conclusive reason against its performance.
However, the virtuousness of an action is only a prima facie
reason for its performance. If the latter were to be con¬
sidered a conclusive reason for acting we would have to suppose
that men are under an obligation to spend their entire lives
in the performance of virtuous actions. For at any given time
there is some virtuous act a man might perform. Rather, we
Cont'd
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However, the moral point of view is not the only position from
which the world of human action can be considered. Nor is it the
only coherent stance an agent might adopt. The most comprehensive,
as well as most obvious, alternative is the point of view of self-
interesto The man who takes up this point of 'view will no doubt
often conform to the dictates of morality. In many circumstances
he will find virtue to be the best policy and vice contrary to his
interest. Nevertheless, morality and self-interest are quite
different; for the latter cuts across the categories of virtue and
vice. Prom the self-interested point of view the fact that an
action is virtuous or vicious carries no weight in the agent* s
decision. He chooses what to do purely in the light of his own
13 cont'd
suppose virtue to be positively prescribed only when appropriate
circumstances arise. This is not to say a man might not de¬
vote his life to positive virtue. But in this case we think
of him as acting beyond the call of moral duty, and of his
actions as works of supererogation. Locke is well aware of
this asymmetry. The law of nature does not bind man, "at all
times to perform everything that the law of nature commands.
This would be simply impossible, since one man is not capable
of performing different actions at the same time . . . we say
that the binding force of nature is perpetual in the sense that
there neither is, nor can be, a time when the law of nature
orders men, or any man, to do something and he is not obliged
to show himself obedient . . . The binding force of the law
never changes, though often there is a change in both the times
and the circumstances of actions, whereby our obedience is
defined. \Je can sometimes stop acting according to the
law, but act against the law we cannot". /Essays, p. 19^7
See also, Locke's letter to Denis Grenville, 23 Mar. 16?"7 - 8.
Zh. P, Fox Bourne: The Life of John Locke, Vol. I, p. 39^7
284
desires. This point of view can be adopted with perfect consistency.
The agent is not bound in consistency to universalize his point of
view, i.e. to will that all men act strictly out of a regard for
their own interest. For clearly the universal pursuit of self-
interest would be contrary to the selfish individual's own interest.
He will, of course, not divulge his position to others; but, as he
will follow virtue whensoever it suits him, he should not find
keeping this secret any great strain. He will be guilty of a kind
of inconsistency only if he maintains that in constantly following
his own interest he is conforming to the moral law. Nov? on the
doctrine that an action is rational only when it is aimed at the
agent's own happiness, the point of view of self-interest appears the
one position which it is reasonable for a man to adopt. Consequently,
the moral point of view is unreasonable.
Locke's defence of the reasonableness of virtue turns on the
possibility of reward and punishment in the next life. The bare
possibility that a life of virtue will earn reward, and a life of
vice punishment, after death constitutes an overwhelming reason for
adopting morality rather than self-interest:
The rewards and punishments of another life, which the
Almighty has established as the enforcements of his law
are of weight enough to determine the choice against what¬
ever pleasure or pain this life can show, when the eternal
state is considered but in its bare possibility, which
nobody can make any doubt of . . . This is evidently so,
though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain, and the
vicious, continual pleasure: which yet is, for the most
part, quite otherwise . . . But when infinite happiness
is put in one scale against infinite misery in the other;
if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes,
be the best that the wicked can attain to; if he be in the
right, who can without madness run the venture? . . .
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Whereas on the other side, the sober man ventures nothing
against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation
comes to pass. If the good man be in the right, he is
eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not miserable, he
feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in
the right, he is not happv; if he mistakes,he is
infinitely miserable. /II, xxi, 70]
Locke's whole argument bears a striking resemblance to Pascal's famous
14
'wager'. Like Pascal, -what Locke argues for is a way of lifeo
It is important to recognize that it is a way of life, and not merely
a series of disconnected actions, which is at stake here. Other¬
wise we are likely to come away with a distorted picture of Locke's
moral philosophy.
The emphasis Locke places on rewards and punishments may give
the impression that he does after all reduce morality to self-
interest. For how can rewards and punishments in the next life be
anything more than additional factors to be considered in a
practical calculation made from the point of view of self-interest?
The agent realizes that, although a certain action will bring him
transient pleasure, there is a likelihood of its bringing far
greater pain upon him at a future date. Similarly, he realizes
that a painful action may bring ultimate pleasure. However, as
this calculation is one of pure self-interest, the fact that those
actions likely to result in ultimate pain and those likely to result
in ultimate pleasure are respectively vices and virtues plays no
part. For Locke, on the other hand, this fact is essential. It
is essential for two reasons. In the first place, the concept of
14 See Pensees (trans. A. J. Kailsheimer) @ 418, pp. 149 - 53*
There can be little doubt that Locke's borrowing is quite
conscious; for he had read Pascale and kept a copy of the
Pen3ees in his Library.
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rewards and punishments for actions in the next world is intelligible
only if actions are considered under the aspect of virtue and vice.
Rewards and punishments are not pleasures and pains which happen
to result from specific kinds of actions; they are imposed by a
rightful authorityo In Locke's theory it makes sense to talk of
pleasure as a reward and pain as a punishment only against the
background of law<> As he explains, the law of nature places men
under both an obligation of obedience and a liability to punishment
15
if they disobey. The pain of punishment is, therefore, not
simply a result of a man's action, but something he deserves
because of his action. Any pain a man incurs because of what he
does cannot be properly interpreted as punishment unless he is
understood to have broken the law, end thus deserved punishment.
Now the actions proscribed by the law of nature, and-which thus
deserve punishment in the next world, are those falling within the
category of vice. Consequently, if the agent understands that
a certain action is likely to be punished in the next world he cannot
but see that action as vicious. That is, he must be looking at
it from the moral point of view, and must acknowledge himself under
an obligation to refrain from that action. Similarly, if the
agent considers the rewards he is likely to deserve because of
his actions he must again be looking at them from the moral point
of view. Of course, it is in the agent's interest to live, his life
in accord with the dictates of morality. This is the whole burden
of Locke's argument« Nevertheless, this does not alter the fact
15 See above, Ch, II, pp. 35 - 36.
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that the point of view from which actions are seen under the cat¬
egories of virtue and vice is quite different from that from which
they are judged solely in the light of the agent's own pleasure
16
or pain.
In the second place, it is essential that each man view his
actions under the aspects of virtue and vice because the life of
virtue is the only means whereby an individual can achieve his
complete happiness, while the life of vice is a certain way to
his complete misery. Although what constitutes happiness for
one man may differ to a considerable degree from that which con¬
stitutes the happiness of another, we can be certain that the
reward of heaven will suit each and every man:
For that being intended for a state of happiness, it must
certainly be agreeable to everyone's wish and desire;
could we suppose their relishes as different there as they
are here, yet the manna in heaven will suit everyone's
palate. Til, xxi, 6^7
Because of the relative nature of pleasure there is no summum
bonum to be pursued in this world. It is the hope of heaven alone
which can impose unity on the various actions of men:
For if there be no prospect beyond the grave, the
inference is certainly right, let us eat and drink, let
us enjoy what we delight in, for tomorrow we shall die.
16 Locke does not, as Professor Kemp suggests, "give up what
purported to be a system of ethics in favour of a system of
prudential calculations". /Reason, Action and Morality, p«247
On the interpretation given here, prudential calculation mil
consist purely in a consideration of the agent's own pleasure
and pain without any thought being given to the virtue or
vice of the action in question. It is certainly prudent for
the agent to consider his actions in terms of virtue and vice,
but this is not to say that such a consideration is identical
with prudence.
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This, I think, may serve to show us the reason why, though
all men's desires tend to happiness, yet they are not
moved by the same object. Hen may choose different
things, and yet all choose right: supposing them only
like a company of poor insects, whereof some are bees,
delighted with flowers and their sweetness; others
beetles, delighted with other kinds of viands, which,
having enjoyed for a season th#w should cease to be and
Locke's ethics is, therefore, teleological in a double sense. The
object of morality is human happiness in general. But Locke did
not make the mistake of supposing that obedience to the law must
therefore promote each agent's personal happiness. So far as the
individual is concerned, what makes virtue a proper object of
choice (indeed the most proper object of choice) is the belief
that the life of virtue in this world has as its end his own greatest
happiness in the world to come<> Locke's conception of the double
end of human existence is well expressed in a Journal entry dated
8th February, 1677:
. . . if we will consider man as in this world & that his
minde & facultys were given him for any use, we must necessarily
conclude it must be to procure him that happynesse w0*1 this
world is capable of wcn certainly is noe thing else but plenty
of all sorts of those things w0^ can with most ease pleasure
& variet.y preserve him longest in it ... It being . . .
possible & at least probable that there is an other life
where we shall give an account of our past actions in this
to the grat god of heaven & earth here comes in another and
the main grat concernment of mankinde & that is to know what
those actions are that he is to dee what those are he is to
avoid what that law is he is to live by here and shall be
judg by hereafter. /Karon and Gibb, p. 87 - 88]
We have seen that the knowledge necessary for achieving the 'main
concernment of man* cannot be divorced from that necessary for his
well-being in this world. The law according to which each individual
exist no more for ever
will be judged hereafter is the law of the temporal happiness of
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mankind.
Notwithstanding this justification of the moral point of view,
there still remains the second difficulty which we have broadly
indicated in the question, 'how is it possible the agent should ever
spontaneously choose virtue?' On Locke's defence of the reasonable¬
ness of virtue, it would appear that men coolly choose the life of
virtue on the grounds that, although it is not intrinsically
pleasant, it leads to their ultimate happiness. But this ignores
the face that men are quite capable of performing virtuous acts
spontaneously, without ever having thought on the rewards which might
be involved. If men always act with a view to their own happiness,
and if virtue is not intrinsically pleasant, how is spontaneous
virtue possible? Locke's answer to this question is very largely
dependent on the modifications he introduces in his general theory
of action in the second edition of the Essay.
In the first edition of the Essay Locke expounds the common
doctrine that a man always acts in order to attain what he apprehends
to be his greatest good. That is, on Locke's interpretation of
goodness, he acts under the aspect of -what he considers his greatest
happiness, or pleasure. Wrong action is therefore a species of
x-jrong judgement. It occurs when, through ignorance or some other
cause, a man mistakes a lesser good for a greater. In short, wrong
action is due solely to, "the weak ana narrow Constitutions of our
Kinds". /jit xxi.> 64, 1st. ed. AZ7 In the second edition, Locke
shifts the emphasis from the intellectual to the non-intellectual
roots of action:
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What Is it that determines the will in regard to our
actions? And that, upon second thoughts, I am apt to
imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greatest
good in view, but some (and for the most part the most
pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under. /lls
xxi, 3J/
Locke's modified doctrine is initiated first, by the fact that men
do often acknowledge their greatest happiness to lie in one
direction while they act in a contrary direction. Ee cites the
example of a drunkard destroying his health /ll, xxi, 357 an(* of
a man risking the loss of the eternal reward of heaven. jTtl* xxi,
447 Hence, something more than the mind's apprehension of good
is requisite to explain human action. Secondly, theoretical
considerations show that absent happiness cannot, in itself, move
the will; for, "it is against the nature of things that what is
absent should operate where it is not". 7^1, xxi, 3^7 The idea
of absent happiness can, of course, be brought before the mind;
but it can have no efficacy with respect to action unless
accompanied by an uneasiness in the agent; "Till then the fdea in
the mind of whatever is good is there only like other ideas, the
object of bare unactive speculation, but operates not on the will.
nor sets us on work". 7fbid7
Locke's conception of uneasiness, is, to say the least of it,
shadowy. At times it is presented as an empirically observable
item in our mental life; as when Locke writes, "it seems to me
evident that the will, or power of setting us upon one action in
preference to all others, is determined in us by uneasiness; and
whether this he not sc, I desire everyone to observe in himself".
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xxi, 387^ At other times he employs 'uneasiness* as a
blanket term covering various states and dispositions of the agent;
e.g., aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame /il, xxi, 3%]', hunger,
thirst, heat, cold, weariness, the desire for honour, power or
riches /il, xxi, 4^7. As it is clearly impossible to reduce all
these to a unity in one definite psychic entity, Locke's 'uneasiness'
is best understood as a theoretical construct; one which is
introduced to make good the deficiencies in his earlier theory of
action. Locke's modifications in no way replace his earlier theoryo
He still maintains the thesis that men aim at happiness in all of
their actions. It is for this very reason that uneasiness is able
to move the will. For, whatever state or states may be grouped
under the term, they are all incompatible with the agent's happiness:
... whilst we are under any uneasiness, we cannot
apprehend ourselves happy, or in the way to it: pain and
.uneasiness being . . . inconsistent with happiness,
spoiling the relish even of those good things which we
have . . . And, therefore, that which of course determines
the choice of cur will to the next action will always be
the removing of pain, as long as we have any left, as the
first and necessary step towards happiness. 51, xxi, 36/
Uneasiness, then, arises whenever a man recognizes a defect in his
own situation as vitiating or preventing his own happiness.
Uneasiness is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for
action, in that, whenever a man is conscious of any uneasiness within
17 Cf. Berkeley's pointed criticism: "Uneasiness precedes not
every Volition. This evident by experience". /Philosophical
Commentaries, 628, in Works Vol. 1, p. 77/
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himself, he will act in order to be rid of it. Nevertheless, Locke
does not suppose men inevitably determined by the first uneasiness
they perceive. The intellectual element in action is not, or at
least need not be, superseded by the feeling of uneasiness. Acc¬
ording to Locke, human freedom lies in the capacity which the mind
has for standing back from what happens to be the most pressing
uneasiness of the moment, and deciding whether the action prompted
by that uneasiness really does accord with the true happiness of
the agent:
. . • the mind, having in most cases, as is evident in
experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction
of any of its desires, and so all, one after another, is at
liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all
sides, and weight them with others. In this lies the
liberty man has; and from the not using of it right comes
all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we
run into in the conduct of our lives and our endeavours
after happiness, whilst we precipitate the determination
of our wills and engage too soon before due examination.
ZTi, xxi, 42/
There is still an uneasiness at the back of the action the agent does
finally perform; but the uneasiness is now a desire for the object
1 s
which best suits his idea of happiness.
18 This hardly saves Locke from the charge that his theory of
action is thoroughly determinist. The suspension of the
operation of desire on a particular occasion would appear' it¬
self to be an action. According to Locke's theory, then, it
must be prompted by some uneasiness. If the uneasiness
involved is the one which happens to be the most pressing, it
must be conceded that men are determined by the desire which
becomes uppermost in their perception. If, on the other hand,
it is supposed that the act of suspending desire might itself
be preceded by a suspension of desire, a vicious infinite
regress is generated. The suspension of desire in which
'lies the liberty man has' will then render action impossible.
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As well as a capacity to suspend the immediate operation of
uneasiness, the mind is able to generate uneasiness from the con¬
templation of that which it judges to be good:
• . • by a due consideration, and examining any good
proposed, it is in our power to raise our desires in a
due proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its
turn and place it may come to work upon the will and be
pursued. /ll, xxi, 46/
In this way a man who understands the eternal bliss of heaven to
comprise his greatest good can make himself uneasy when separated
from the means to that end. That is, he can cultivate in himself
a genuine desire to act virtuously and to avoid viceo Thus Locke
writes; "the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires,
the moderation and restraint of our passions, so that our under¬
standings may be free to examine, and reason unbiased give its
judgement, being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to
true happiness depends: it is in this we should employ our chief
care . . . and not permit an allowed or supposed possible great and
weighty good to slip out of our thoughts . . . till by a due
consideration of its true worth, we have formed appetities in out'
minds suitable to it, and made ourselves uneasy in the want of it,
or in the fear of losing it". JYL, xxi, 5^7 In other words, Locke
holds that the agent can, and should, make himself into a person who
needs to act virtuously. For such a man virtue becomes a good;
at least it is a good in the negative sense of being something the
lack of which makes his happiness impossible* It would be highly
inappropriate to call such a man self-interested in Ms actions*
On the contrary, he has taken on virtue as a necessary component in
294
Ms own happiness and is properly a virtuous man.
Locke's modified theory of action, with its emphasis on the
state of uneasiness rather than the intellectual apprehension of
happiness, does go part of the way towards an explanation of
spontaneous virtuous action. Yet it does not go the whole way.
Locke's account presupposes a complex operation of the understanding©
Beginning from the judgement that the pleasures of heaven must
constitute his greatest possible happiness (and that the punishment
of vice must constitute Ms greatest pain), the agent trains himself
to value those things which are the means to that supreme happiness
and to feel uneasy when they are absent from his life© Virtue,
therefore, is a good to the agent, but only in the secondary sense
that pleasure 'is looked on to be a consequent of it*. However,
men do sometimes claim, with apparent sincerity, to take pleasure
in the actual performance of virtuous actions. Locke's theory
leaves this phenomenon in obscurity; for here it seems the pleas¬
antness of virtue itself moves the will, irrespective of any
precedent opei'ation of the understanding. Locke can meet this
objection; but Ms answer is not to be found in the theory of action
detailed in the Essay© It is most clearly expressed in the educ¬
ational theory expounded in Some Thoughts concerning Education.
19 Here a further parallel might be drawn with Pascal's Yager.
According to Pascal, those who wager in favour of God's
existence and live their lives accordingly will in time
acquire faith and become truly religious© See Op.Pit©, p. 152©
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Locke believes thai a man has the ability to train himself
to need virtueo He also believes that the child may be similarly
trained by the educator. The' most important object in education
is not the learned man, but the virtuous character:
' Tis Vertue . . . direct Vertue, which is the hard and
valuable part to be aimed at in Education . . . This is
the solid and substantial good, which . . . the Labour,
and Art of Education should furnish the Mind with, and
fasten there, and never cease till the young Man had a
true relish of it, and placed his Strength, his Glory,
and his Pleasure in ito /Education. § 70/
How then is virtue to be inculcated? According to Locke, the first
necessity is to teach the child self-denial. For "our Natural
Propensity to indulge Corporal and present Pleasure, and to avoid
Pain at any rate . . . is the Root from whence spring all Vitious
Actions". /Education. § 48/ Conversely, "the great Principle
and Foundation of all Vertue . . .is placed in this, That a Man
is able to deny himself his own Desires, cross his own Inclinations,
and purely follow what Reason directs as best, tho' the Appetite
lean the other way". /Education. § 5^7 However, were the child
brought to deny his natural inclination to present pleasure out of
nothing more than a fear of greater corporal pain in the future,
the purpose of education would be defeated. On the contrary, the
power of denying oneself immediate enjoyment provides an effective
foundation for virtuous conduct only when it is internalized,
when it is, "got and improved by Custom, made easy and familiar
by an early Practice". /Education. § 58~J This is not to be
achieved by physical rewards and punishment, but principally by
praise and blame. The child naturally finds pleasure in the esteem
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shown Jiim by others, and pain in their contempt. The educator
is, therefore, to suit his expressions of esteem and contempt
respectively to the virtues he would nurture and the vices he would
eradicate:
If by these Means you can come once to shame them out
of their Faults (for besides that, I would willingly
have no Punishment) and make them in love with the
Pleasure of being well thought on, you may turn them
as you please, and they will be in love with all the
ways of Vertue. /Education. § 587
The successfully educated agent remains a creature motivated solely
by uneasiness, one whose actions are all orientated towards his
own happiness. But he has been moulded in such a way that his
happiness acquires a specific content, and his uneasiness takes on
a definite object. For him pleasure is not merely seen as the
final consequence of a virtuous action, but as accompanying that
.. 20
action.
The major thdme of this chapter has been the relation between
moral judgements and action, a theme which has occupied an increas¬
ingly prominent position in moral philosophy over the last few
decades. We will end with a brief synopsis of the theory which
20 The implications of Locke1s theory of moral education and its
importance in the history of ideas have been admirably dealt
with by J. A. Passmore, in "The Malleability of Man in Eight-
teenth-Century Thought", /Aspects of the Eighteenth Century.
ed. Wasserman/. See also, Passmore's The Perfectibility of
Man, esp. pp. 159 - 163. I have discussed the Lockean theory
as it is taken over and developed by Mandeville, in "Bernard
Mandeville and the Reality of Virtue", /Philosophy, 19727
29?
has emerged during the preceding discussion.
Within Locke's moral philosophy there is clearly no room for
a dynamic property internally related to moral judgements. The
acknowledgement of the virtue or the vice of an action cannot, "by
itself, move the agent's will. Moral rectitude and moral pravity
are in themselves neither good nor evil, there being nothing
inherently pleasant in a virtuous act, or painful in a vicious
one. Therefore, a moral judgement can serve to prompt action
only when virtue is connected with pleasure, and vice connected
with pain, in the mind of the agent. The agent himself may forge
this connexion by contemplating the object of his ultimate
happiness and the means whereby it can be obtained. It may also
be created in the agent's consciousness by the art of the educator.
Either way it is not the moral judgement on its own which initiates
action, but the judgement in a context ;'pf acquired desires and
propensities.
Finally, can we say, within the terms of Locke's theory, that
a moral judgement ever gives a man a reason for acting in one way
rather than another? Taken in one sense, the answer is 'no'. A
man may agree that an action is vicious, or that it is virtuous, yet
disagree that he has been provided with a reason for acting. As
all men constantly aim at their own happiness, no consideration can
be seen by the agent as a reason for acting unless it in some way.
involves the furtherance of his happiness. Nevertheless, there is
a sense in which a moral judgement does stand as a reason for action.
When he makes a moral judgement (or acquiesces in one made by another)
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the agent sees the object of judgement from the moral point of viewo
He thus acknowledges an obligation to act in accord with the
judgements. The consequences of this is that in justifying his
action, either to himself or to others, he need but repeat the
judgement# Once the judgement is articulated, his account of why
he did what he did is complete# Here an analogy with a game like
chess helps to clarify the situation. Suppose someone observing
a game of chess asks one of the players why he made a certain move,
and is told that the move, either directly or indirectly, results
in checkmate. So long as the observer understands chess, he has
been given a complete explanation of, and justification for, the
move in question. If he does not understand chess, then the rules
and the aim of the game must be explained to him. But even with
this knowledge the observer might go on to ask why people play chess
in the first place# Generally this will be a trivial question,
and its answer the trivial one that people play chess because they
enjoy it« Analogously, an agent might be asked why he performed
a certain action, and reply that, when seen from a moral point of
view, the action is of a specific kind# In general, this answer
will count as a complete explanation, and justification for, the
action in question. However, he may be asked further why he looks
at his actions from the moral point of view# Here a quite different
explanation is being demanded. Granted that, if one does take on
morality, certain factors constitute reasons for actions just as, if
one plays chess, certain factors constitute reasons for moves, but
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why should one be moral in the first place? This question is
obviously very far from trivial. Some philosophers have been
willing to dismiss it as logically incoherent, while others have
tended to think it morally wicked. Locke, however, sees it as a
question which must be answered if the practice of morality is to
have any basis® As God has made men such that they desire
happiness above all else, the only satisfactory answer must be
one given in terms of happiness. The practice of morality promotes
both the happiness of men in this world and. the ultimate happiness.
of each virtuous man in the next world:
I place Vertue as the first and most necessary of those
Endowments, that belong to a Man . . ® as absolutely
requisite to make him valued and beloved by others9
acceptable or tolerable to himself® Without that I
think, he will be happy neither in this, nor the other
World® /Education, 8 13^7
CONCLUSION
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Any philosopher, no matter what his chosen field of enquiry,
is subject to two basic demands: he must be consistent in his
thoughts and what he says must be adequate to the phenomena under
investigation. One of the major contentions in the foregoing
thesis has been that, despite the weight of contrary critical
opinione, Locke is consistent in his thoughts on morality. In
conclusion we will very briefly consider the second demand: Does
Locke's theory constitute an adequate account of moral phenomena?
Questions of the adequacy of philosophical theories are
always difficult to answer. For the demand that a theory be
adequate is by no means clear-cut, and this is especially so in
moral philosophy. The concepts we bring to bear in cur endeavours
to explain the diverse phenomena which have a claim to the title of
morality unavoidably influence our general view of the phenomena
under investigation. Consequently, it is not the case that there
are a number of different moral theories put forward by moral
philosophers, each of which may be measured against a set of
agreed facts. Rather, each theory includes its own account of
what the moral facts really are, of what morality is in its essence.
The result is a number of competing pictures of morality. The
acceptability or otherwise of these pictures most often depends on
facts which are themselves outside the phenomena of morality.
Locke is consciously putting forward one type of moral theory.
There are, he realises, other types; but these he believes to be
erroneous:
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That men should keep their compacts is certainly a great
and undeniable rule in morality<> But yet, if a Christian,
who has the view of happiness and misery in another life,
be asked why a man must keep his word, he will give this
as a reason; because God, who has the power of eternal
life and death, requires it of us, But if a Hobbist be
asked why, he will answer: because the public requires
it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not. And
if one of the old heathen philosophers had been asked, he
would have answered: because it was dishonest, below the
dignity of a man, and opposite to virtue, the highest
perfection of human nature, to do otherwise. ]_I, iii,
Locke sees both the Hobbist and the Stoic as giving mistaken accounts
of morality. The correct answer is that which he understands as
being given by the Christian, The existence of a God who has
created man and issued laws for his guidance is the key fact in
Locke's entire moral theory. Morality is a matter of law, a law
which is above any and every positive enactment or institution of
mankind. Were there no authority with competence to deliver such
a supreme law, morality could have no existence. Locke states
this opinion clearly at the beginning of the first of the Essays
on the Law of Nature:
I assume there will be no one to deny the existence of
God, provided he recognizes either the necessity for
some rational account of our life, or that there is a
thing that deserves to be called virtue or vice.
/Essays, p. 10
We have discovered nothing in Locke1s subsequent writings to indicate
that he ever revised the opinion expressed in the early years of
his philosophical career,
Locke's moral theory remains strictly theological. The one
fact which dominates his picture of morality in Ms early un¬
published works and in his mature philosophy is the existence of
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God. However, Locke escapes the objection so often urged as a
decisive refutation of any morality founded on the existence of
Godo His theological picture does not reduce morality to a
series of arbitrary commands expressing nothing but the whim of
an omnipotent beingo The fact that it is God who enacts tho
moral law constitubes the form of moral obligation; the matter
of moral obligation derives from the way man himself is, and pre¬
eminently from the fact that all men desire happiness. Considered
with regard to its content, morality is a system of laws the final
object of which is the happiness of mankind in general.
The picture of morality as a system of laws does mislead
Locke in one important respect. It encourages his belief in the
possibility of a demonstratively certain morality. Traditionally,
the moral law of nature was looked upon as one aspect of the over¬
all order of the universe, Locke assumes the universal order in
its physical aspect to be somehow logically necessary. Given this
assumption, it is quite natural for him to make the transition from
logical necessity in the physical order to logical necessity in the
corresponding moral order. We saw that Locke's ambitions for a
demonstration of morality led him into an intellectual cul-de-saco
His thesis that moral notions are similar to mathematical notions
in that they can be precisely and completely defined by an
enumeration of elements is mistaken. Once this mistake is realized,
the whole idea of a system of morals exhibited in accordance with
Locke's method of demonstrations loses plausibility.
Locke's "belief that morality might be demonstrated also
suggests the picture of a timeless moral order* Morality is a
whole made up of parts, each one of which is essential to the
vholeo It might be seen as analogous to a mosaic constructed
from interlocking segments, each segment being necessary to the
completed design. This kind of picture did have an appeal for
Locke and his contemporaries. After all, morality, or the law
of nature, was seen as God's designo Nevertheless, this is not
the only picture to have emerged from our examination of Locke's
moral theory. His account of moral notions and his insistence
(especially prevalent in his mature writings) on the connexion
between morality and human happiness, suggests a somewhat different
picture. Moral notions are human constructs formed to accord with
the interests of men. This does not mean that morality has no
objective warranty. Moral notions signify actions and the motive
constantly at the back of human action is the desire for happiness.
Moral notions (at least, well-formed moral notions) categorise
actions on the grounds of their tendency to promote or hinder the
happiness of mankind. As it is God who has implanted the ruling
hedonistic drive in human nature, it is clear that God wills men to
regulate their conduct in ways which will promote happiness. This
picture does not represent the morality as a mosaic of interconnected
laws. Rather, the law of nature appears to consist in rules for
the attainment of a specific end, i.e. happiness. It is this which
gives shape to the various precepts of the law; for it indicates,
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in a broad manner, the content to be included in all moral notionso
Such a picture introduces a certain flexibility into moralityo
Moral notions are not presented as reflections of a timeless (and
therefore a rigid) order, but as products of man's attempts to
cope with the human situationo Morality, we might say, derives
from experiments in living. God, of course, continues to occupy
the dominant position in this second picture of morality. Were
there no God and no law set by God, human happiness could not be
the end of morality. Men might still strive after happiness,
but their endeavours would be completely lacking in moral sig¬
nificance.
The picture of morality as an activity aimed at happiness
has, needless to say, been of tremendous influence in the history
of moral philosophy. This is especially so if we consider moral
theories developed by philosophers influenced by Locke. Never¬
theless, there are rival pictures. It is often said that morality
can neither be based on the existence of God nor have any object
outside of itself. Moral judgements are sul generis. To suppose
that a moral judgement can be entailed by a non-moral fact, or set
of non-moral facts, is to misconceive the nature of morality.
However, a discussion of this picture is far beyond the scope of
our present enquiry. So far as the examination of Locke's moral
philosophy is concerned, it should be pointed out that the picture
of morality as something absolutely autonomous is no more than a
rival to Locke's picture; it does not supplant or refute Locke.
Ind.eed, one of the most interesting developments in recent moral
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philosophy has been the trenchant criticism of the doctrine of
autonomous morality, and the re-emergence of a teleological, and
even theological, view of morals. Thus, Locke's moral philosophy
is not to he dismissed as a relic which is worth dusting only in
order to exhibit its antique colours. For all.its manifest
faults, what Locke has to say on the subject of morality is just
as suggestive and fruitful in the present climate of opinion as
it was at the end of the seventeenth-centuryo
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